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L INTRODUCTION
The 1967 United States Supreme Court decision In re
Gaultl precipitated a procedural revolution that has transformed the juvenile court into a legal institution very different
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I benefitted from the critical comments of a number of colleagues who reviewed an earlier draft of this
Article, including Ms. Kathy Bishop and Professors Daniel Farber, Richard
Frase, and Robert Levy. Of course, they bear no responsibility for my failure to
heed their advice. This Article could not have been completed without the research contributions of a number of students whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged, including Maria Wyant Cuzzo, Gadi Hill, Elizabeth Neufeld-Smith"
Polly Peterson, Jeff Saunders, Agnes Schipper, Ann Underbrink, and Mary Ann
Wray.
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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from that envisioned by its Progressive creators. 2 In the years
since Gaut4 states have struggled to bring the administration
of their juvenile courts into harmony with the requirements of
the Constitution, 3 aided by professional commentary and the
continuing evolution of juvenile procedural due process
requirements.
This Article studies the effects of these efforts on the juvenile justice system. The Article briefly reviews the Progressive
conception of the juvenile court and examines both the
changes resulting from the Supreme Court's due process decisions and the legislative impetus those decisions provided.
Then, through consideration of recent efforts such as Minnesota's new Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court,4 the Article
analyzes the contemporary juvenile court, examines the extent
to which it has departed from its original conception, and assesses its criminalization and its convergence with adult criminal courts. The Article concludes that the juvenile court has
been effectively criminalized in that its current administrative
assumptions and operations are virtually indistinguishable
from those of adult criminal courts. At the same time, however,
the procedures of the juvenile court often provide protections
for juveniles less adequate than those afforded adult criminal
defendants. As a result, juveniles receive the worst of both
worlds, and the reasons for the very existence of a separate juvenile court are called into question.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE PROGRESSIVE JUVENILE COURT

Between 1870 and World War I, the railroads changed
2. For various interpretations of the development of the juvenile justice
system, see generally J. INVERAR-TY, P.

LAUDERDALE & B. FELD, LAw AND SOCIETY: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRIMINAL LAW 173 (1983); A. PLATT, THE
CHITSAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); D. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE
AMERICA (1980); E. RYERSON, THE BEsT-LAiD PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE
COURT EXPERIMENT (1978); S. SCHLOssMAN, LOVE AND THE AMERICAN DEUNQUEN. THE THEORY AND PRACTCE OF "PROGRESSIVE" JUVENILE JUSTICE 18251920 (1977); JUVENILE JUSTICE: THE PROGRESSIVE LEGACY AND CURRENT REFORMS (L. Empey ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE], FOX, Juve-

nile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187 (1970);
Mack, The Juvenile Court 23 HAv. L. REV. 104 (1909).
3. See, e.g., Note, Minnesota Juvenile Court Rules: Brightening One World
for Juveniles, 54 MINN. L. REV. 303, 303 (1969).
4. The Rules were promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court on December 17, 1982, and became effective on May 1, 1983. See infra notes 81-87 and
accompanying text.
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America from an agrarian to an industrial society by fostering
economic growth, changing the processes of manufacturing,
and ushering in a period of rapid economic modernization.5 Simultaneously, traditional social patterns faced challenges as
new immigrants, primarily from southern and eastern Europe,
and rural Americans flooded into the burgeoning cities and
crowded into ethnic enclaves and urban slums.6 Overburdened

by numbers, cities proved unable to provide even basic needs.7
As a result, urban ghettos, poverty, congestion, disorder, crime,
and inadequate social services accompanied the development
of modern urban industrial life.
Accompanying these developments were changes in family
structure and function, including a reduction in the number
and spacing of children, a shift of economic functions from the
family to other work environments, and a modernization and
privatization of the family that substantially modified the roles
of women and children. 8 The lbtter development was espe5. See generallyT. COCHRAN, BusINEss IN AMERICAN LIFE (1972); S. HAYS,
THE RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIALISM 1885-1914 (1957); R. HOFsTADTER, THE AGE OF
REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.RI (1955); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATism: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (1963); D. NOBLE,
AMERICA BY DESIGN: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE RISE OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM (1977); H. THORELLU, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRusT POLICY (1954); A.
TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA (1982); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE 1900-1918 (1968); H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH
FOR ORDER 1877-1920 (1967).
6. The "new immigrants" differed in language, religion, political heritage,
and culture from the dominant Anglo-Protestant Americans. They predominantly were peasants, and their cultural and linguistic differences from the
dominant culture, coupled with their numbers, hindered their assimilation.
See, e.g, a. HOFSTADTER, supra note 5, at 8. See generally U.S. BuREAu OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970
(Bicentennial ed. 1976) (statistics about immigration and the changing
demographics of the United States population).
7. See, e.g., W. TRATrNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY
OF SocIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 135 (3d ed. 1984); H. WILENSKY & C. LEBEAUx,
INDusTRIAL SOCIETY AND Socr WELFARE 115-32 (1958). The needs of the urban masses increased by the end of the nineteenth century because of changes
in the economic structure and the difficulties of assimilation created by linguistic and cultural difference. See, e.g., H. HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: PATTERNS OF AMERICAN NATrvisM, 1860-1925, at 87 (1974); R. HoFsTsnAra, supra
note 5, at 8.
8. See, e.g., J. KE=r, RrrEs OF PASSAGE: ADOLESCENCE IN AMERIcA 1790 TO
THE PRESENT 114-16 (1977); Hareven, The Dynamics of Kin in an Industrial
Community, in TURNING POINTS: HSTRmcAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ESSAYS ON THE
FAMILY 151 (J. Demos & S. Boocock eds. 1978); Hareven & Vinovskis, Patternsof

Childbearingin Late Nineteenth-Century America: The Determinantsof Marital Fertilityin Five MassachusettsTowns in 1880, in FAMILY AND Pox'uATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 85 (T. Hareven & M. Vimovskis eds. 1978). But
see C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 9, 178-209 (1980) (industrialization is an inade-
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cially noticeable in the upper and middle classes, which had
begun to view children as corruptible innocents whose upbringing required special attention, solicitude, and instruction. 9 As a
result, women, especially in the middle and upper classes, assumed a greater role in supervising the child's moral and social
development.10
At the same time, the general social and economic
quate explanation of the mid-nineteenth century decline in fertility; that decline is caused by women's "increasing consciousness of themselves as
individuals" and, consequently, their desire to control reproduction). See generally C. LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED 6-10
(1977) (effects on family life of the nineteenth-century emancipation of women
and the growth of industrialization); E. SHORTER, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
FAMILY 205-68 (1975) (explaining changes in family life as consequences of the
growth of laissez-faire capitalism); Wells, Women's Lives Transformed: Demographic and Family Patterns in America, 1600-1970, in WOMEN IN AMERICA: A
HISTORY 16, 18-24 (C. Berkin & M. Norton eds. 1979) (comparing changes in
household structure and women's place in that structure to the increase in life
expectancies, the decrease in fertility, and the migration to the cities that resulted from industrialization).
9. See generally P. Auits, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD 329 (1962) (summarizing the development of the "modern theory" of childhood that suggests that
children are not small adults, but rather that childhood is a separate stage of
development); C. DEGLER, supra note 8, at 86-110 (change in child-rearing methods of nineteenth century related to new perception of children as innocent
and trainable); J. GiLms, YOUTH AND HISTORY: TRADITION AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN AGE RELATIONS 1770-PRESENT 98-105 (1974) (concern for children extended to older youths); D. HUNT, PARENTS AND CHILDREN IN HISTORY: THE

33-36 (1970) (slow
emergence of the concept of "childhood" in France, beginning in the Middle
Ages and attaining full realization during the ancien regime); J. KETT, supra
note 8, at 109-43 (origins of the idea of "adolescence" from 1840-1880); B. WISHY,
THE CHILD AND THE REPUBLIC 94-114 (1968) (new ideas of childhood and child
rearing as reflected in children's books and child-rearing manuals for parents
from 1860-1900); deMause, The Evolution of Childhood, in THE HISTORY OF
CHILDHOOD 1 (L. deMause ed. 1974) (noting the gradual shift from a norm of
physical and sexual abuse of children to one promoting socialization; the new
norm viewed children as malleable creatures to be trained by adults to conform
to societal mores).
Childhood as a recognizable developmental stage is a recent phenomenon.
Prior to the past two or three centuries, there was neither a fully separate,
highly valued social status based on age nor a corresponding age segregation.
Young people were perceived as miniature adults or inadequate versions of
their parents who did not require any special protection or discrete legal status.
Even in the early nineteenth century the newer views of children were only beginning to alter child-rearing practices. This trend was accentuated as commercial and industrial developments enabled young people to achieve economic
independence. See Marks, Detours on the Road to Maturity: A View of the
Legal Conception of Growing Up and Letting Go, 39 LAw &CONTEMP. PROBs. 78,
80 (1975). By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the preparation of
children for adult roles and their autonomous departures from home became
much more restrictive. See authorities cited supra notes 2 &8.
10. See, e.g., A- PLATT, supra note 2, at 75-83; see also B. WISHY, supra note
9, at 116 (discussing increased role of mothers in child development).
PSYCHOLOGY OF FAMILY LIFE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE

JUVENILE JUSTICE

1984]

problems sparked the Progressive Movement." Progressivism
included a host of ideologies and addressed issues ranging
from economic regulation to criminal justice and political reform.12 A unifying theme, however, was the development by
professionals and experts of rational and scientific solutions
that would be administered by the State.13 Progressive reliance on the State reflected a fundamental belief that state action could be benevolent, that government could rectify social
problems, and that Progressive values could be inculcated in
others.14
The Progressive trust of state power combined with
changes in the cultural conceptions of children and child-rearing to lead Progressives into the realm of "child-saving"--child
11.
12.

See generally authorities cited supra note 5.
See generallyB. BRNmGHURsr, ANIT'RusT AND THE OIL MONOPOLY (1979)

(antitrust); L CREm, THE TRANsFORmATIoN OF THE SCHOOu PRoGREssrVisM IN

AmERIcAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961)

(compulsory education); G. KOLKO,

RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965) (railroad regulation); D. ROTHmAN,
supranote 2 (criminal justice reform); H. THORELLI, supra note 5 (antitrust); S.
TIFFIN, IN WHOSE BEST INTEREST? CHILD WELFARE REFORM IN THE PROGRESSIVE
ERA (1982) (child welfare); W. TRATINER, CRUSADE FOR THE CHILDREN: A HisTORY OF THE NATIONAL CHILD LABOR COMIUTrEE AND CMLD LABOR REFORM IN
NEW YORK STATE (1965) (child labor laws); W. TRATrNER, supra note 7 (urban
welfare reform); P, WIEBE, BuSINESSMEN AND REFORM (1962) (business regulation); Hays, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the Progressive
Era,PAC. Nw. Q., Oct 1964, at 152 ("good government").
13. See, e.g., S. HAYS, supra note 5, at 156; R. WHIBE, supra note 5, at 166-70.
Professors Hays and Wiebe attribute Progressive reforms to the newly emerging middle class of college-educated technocrats, corporate managers, and professionals who viewed the decline of the older order as an opportunity to
realize their own potentials through the development of rational, scientific, and
managerial solutions to a host of social problems. See S. HAYS, supranote 5, at
73-74; R. WIEBE, supra note 5, at 111-32. This interpretation explains the role of
the detached, objective professional and scientific rationality and expertise that
recurs throughout most Progressive reform efforts. See Kennedy, Overview:
The ProgressiveEra, 37 HISTORIAN 453, 460 (1975); Stone, A Spectre is Haunting
America: An Interpretationof Progressivism,3 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 239, 243-44
(1979). There have been extensive and often conflicting interpretations of the

origins and goals of the Progressive reformers. CompareR. HoFsTADTER, supra
note 5 and Kennedy, supra (Progressive era was an era of transition) with R.
supra note 5 and G. KoLuo, supranote 5 (emphasizing conservative aspects of Progressivism).
14. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE
BORDERLAND OF CRHINAL JUSTICE 25, 26-27 (1964) [hereinafter cited as BoRWIEBE,

F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEALT PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 11-15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as F. ALLEN, DECLINEJ; D.
DERLAND];

RoTmAN, supra note 2, at 60-61; Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal

in American Criminal Justice,27 CLEv. ST. L REv. 147, 150-51 (1978). Progressives felt no reservations when they attempted to "Americanize" the immigrants and poor through a variety of agencies of assimilation and acculturation
to become sober, virtuous, middle-class Americans. D. RorEmtAN, supra note 2,
at 49.
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labor laws, child welfare laws, compulsory education laws, and
the juvenile court system.I5 The Progressive programs were intended to structure child development and to control and mold
children while protecting them from exploitation. The goals
and the methods of these programs, however, often reflected
antipathy to the immigrant hordes and a desire to save the second generation from perpetuating the old world ways.16
Similarly, the development of new theories about human
behavior and social deviance led Progressives to new views on
criminal justice and social control policies.' 7 The Progressives
saw crime not as a product of the deliberate exercise of an individual's free wil1 8 but as a result of external, antecedent

forces.19 They focused, therefore, on reforming the offender
15. As one author noted, many Progressive programs shared a unifying
child-centered theme. 'The child was the carrier of tomorrow's hope whose innocence and freedom made him singularly receptive to education in rational,
humane behavior. Protect him, nurture him, and in his manhood he would create that bright new world of the progressives' vision." R. WIEBE, supra note 5,
at 169; see also J. KErr, supra note 8, at 226-27 (many groups were instrumental
in structuring the activities of children); REPORT OF PANEL ON YOUTH OF THE
PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITrEE, YOUTH: TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD

34 (1974) [hereinafter cited as YOUTH: TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD] (the United
States adopted a variety of laws to protect children against dangerous labor
and neglect, to require them to attend school, and to secure for them a better
future); D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 206-07 (Progressives attempted to influence immigrant children to adopt the American way of life); E. RYERSON, supra
note 2, at 27-31 (the establishment of the juvenile court was an outgrowth of a
more comprehensive child-study movement, based on a view of children as innocents); S. Tnurn, supra note 12, at 61-83 (institutional child care in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was based on children's innocence and
malleability of character); Schlossman & Wallach, The Crime of Precocious Sexuality: Female Juvenile Delinquency in the Progressive Era, 48 HARv. EDUc.
REv. 65, 67 (1978) (girls were discriminated against in the early twentieth century juvenile court because it was believed that they needed more protection
than boys).
16. See Empey, Introduction. The Social Construction of Childhood and
Juvenile Justice, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDHOOD AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 19-21

(L. Empey ed. 1979); Empey, The ProgressiveLegacy and the Concept of Childhood, in JuvENILE JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 3, 25-28. All four of these reforms-

child labor laws, child welfare laws, compulsory education requirements, and
the juvenile court system-reflected the central Progressive assumption that
the ideal way to prepare children for life was to strengthen the nuclear family,
shield children from adult roles, and formally educate them for upward mobility. See, e.g., D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 206-09; YOUTH: TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD, supra note 15, at 25.
17. See D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 43.
18.

See, e.g., D. MATzA, DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT 5 (1964); D. ROTHMAN,

supra note 2, at 50-51.
19. The new criminology, as distinguished from the old theory of "free
will," asserted a scientific determinism of deviance and sought to identify the
causal variables producing crime and deliquency. In its quest for scientific legitimacy, criminology borrowed both methodology and vocabulary from the
medical profession. Medical metaphors such as pathology, infection, diagnosis,
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rather than on punishing the offense. 20 The result was the "Rehabilitative Ideal" that permeated all Progressive criminal justice reforms. 21 The Ideal emphasized open-ended, informal,
and highly flexible policies so that the criminal justice professional had the discretion necessary to formulate individualized,
case-by-case strategies for rehabilitating the deviant.2 2
and treatment were popular analogues for criminal justice professionals, who
also prescribed an individualized approach to the diagnosis and cure of each
offender. See, eg, A. PLATr, supra note 2, at 18; D. Ro'mA, supra note 2, at
56.
20. See E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 22. These deterministic interpretations of human behavior caused a redirection of research efforts in order to
identify the causes of crime by scientifically studying the offender, because the
ability to identify the causes of crime also implied the correlative ability to
"cure" crime. Although early positivistic criminology attributed criminal behavior to hereditary and biological factors, these views were soon challenged
by social and environmental explanations of crime. The social science professionals in psychology, sociology, and social work who were emerging from colleges and universities acquired a professional stake in environmental
explanations of deviance, because environmental factors allowed for greater
possibilities of intervention and cure than did imperious biological determinism. See, e.g., J. HAwES, CHILDREN I URBAN SOCIETY: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 192 (1971); R. LUBOVE, THE PROFESSiONAL AL-

TRUIS 56 (1967); A. PLATr,supra note 2, at 53; E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 2h
W. TRATrN-a, supra note 7, at 186. The environmental interpretations of deviance attributed deviance to the social and economic conditions associated with
immigrant ghettos and urban slums into which the benefits of the American society could not penetrate. Environmentalists emphasized the impacts of industrialization and urbanization in the process of crime causation. Although there
was always a touch of moralism condemning those who succumbed to these
deleterious influences, there was also an appreciation of the vulnerability of the
urban poor to economic forces and social conditions beyond their control See,
e.g., E. RYERsoN, supra note 2, at 24.
21. These reforms included increased use of probation and indeterminate
sentencing, parole supervision following release, and the juvenile court. See F.
ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Idea in BORDERLAND, supra note
14, at 25, 26; see also F. ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 14, at 6 (twentieth century

innovations in criminal justice reflect the Rehabilitiave Ideal); Allen, supra
note 14, at 149 (same).
22. A pervasive feature of all Progressive criminal justice reforms was discretionary decision making by experts. Discretion was necessary because identifying the causes and prescribing the cures for delinquency required an
individualized approach that precluded uniformity of treatment or standardization of criteria. See D. Romum, supra note 2, at 54. It is probably not coincidental that the increased flexibility, indeterminacy, and discretion in social
control practices corresponded to the increasing volume and changing characteristics of offenders during this period. See id.at 77; see also Feld, supra note
2, at 182 (discretion afforded flexibility in social control of immigrants and their
children).
A flourishing Rehabilitative Ideal requires both a belief in the maleability
of human behavior and a basic moral consensus about the appropriate directions of human change. It also requires agreement about means and ends, the
goals of change, and the strategies necessary to achieve them. Progressives believed that the new sciences of human behavior provided them with the tools
for systematic human change. They also believed in the virtues of the social
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The juvenile court was based on this Rehabilitative Ideal.
It was conceived as a specialized, bureaucratic agency, staffed
by experts and designed to serve the needs of a specific category of client: the "child at risk," whether offender, dependent,
or neglected. The juvenile court professionals were to make
discretionary, individualized treatment decisions to achieve benevolent goals and social uplift by substituting a scientific and
preventative approach for the traditional punitive philosophy of
the criminal law. 2 3 The legal justification for intervention was
parens patriae-the right and responsibility of the state to substitute its own control over children for that of the natural parents when the latter were unable or unwilling to meet their
responsibilities or when the child posed a community crime
problem. 24 The parens patriae doctrine drew no distinction beorder and the propriety of imposing the values of a middle-class lifestyle on immigrants and the poor. See F. ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal, in BORDERLAND, supra note 14, at 25.
23. See Hazard, The Jurisprudenceof Juvenile Deviance, in PURSUING JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 4 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as PURSUING
JUSTICE]; Mennel, Attitudes and Policies Toward Juvenile Delinquency in the
United States: A HistorigraphicalReview, in 4 CRIME AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 191,
207-15 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1983); Platt, The Triumph of Benevolence: The
Origins of the Juvenile Justice System in the United States, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE
IN AMERICA 356, 377-84 (R. Quinney ed. 1974); Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile
Court History, 19 CRIME & DELINQ. 457, 458-59 (1973). See generally authorities
cited supra note 2.
Many of the characteristics of the Progressive juvenile court can be traced
to the Houses of Refuge that emerged in the first third of the nineteenth century. The Houses were the first specialized agency for the control of youth.
See, e.g., H. FINESTONE, VICTIMS OF CHANGE: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 25-27 (1976); J. HAWES, supra note 20, at 144-45; J. KETr, supra note
8, at 122, 222; R. MENNEL, THORNS AND THISTLES: JUVENILE DELINQUENTS IN TIHE
UNITED STATES 1825-1940, at 130-35 (1973); R. PICKETr, HOUSE OF REFUGE: ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM IN NEW YORK STATE 1815-1857, at v (1969); D. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN THE NEW

REPUBLIC 207 (1971); Fox, supra note 2, at 1187-89, 1207-12. One authority contends that
developments in the 19th century laid the foundation for the subsequent development of the juvenile justice system in the United
States.... [L]egislation establishing the juvenile court in Chicago
did no more than formalize long-standing practices for dealing with
[I] n almost every state the legal and ideologijuveniles in Illinois ....
cal innovations typically associated with the juvenile court (e.g., the extension of legal control over noncriminal children, the denial of due
process, and the legalization of the rehabilitative ideal) had occurred
before the advent of children's courts, as a result of earlier legislation
establishing juvenile reformatories.
Sutton, Social Structure, Institutions,and the Legal Status of Children in the
United States, 88 AM. J. Soc. 915, 917 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of
"ParensPatriae,"22S.C.L. REV. 147, 181 (1970); Curtis, The Checkered Careerof
ParensPatriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 895, 901-02
(1976); Pisciotta, Saving the Children: The Promise and Practice of Parens Pa-
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tween criminal and noncriminal youth conduct, a view that
supported the Progressive position that juvenile court proceedings were civil rather than criminal in nature. The civil nature
of the proceedings fulfilled the reformers' desire to remove children from the adult criminal system and allowed greater supervision of the children and greater flexibility in treatment.2 5
Because the reformers eschewed punishment, they could reach
behavior such as smoking, sexual activity, truancy, immorality,
stubbornness, vagrancy, or living a wayward, idle, and dissolute
life-behavior that had previously been ignored but that the
Progressives wished to end because it betokened premature
adulthood.26 Such "status jurisdiction" reflected the dominant
concept of childhood and adolescence that had taken root during the nineteenth century and authorized predelinquent intervention to forestall premature adulthood, enforce the
dependent conditions of youth, and supervise children's moral
triae, 1838-98, 28 CRitE & DELNQ. 410, 410 (1982); Rendleman, Parens Patria:
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C.L. REv. 205, 207-10 (1971). The
leading case of the period, Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1838), reflects not
only the ideology of environmentalism and preventive intervention, but also
the breadth of the parens patriae doctrine and the futility of legal challenges to
state intervention. See id. at 11; see also D. RoTmmv, supra note 2, at 212 (reformers' use of parens patriae to justify state intervention); Fox, supra note 2,
at 1192-93 (the emergence of the doctrine of parens patriae).
25. The juvenile court sought to aid children as well as to control their
criminal behavior. Historically, controlling youth through the criminal law
presented the stark alternatives of a criminal conviction and punishment as an
adult or an acquittal or dismissal that freed the youth from all supervision.
Jury or judicial nullification to avoid punishment excluded many youths from
control, particularly minor offenders. Desires for greater supervision and control, rather than leniency, animated many reformers. They sought a system
that would allow the law to intervene affirmatively in the lives of young offenders, rather than only to impose punishment. The rehabilitative juvenile court
provided Progressives with a middle ground between punishing behavior
through the criminal process, thereby criminalizing a youth, and ignoring it altogether, thereby encouraging a resumption of a criminal career. See, e.g, J.
HAwEs, supra note 20, at 162; A. PLATr, supra note 2, at 46-55, 101-36, D. RoTHMAN, supranote 2, at 213; E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 33; Fox, supra note 2, at
1194, 1212-15.
26. See authorities cited supra notes 2 & 23; see also Andrews & Cohn, Ungovernability: The UnjustifiableJurisdiction,83 YALE L.J. 1383, 1388 (1974) (discussing the significance of juvenile adjudications for status offenses); Garlock,
'Wayward" Children and the Law, 1820-1900: The Genesis of the Status Offense
Jurisdictionof the Juvenile Court; 13 GA. L. REv. 341, 342-43 (1979) (questioning
whether juvenile courts should refuse to exercise jurisdiction over status offenses); Rosenberg & Rosenberg, The Legacy of the Stubborn and Rebellious
Son, 74 MicaL . REV. 1097, 1098-99 (1976) (noting that every state and the District of Columbia have statutes giving the juvenile court jurisdiction over status
offenses); Schlossman & Wallach, supra note 15, at 70, 81 (discussing the purpose of the Progressives' concern with certain behavior).
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upbringing. 27
The Progressives envisioned a juvenile court administered
by an expert judge and assisted by social service personnel, clinicians, and probation officers. They hoped judges would be
specialists, trained in the social sciences and child development, whose empathic qualities and insight could aid in mak-

ing individualized dispositions in the "best interests of the
child. ' 28 Because it was assumed that a rational, scientific
analysis of facts would reveal the proper diagnosis and prescribe the cure, the juvenile court's methodology encouraged

collecting as much information as possible about the child. The
resulting factual inquiry into the whole child accorded minor

significance to the specific criminal offense because the offense
indicated little about a child's "real needs." 2 9

Because the re-

formers' aims were benevolent, their solicitude individualized,
and their intervention guided by science, they saw no reason to

narrowly circumscribe the power of the state. They maximized
discretion to provide flexibility in diagnosis and treatment and

focused on the child and the child's character and lifestyle
rather than on the crime.
In distinguishing children from adult offenders, the juvenile court also rejected the procedures of criminal prosecution.
It introduced a euphemistic vocabulary and a physically separate court building to avoid the stigma of adult prosecutions,
and it modified courtroom procedures to eliminate any implica-

27. See A. PLATr, supra note 2, at 135. Ironically, the juvenile court simultaneously affirmed the primacy of the nuclear family and expanded the power
of the state to intervene in instances of parental inadequacy. See D. ROTHMAN,
supra note 2, at 212. Child rearing had become too complex to relegate to unsupervised family control. Immigrant and lower class families, caught in the
conflict of cultures, could not be expected adequately to Americanize their children, and state supervision was imposed to assure that the next generation
adopted an acceptable middle-class way of life. See id. at 206. The juvenile
court provided the agency through which Anglo-Protestant Americans defined
the norms of family and childhood to which the outsiders were to adhere. See
E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 48.
28. One consequence of judicial discretion, however, "was a system that
made the personality of the judge, his likes and dislikes, attitudes and
prejudices, consistencies and caprices, the decisive element in shaping the
character of his courtroom." D. RoTHmAN, supra note 2, at 238.
29. See id. at 215. A system of decision making in which literally everything is relevant to the ultimate determination of a child's "best interests" necessarily is heavily dependent on sound judgment and professional expertise.
The Progressives envisioned a well-trained probation staff schooled in the principles of psychology and social work, aided by mental hygiene clinics and psychological diagnostic services, and able to provide the scientific undergirding
that would assure consistency in dispositions. Id. at 242-43.
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tion of a criminal proceeding. 30 For example, proceedings were
initiated by a petition in the welfare of the child, rather than by
a criminal complaint. Because the important issues involved
the child's background and welfare rather than the commission
of a specific crime, courts dispensed with juries, lawyers, rules
of evidence, and formal procedures. To avoid stigmatization,
hearings were confidential and private, access to court records
was limited, and youths were found to be "delinquent" rather
than guilty of an offense. To make proceedings more personal
and private, the judge was supposed to sit next to the child
while court personnel presented a treatment plan to meet the
child's needs as determined by a background investigation
identifying the sources of the child's misconduct. Dispositions
were indeterminate and nonproportional and could continue
for the duration of minority. The events that brought the child
before the court affected neither the degree nor the duration of
intervention because each child's needs differed and no limits
could be defined in advance. The dispositional process was
designed to determine why the child was in court in the first instance and what could be done to change the character, atti31
tude, and behavior of the youth to prevent a reappearance.
B. THE CONSITrUTIONAL DOMESTICATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT
Despite occasional challenges and criticism of some conceptual or administrative aspects of juvenile justice, no sustained and systematic examination of the juvenile court
occurred until the 1960's.32 In 1967, however, In re Gaul3" began a "due process revolution" that substantially transformed
the juvenile court from a social welfare agency into a legal institution. This "constitutional domestication"M was the first
step in the convergence of the procedures of the juvenile justice system with those of the adult criminal process.3 5
30. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMUSSION ON LAW ENFORCEUENT AND ADmansTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT. JuvENILE DELINQUENCY AND Yourr
CRnmE 92 (1967) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YouT
CRIME]; D. ROTmiAN, supra note 2, at 218; see also authorities cited supra notes
2 & 23.
31. See E. RYERsoN, supra note 2, at 38.

32.

See, e.g., Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:

Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 7, 8; Note, Juvenile Delin-

quents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice; 79 HARv. L REV.
775, 775-76 (1966).
33. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
34. Id. at 22.
35. On the "criminalization" of the juvenile court, see, e.g, Feld, Juvenile
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In re Gault involved the delinquency adjudication and institutional commitment of a youth who allegedly made a lewd
telephone call of the "irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety" to a neighbor.36 Fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was taken
into custody, detained overnight without notification of his parents, and made to appear at a hearing the following day. A pro
forma petition alleged simply that he was a delinquent minor
in need of the care and custody of the court. The complaining
witness did not appear, no sworn testimony was taken, and no
transcript or formal memorandum of the substance of the proceedings was made. The judge interrogated Gault, who apparently made incriminating responses. At no time was Gault
assisted by an attorney or advised of a right to counsel. Following his hearing, the judge returned Gault to a detention cell for
several days. At his dispositional hearing the following week,
the judge committed Gault as a juvenile delinquent to the State
Industrial School "for the period of his minority [that is, until
37
21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law."
The Court examined the realities of juvenile incarceration
rather than accepting the rehabilitative rhetoric of Progressive
juvenile jurisprudence. In reviewing the history of the juvenile
court, the Court noted that the traditional rationales for denying procedural safeguards to juveniles included the belief that
the proceedings were neither adversarial nor criminal and that,
because the State acted as parens patriae, the child was entitled to custody rather than liberty. 38 The Court rejected these
assertions, however, because denial of procedures frequently
resulted in arbitrariness rather than "careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment."39 Although the Court hoped to reCourt Legislative Reform and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the
"Rehabilitative Ideal," 65 MIn. L. REV. 167, 202 (1980). On the due process
revolution in the juvenile court, see, e.g., Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court 1967 Sup. CT.REV. 233, 237; Paulsen, Kent v. United
States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167,
168-69 [hereinafter cited as Paulsen, ConstitutionalContext].
36. 387 U.S. at 4.
37. Gaul4 387 U.S. at 7-8 (brackets in original). If Gault had been an adult,
his offense would have resulted in no more than a $50 fine or two months' imprisonment; as a juvenile, however, he was subject to incarceration for up to six
years, the duration of his minority. Id. at 8-9. Although Arizona has increased
the penalties that can be imposed in misdemeanor cases, they still
are much
less severe than the dispositions juveniles can receive. Cf.Aiuz. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13-2904 (1978) (Gault's conduct is a class 1 misdemeanor); 13-707 (a
class 1 misdemeanor carries a maximum term of imprisonment of six months);
12-802(A) (a class 1 misdemeanor carries a maximum fine of $100).
38. See Gaul4 387 U.S. at 14-17.
39. Id. at 18.
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tain the potential benefits of the juvenile process, it insisted
that the claims of the juvenile court process had to be candidly
appraised in light of the realities of recidivism, the failures of
rehabilitation, the stigma of a "delinquency" label, the
breaches of confidentiality, and the arbitrariness of the process. o The Court noted that a juvenile justice process free of
constitutional safeguards had not abated recidivism or lowered
the high crime rates among juvenile offenders. It also emphasized that the realities of juvenile institutional confinement
mandated elementary procedural safeguards. 41 These safeguards included advance notice of charges, a fair and impartial
hearing, assistance of counsel, opportunity to confront and
cross-examine witnesses, and a privilege against self4
incrimination.A
Although the Court discussed the realities of the juvenile
system and mandated procedural safeguards, it limited its
holding to the adjudicatory hearing at which a child is determined to be a delinquent.4 3 It asserted that its decision would
40. See id. at 21.
41. The Supreme Court noted that:
The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a "receiving home" or an "industrial school" for juveniles is an institution of
confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a greater or lesser
time. His world becomes "a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine, and institutional hours ... ." Instead of mother and
father and sisters and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is
peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and "delinquents"
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.... [Uinder our Constitution, the condition of being a [childl
does not justify a kangaroo court.
Id. at 27-28.
42. See id. at 31-57; see also id. at 22, 24, 27 (discussing whether juveniles
should be afforded constitutional protection through procedural safeguards);
Rosenberg, The ConstitutionalRights of Children Chargedwith Crime: Proposalfor a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L Rav. 656, 662-63 (1980)
(constitutional protections should attach in proceedings that may result in incarceration of a child). The Gault opinion is unclear regarding whether the
various rights afforded juveniles attach because of the possibility of institutional commitment, see, e.g., Gault 387 U.S. at 13, or if they attach only when
the youth is actually committed to a state correctional facility, see id. at 36-37,
41, 44, 49, 56, 57; cf. Schultz & Cohen, Isolationism in Juvenile Court Jurisprudence, in PURSUING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 20, 28 (Gault opinion unclear

about basis of extension of right to juveniles). Compare Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial in state criminal proceedings determined by the penalty authorized by law rather than the sentence
actually imposed) with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (sixth amendment
right to counsel in state misdemeanor trials attaches only if a jail sentence is
actually imposed).
43. See Gault 387 U.S. at 13. The Court specifically held that "I[wie do not
in this opinion consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the
totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state. We do not even con-
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in no way impair the value of the unique procedures for
processing and treating juveniles and that the procedural safeguards associated with the adversarial process were essential
in juvenile proceedings, both to determine the truth and to pre44
serve individual freedom by limiting the power of the state.
In contrast to the narrow holding, the basis for the Court's
constitutional analysis of what rights must be afforded
juveniles in adjudicatory hearings was broad. The Court used
the "fundamental fairness" requirements of fourteenth amendment due process to grant the rights to notice, counsel, and
confrontation and did not even refer specifically to the explicit
requirements of the sixth amendment.4 5 The Court did, howsider the entire process relating to juvenile 'delinquents.'" Id.; see also McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 42 U. Prrr. L Rnv. 457, 459-60 (1981) (discussing the

limitations on juveniles' procedural rights). The Court's holding did not address a juvenile's rights in either the preadjudicatory (i.e., intake and detention) or postadjudicatory (i.e., disposition) stages of the proceeding, but
narrowly confined itself to the actual adjudication of guilt or innocence in a
trial-like setting. See Gault 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48. As will be suggested in the
analysis of the Minnesota Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure for Juvenile
Court, the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to address the nonadjudicatory stages of the juvenile process has resulted in the consistently "second
class" procedural characteristics of the juvenile court. See infra notes 284-331,
344-387, and accompanying text.
44. See Gaul4 387 U.S. at 21. In its subsequent delinquency decisions, the
Court balanced the particular function that a constitutional right served against
its impact on the unique processes of the juvenile court and used the degree of
impairment of the traditional juvenile court's functions as one of the criteria in
determining whether a right would be afforded to juveniles. See, e.g., Breed v.
Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535-39 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547
(1971). In Gault, however, the Court was adjudicating constitutional ights in a
procedural void.
45. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed.., and to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The discussion of the notice requirement in Gault
made no reference to the sixth amendment's provision for notice; rather, the
Court held that "due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described-that is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a
civil or criminal proceeding." Gault; 387 U.S. at 33. Similarly, although the
Court described a delinquency proceeding as "comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution," id. at 36, the right to counsel in a juvenile proceeding is
grounded in the "due process clause of the fourteenth amendment" rather than
the sixth amendment's right to counsel, id. at 41. Finally, the Court's analysis
of the right to confront and examine witnesses rested on "our law and constitutional requirements" rather than the specific language of the sixth amendment.
Id. at 57. In deciding the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege against
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ever, explicitly invoke the fifth amendment to establish that
juveniles were protected against self-incrimination in delin-

quency proceedings.4

The Court's extension of the self-incrim-

ination protection provides the clearest example of the dual
self-incrimination, the majority resorted to an analytical strategy akin to selective incorporation, finding a "functional equivalence" between a delinquency
proceeding and an adult criminal trial. See id. at 50.
Cases such as Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942), overruled,Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); and Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908),
reflect the historical constitutional debate between proponents of "selective incorporation" and proponents of "fundamental fairness" and "total incorporation" of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., Henkin, "Selective Incorporation"in the
FourteenthAmendment 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due ProcessAdjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE W. 319, 32733 (1967); Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 666-67.
The irony of the "fundamental fairness" strategy employed by the Court in
Gault to provide procedural safeguards is that this same strategy later permitted the Court to deny juveniles a jury trial by finding that the right was not fundamental See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); infra notes 57-71
and accompanying text. The irony stems from the fact that in the years between Gault and McKeiver, the Supreme Court decided Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968), which held that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial
was applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment due process clause
because it was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Duncan, 391
U.S. at 149.
46. It would be entirely unrealistic to carve out of the Fifth Amendment all statements by juveniles on the ground that these cannot lead
to "criminal" involvement In the first place, juvenile proceedings to
determine "delinquency," which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as "criminal" for purposes of the privilege
against self-incrimination... [C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called "criminal" or "civiL"
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 49-50; accordAddington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979)
(criminal and delinquency proceedings are distinguishable from involuntary
civil commitment because the former are punitive).
As a consequence of the Court's decision in Gault recognizing the applicability of the privilege against self-incrimination, juvenile adjudications no
longer could be characterized as either "noncriminal" or as "nonadversarial,"
because the fifth amendment privilege, more than any other provision of the
Bill of Rights, is the fundamental guarantor of an adversarial process and the
primary mechanism for maintaining a balance between the state and the individual.
The Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964), described
the multiple policies underlying the fifth amendmentThe privilege against self-incrimination... reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject
those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, our preferencefor an accusatorialratherthan an inquisitorialsystem of criminal justice; our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense offairplay which dictates "a fair state.individualbalance by requiring the government to leave the individualalone until good cause is
shownfor disturbinghim and by requiringthe government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load" ... ; our distrust of
self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege,
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functions of such safeguards in juvenile court adjuciations: assuring accurate fact finding and protecting against government
oppression. 47 In this respect, Gault is a premier example of the
Warren Court's belief that expansion of constitutional rights
and limitation on the coercive powers of the State could be obtained through the adversary process, which in turn would assure the regularity of law enforcement and reduce the need for
while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent."
378 U.S. at 55 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See generallyL.LvY, OnIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT (1968) (historical analysis of the fifth amend-

ment as a limitation on state power over the individual); Ritchie, Compulsion
That Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L.
REv. 383, 385-86 (1977)

(discussing the importance of the policies requiring the
government to leave the individual alone and of prohibiting the government
from the act of compelling self-incrimination).
47. If the Court in Gault had been concerned solely with the reliability of
juvenile confessions and the accuracy of fact finding, safeguards other than the
fifth amendment privilege, such as a requirement that all confessions must be
shown to have been made voluntarily, would have sufficed. In both Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), and Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), the U.S.
Supreme Court considered the admissibility of confessions made by juveniles
and, employing the "voluntariness" test, concluded that youthfulness was a
special circumstance requiring close judicial scrutiny. Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 5455; Haley, 332 U.S. at 599-601. The Court, however, recognized that fifth amendment safeguards are not required simply because they ensure accurate fact
finding or reliable confessions, but also because they serve as a means of maintaining a proper balance between the individual and the state:
The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, related to the
question of the safeguards necessary to assure that admissions or confessions are reasonably trustworthy, that they are not mere fruits of
fear or coercion, but are reliable expressions of the truth. The roots of
the privilege are, however, far deeper. They tap the basic stream of
religious and political principle because the privilege reflects the limits
of the individual's attornment to the state and-in a philosophical
sense-insists upon the equality of the individual and the state. In
other words, the privilege has a broader and deeper thrust than the
rule which prevents the use of confessions which are the product of coercion because coercion is thought to carry with it the danger of unreliability. One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or
by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the
person under investigation and depriving him of the freedom to decide
whether to assist the state in securing his conviction.
Gault 387 U.S. at 47 (footnotes omitted); see also Rosenberg, supra note 42, at
668 (discussing the Gault Court's argument that a juvenile proceeding may be
"functionally equivalent" to an adult criminal proceeding). One author distinguishes between those aspects of procedural due process that ensure the reliability of the process of determining guilt and those that are designed to ensure
respect for the dignity of the individual. See Kadish, supra note 45, at 346-67;
see also McCarthy, supra note 43, at 464 (distinguishing between procedures
"designed to lead to accurate determinations" and those designed to safeguard
the "balance in the relationship between an individual and the government");
infra notes 101-64 and accompanying text (analyzing the Minnesota Rules of
Procedure for Juvenile Court's treatment of the admissibility of juvenile
confessions).
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continual judicial scrutiny. 48
In subsequent juvenile court decisions, the Supreme Court
further elaborated upon the criminal nature of delinquency
proceedings. In In re Winship,49 the Court decided that proof of
delinquency must be established "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
rather than by lower civil standards of proof.50 Because there
is no explicit provision of the Bill of Rights regarding the standard of proof in criminal cases, the Winship Court first held
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was a constitutional requirement in adult criminal proceedings.5 1 The Court then extended the same standard of proof to juvenile proceedings
because of the standard's equally vital role there.5 2 The Court
concluded that the need to prevent unwarranted convictions
and to guard against government power was sufficiently important to outweigh the dissenters' concerns that the juvenile
court's unique therapeutic function would be thwarted and that
"differences between juvenile courts and traditional criminal
courts [would be eroded] ."53
48. See Allen, The Judicial Questfor PenalJustice: The Warren Court and
The CriminalCases, 1975 U. I-L. LF. 518, 530-31.
49. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
50. See id. at 368.
51. See id. at 361-64.
52. See id. at 365-67. It is instructive to compare the Winship Court's treatment of the standard of proof in delinquency cases with that required for involuntary civil commitment of the mentally ill, which requires only "dear and
convincing" evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979). In Addington, Chief Justice Burger distinguished both criminal and delinquency prosecutions from involuntary civil commitments and, in so doing, equated criminal
trials and delinquency proceedings:
The Court [in Winship] saw no controlling difference in loss of liberty
and stigma between a conviction for an adult and a delinquency adjudication for a juvenile. Winship recognized that the basic issue-whether
the individual in fact committed a criminal act-was the same in both
proceedings. There being no meaningful distinctions between the two
proceedings, we required the state to prove the juvenile's act and intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
... Unlike the delinquency proceeding in Tinship, a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.
441 U.S. at 427-28. Chief Justice Burger also noted that proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" is a critical component of criminal cases because it helps to preserve the "'moral force of the criminal law,'... and we should hesitate to
apply it too broadly or casually in noncriminal cases." Id. at 428 (citation
omitted).
53. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 376-77 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although
parens patriae intervention may be a desirable method of dealing with wayward youths, "that intervention cannot take the form of subjecting the child to
the stigma of a finding that he violated a criminal law and to the possibility of
institutional confinement on proof insufficient to convict him were he an adult."
397 U.S. at 367.
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Five years later, the Court in Breed v. Jones5 4 held that the
protections of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment prohibit the adult criminal prosecution of a youth after a
conviction in juvenile court for the same offense. Although the
Court framed the issue in terms of the applicability of an explicit provision of the Bill of Rights to state proceedings,5 5 it resolved the question by recognizing the functional equivalence
and the identical interests of the defendants in a delinquency
56
proceeding and an adult criminal trial.
7
Only in McKeiver v. PennsylvaniaW
did the Court decline
to extend the procedural safeguards of adult criminal prosecutions to juvenile court proceedings. 8 The Court in McKeiver
held that a jury is not required in a juvenile proceeding because the only requirement for "fundamental fairness" in such
proceedings is "accurate factfinding," a requirement that can
be as well satisfied by a judge as by a jury.5 9 In suggesting that
due process in the juvenile context required nothing more than
54. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
55. See id. at 520.
56. The Court reiterated:
Although the juvenile-court system had its genesis in the desire to provide a distinctive procedure and setting to deal with the problems of
youth, including those manifested by antisocial conduct, our decisions
in recent years have recognized that there is a gap between the originally benign conception of the system and its realities.
... [I]t is simply too late in the day to conclude ... that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceeding whose object is to determine
whether he has committed acts that violate a criminal law and whose
potential consequences include both the stigma inherent in such a determination and the deprivation of liberty for many years.
Id. at 528-29. The Court concluded that, with respect to the risks associated
with double jeopardy, "we can find no persuasive distinction in that regard between the [juvenile] proceeding... and a criminal prosecution, each of which
is designed to 'vindicate [the] very vital interest in enforcement of criminal
laws.'" Id. at 531 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971) (plurality opinion)) (brackets in Breed).
57. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
58. McKeiver was ultimately decided on the basis of fourteenth amendment due process and "fundamental fairness," even though the Court noted
that the sixth amendment jury trial guarantee was applicable to state criminal
proceedings by its incorporation into the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 540.
The Court insisted, however, that "the juvenile court proceeding has not yet
been held to be a 'criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the
Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given the civil label." Id. at 541. The
Court cautioned that "[t]
here is a possibility, at least, that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept, will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been
the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding." Id. at
545.
59. See id. at 543.

1984]

JUVENILE JUSTICE

accurate fact-finding, however, the Court departed significantly
from its own prior analyses, which relied on the dual rationales
of accurate fact-finding and protection against governmental
oppression. 60 Furthermore, in insisting that the accuracy of the
fact-finding process is the only concern of fundamental fairness, the Court ignored its own analysis in GauZl in which it
held that the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination was necessary in order to protect against governmental oppression even though accurate fact-finding might be impeded. 61
Justice Brennan's concurring-dissenting opinion in McKeiver
notes that protection from governmental oppression might also
be afforded by an alternative method, such as a public trial that
would render the adjudicative process visible and accountable
to the community.6 2 The Court, however, denied that protection against government oppression was required at all 63 and,
invoking the mythology of the sympathetic, paternalistic juvenile court judge, rejected the argument that the inbred, closed
nature of the juvenile court could prejudice the accuracy of
fact-finding.6 4
60. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1,47 (1967).
61. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
62. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 553-55 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The McKeiver decision involved two cases raising the issues of jury trials
in juvenile proceedings, one arising in Pennsylvania and the other in North
Carolina. Although Justice Brennan acknowledge& that delinquency prosecutions were not criminal proceedings for purposes of implicating the sixth
amendment right to a jury trial and required only the "essentials of due process and fair treatment," id at 553 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting), he
differentiated between the Pennsylvania and North Carolina proceedings. Justice Brennan noted that "the States are not bound to provide jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the
interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve." Io at 554
(Brennan, J, concurring and dissenting). He noted that the availability of trial
by jury protects the individual against oppression by providing a mechanism to
appeal to the conscience of the community. Id. (Brennan, J., concurring and
dissenting). The Pennsylvania juvenile procedures permitted a public trial,
which Justice Brennan regarded as providing a functionally equivalent safeguard for the core values protected by the jury trial rights. See id. at 554-55
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). He dissented in the North Carolina
case, however, because the North Carolina procedures either permitted or required the exclusion of the public, and the public had in fact been excluded
from the proceedings, which arose out of demonstrations by black students and
adults against public school discrimination. Id at 556-57 (Brennan, J, concurring and dissenting); see also infra notes 480-83 and accompanying text.
63. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547-48.
64. See id. at 550-51.
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence, about the juvenile court judge's possible awareness of the juvenile's prior record and of the contents of the social fie; about repeated
appearances of the same familiar witnesses in the persons of juvenile
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In denying juveniles the constitutional right to jury trials,
the Court in McKeiver departed from its earlier mode of analysis 65 and emphasized the adverse impact that this right would
have on the informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile court proceedings. 66 Rather than asking whether the constitutional right in question would have an adverse impact on
any unique benefits of the juvenile court, the Court asked
whether the right to a jury trial would positively aid or
strengthen the functioning of the juvenile justice system. 67 Although the McKeiver Court found faults with the juvenile process, it asserted that imposing jury trials would in no way
correct those deficiencies and would make the juvenile process
unduly formal and adversarial. The Court did not consider,
however, whether there might be any offsetting advantages to
increased formality in juvenile proceedings68 or to what extent
its earlier decision in Gault69 had effectively foreclosed its renewed concern with flexibility and informality at the adjudicaand probation officers and social workers-all to the effect that this will
create the likelihood of pre-judgment--chooses to ignore, it seems to
us, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal
attention that the juvenile court system contemplates.
Id. at 550. There is, however, ample reason for concern about the accuracy of
the fact-finding process in a justice system in which the same probation officers
and the same child appear repeatedly before the same judge, who has access to
the minor's previous social history and delinquency record in the course of deciding different aspects of the case at different stages. See infra notes 378-79
and accompanying text (deslribing the inherently prejudicial nature of such repeated contacts and excessive familiarity).
65. The McKeiver case is a "peculiar" decision because it required the
Court both to misread its own precedents regarding the dual functions of procedural safeguards and the appropriate method of constitutional adjudication,
and to ignore its own legal premises in Winship regarding the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., F. ZIMRING, THE CHANGING LEGAL WORLD
OF ADOLESCENCE 83 (1982); Rosenberg, supra note 42, at 677.
66. The result clearly was dictated by the Court's concern that the right to
a trial by jury would be the one procedural safeguard most disruptive of the
traditional juvenile court and would require substantial alteration of traditional
juvenile court practices because "it would bring with it...
the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the
public trial." McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. Ultimately, the Court realized that such
an imposition would render the juvenile court virtually indistinguishable from
a criminal court and would raise the more basic question of whether there is
any need for a separate juvenile court at all. See id. at 551.
67. See id. at 547.
68. As one of its rationales for imposing procedural formality in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court opined that the absence of formality "frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but in arbitrariness." Id. at 1819.
69. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Gault, particularly with its importation of the fifth
amendment as the bulwark of the adversary system, had determined that an
informal, flexible, nonadversarial procedure was inconsistent with the requirements of due process. See, e.g., Gardner, Punishment and Juvenile Justice: A
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tory stage. The Court also gave no indication why a more
formal hearing was incompatible with the therapeutic dispositions that a young delinquent might receive. Although the
Court decried the possibility of a public trial,70 it presented no
evidence or arguments to support its conclusion that publicity
would be undesirable and that confidentiality of juvenile court
proceedings was an indispensable element of the juvenile jus71
tice process.
Together, Gaul, Winship, and McKeiver precipitated a procedural revolution in the juvenile court system that has unintentionally but inevitably transformed its original Progressive
conception. Progressive reformers envisioned the commission
of an offense as essentially secondary to a determination of the
"real needs" of a child-the child's social circumstances and
environment. Intervention was premised on the need for rehabilitation and social uplift, not on the commission of an offense.
Although McKeiver refused to extend the right to a jury trial to
juveniles, Gault and Winship imported the adversarial model,
the privilege against self-incrimination, attorneys, the criminal
standard of proof, and the primacy of factual and legal guilt as
a constitutional prerequisite to intervention. By emphasizing
criminal procedural regularity in the determination of delinquency, the Supreme Court shifted the focus of the juvenile
court from the Progressive emphasis on the "real needs" of the
child to proof of the commission of criminal acts, thereby effectively transforming juvehile proceedings into criminal
prosecutions. 72
Since these decisions, the transformation of the juvenile
court has continued through legislative, judicial, and administrative action. In addition to increased procedural formality,
there have been major changes in other parts of the system.
ConceptualFrameworkfor Assessing ConstitutionalRights of Youthful Offenders,35 VAND. L" REV. 791, 830 (1982).
70. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. The McKeiver plurality did not respond
to the point made by Justice Brennan in his partial dissent that the possibility

of a public trial was an alternative mechanism that satisfied the core values of a
jury trial. See supranote 62.
71. In other cases, the Court has held to the contrary, finding that the con-

fidentiality of juvenile proceedings must in some circumstances give way to
other important interests. See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 104 (1978) (freedom of the press in publishing lawfully obtained information
prevails over state's interest in protecting juvenile's privacy); Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (the defendant's right of confrontation in a criminal case
is paramount to the state's interest in preserving the confidentiality of a juvenile record).

72. See E. RYERSON, supra note 2, at 156.
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The Supreme Court's recognition that the Progressive juvenile
court failed to realize its benevolent therapeutic promise has
led to changes in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Diversion, deinstitutionalization, and "decriminalization" of status
offenders have altered the role of the juvenile court 73 as states
have removed status jurisdiction from their juvenile codes entirely,7 4 redefined it to avoid the stigma of crime/delinquency
adjudications, 7 5 and limited the dispositions that noncriminal
73. See, e.g., Empey, Juvenile Justice Reform: Diversion, Due Process, and
Deinstitutionalization,in PRISONERS IN AMERICA 13 (L Ohlin ed. 1973). Although "[t]he juvenile court's jurisdiction over children's noncriminal misbehavior has long been seen as a cornerstone of its mission," that foundation is
rapidly eroding. INsTrrtE OF JUDICIAL ADMININSTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT (1977) [hereinafter cited as
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS]. The quotation is from JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra, STANDARDS RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR 2. The Standards continue: "These standards take the position that the present
jurisdiction of the juvenile court over noncriminal behavior-the status offense
jurisdiction-should be cut short and a system of voluntary referral to services
provided outside the juvenile justice system adopted in its stead." Id.
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project was a cooperative effort of the Institute of Judicial Administration and the American Bar Association. The result
of the Project's efforts was a multivolume set of standards that was intended to
be to the juvenile justice process what the Standards Relating to Criminal Justice was to the criminal process. Most of these standards were approved by the
ABA at its mid-year meeting in 1979. The remainder, with the exception of one
volume, were approved at the ABA's mid-year meeting in 1980. The STANDARDS
RELATING TO NONCRIMINAL MISBEHAVIOR were published in 1982. See also E.
SCHUR, RADICAL NON-INTERVENTION:

46-51 (1973)

RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY PROBLEM

(discussing the failure of programs for predicting delinquency);
Rosenheim, Notes on Helping Juvenile Nuisances, in PURSUING JUSTICE, supra
note 23, at 52 (courts persist in handling status offenses despite studies recommending alternative treatment).
Virtually every professional group that has considered the issue of status
jurisdiction has recommended either its elimination from the juvenile court or
drastic restrictions on the grounds for and intensity of intervention. These recommendations also have sustained the "deinstitutionalization" movement. See
generally NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVES: STUDIES IN THE DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF STATUS OFFENDERS (J. Handler & J. Zatz eds. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
NEITHER ANGELS NOR THIEVESI.
74. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 260.015(5) (e) (1971), repealed by Act of April 11,
1974, ch. 469, § 1, Minn. Laws 1149.
75. One version of the redefinitional process was the removal of status offenses from the delinquency jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the creation
of a separate legal category of "Persons in Need of Supervision" (PINS). M.
LEVIN & R. SARRI, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGAL
CODES IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (1974).
Minnesota has chosen not to label truants, runaways, alcohol and controlled substance offenders, and petty offenders as "delinquent." See MINN.
STAT. § 260.015 (5), (19)-(23) (1982). Although the juvenile court still has jurisdiction over these offenders, see, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 260.111 (1982), the dispositions it may impose are more limited than those that can be imposed on
delinquent children. Compare id. § 260.194 (dispositions available to children
who are habitually truants, runaways, or juvenile petty offenders) and id.
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offenders can receive.7 6 Similarly, legislatures and courts have
extensively scrutinized the handling of serious young offenders, and the most difficult youths in the juvenile justice process
are now removed to criminal courts for prosecution as adults.j
These jurisdictional modifications narrow the scope of the juvenile court both at the "hard" end, through the removal of serious juvenile offenders, and at the "soft" end, through the
removal of status offenders. At the same time that juvenile jurisdiction is being narrowed, the dispositions of the remaining
delinquents increasingly reflect the impact of the 'Justice
model," in which "just deserts" rather than "real needs" prescribe the appropriate sentence.7 8 Principles of proportionality
and determinacy based on the present offense and prior record,
not the best interests of the child, dictate the length, location,
and intensity of intervention.7 9 Finally, as the dispositions by
the juvenile court increasingly subordinate the "needs" of the
offender to the nature of the offense and traditional justifications for punishment, the formal procedural safeguards of the

juvenile court increasingly resemble those of the adult criminal

process.8 0 These four developments-the removal of status offenders, the waiver of serious offenders into the adult system,
the increasing punitiveness of dispositions, and the growing
emphasis on procedural formality-have contributed to the
criminalization of the juvenile court. Current practice, as ex§ 260.195 (dispositions available to juvenile alchohol and controlled substance
offenders) with id. § 260.185 (Supp. 1983) (dispositions available to delinquent
children).
76. See, e.g., In re Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 591, 300 N.E.2d 424, 425, 347
N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (1973) (prohibiting the commitment of status offenders to the
same institutions as youths who committed crimes); Harris v. Calendine, 233
S.E.2d 318, 325 (W. Va. 1977) (prohibiting incarceration of status offenders in a
secure institution with children guilty of criminal conduct).
The deinstitutionalization of status offenders received substantial impetus
with the passage of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of
1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5640 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as amended by Juvenile Justice Amendments of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-509, 94 Stat. 2750 (1980). That Act provided, inter alia, that 'Juveniles... charged with... offenses that would not
be criminal if committed by an adult. .. , shall not be placed in juvenile detention or correctional facilities." 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a) (12) (a) (1976 & Supp. III
1979) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §5633(a)(12) (a) (1982)). See generally
NErrRER ANGELS NOR TInEVES, supra note 73 (evaluative studies of impact in
the states of J.J.D.P. deinstitutionalization mandate).
77. See, e.g., Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders for Adult Prosecution:
The Legislative Alternative to Asking UnanswerableQuestions, 62 MiNN. L. Ruv.
515, 519-20 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders);
Feld, supra note 35, at 172; infra notes 497-522 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 428-53 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 442-53 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 391-95 and accompanying text.
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emplified by Minnesota's new rules of procedure, can be understood only against this background.
C.

THE BACKGROUND OF MINNESOTA'S RULES OF PROCEDURE
FOR JUVENILE COURT

In September, 1975, Chief Justice Robert Sheran of the
Minnesota Supreme Court appointed a seventeen-member
Study Commission to assess the role and operation of the juvenile courts in Minnesota and to recommend to the supreme
court ways to improve the administration of juvenile justice.8 1
Elected officials, county attorneys, defense lawyers, police, juvenile court judges, school officials, and citizens comprised the
Study Commission, 82 and a supreme court justice served as its
liaison with the court. Acting on a Study Commission recommendation, Chief Justice Sheran appointed a Special Task
Force in early 1980 and charged it with developing uniform
statewide rules of juvenile court procedure to replace the existing patchwork of rules.8 3 Because the Commission remained
ultimately responsible for proposing the rules to the Minnesota
Supreme Court, members of the two groups consulted each
other~regularly during the year and a half that the Task Force
met.84 The majority of the Task Force members were con81.

See, e.g., SUPREME COURT JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT

(1976).
82. See id. at 1. The Commission conducted a number of studies about the
administration of juvenile justice and made various recommendations to the
court.
83. Order of the Minnesota Supreme Court, In re Proposed Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure (Feb. 25, 1980) (copy on file with the author). The Task
Force was composed of several members of the Study Commission and a
number of other active participants in the juvenile justice process. Rules existing at the time of the Task Force's creation allowed the urban counties to
promulgate their own rules of procedure while requiring rural counties to adhere to uniform rules. Compare MINN. R.P. JU. CT. (1982) (uniform rules for
TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 1-3

rural counties) with BENCH BOOK: HENNEPIN COUNTY JUVENILE COURT RULES
(1977).
84. Although never explicitly articulated, the views of members of both
groups diverged on several important juvenile justice policy issues, reflecting
their fundamental philosophical differences. Within the Rules Drafting Task
Force, the policy views of the "practitioners"-the urban juvenile court judges,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys-prevailed. When the Task Force Report
was submitted to the full Juvenile Justice Study Commission, the commission
members on the Rules Drafting Task Force who had been in the minority on
the Task Force were able to persuade a majority of the Commission's members
to endorse their "minority" position. Thus, the proposed rules of procedure for
juvenile court that were eventually submitted to the Minnesota Supreme Court
for adoption represented the minority position of those who were responsible
for their drafting. Compare STATE OF MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, PROPOSED
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR JUVENILE COURT (July 20, 1982) (the Task Force mi-
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cerned primarily with the efficient administration of juvenile
justice and wanted to afford the young defendant considerable
autonomy as a participant in the process, whereas the majority
of the Study Commission subscribed to the traditional rehabilitative and paternalistic approach.8 5
The Court promulgated the new Minnesota Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court on December 17, 1982, with an effective
date of May 1, 1983.86 Although some of the new rules add little
more than a processing timetable to the preexisting procedures, 87 others raise issues of substantive juvenile jurisprunority position) with R. Sco'rr, MiNoRrry REPORT TO THE PROPOSED JUVEMLE
COURT RuLEs (1982) (the Task Force majority position) (a copy of the Minority
Report is on file with the author).
85. The latter position is reflected in the letter of transmittal that accompanied the Proposed Rules when they were submitted to the Minnesota Supreme
Court for adoption:
Children by reason of their status deserve the special protection of the
law. And the interests of society are best served by affording them
every reasonable assistance and incentive to adapt their future conduct
to the norms of society, despite the odds against success with many
*
While the juvenile courts cannot assure rehabilitation, they must
secure to the children coming within their jurisdiction an environment
which invites that outcome. This environment is best evidenced by
practices and procedures which adapt themselves to the circumstances
of the case, which make the child's rights and interest a first concern of
the court, which promote the child's self-respect and acceptance of society's standards of conduct and which encourage confidence in the integrity and compassion of the juvenile courts.
Supreme Court Juvenile Justice Study Commission, Letter Submitting Proposed Rules 2-3 (May 24, 1982) (copy on file with the author).
86. After receiving the Proposed Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court,
the Minnesota Supreme Court ordered their publication and scheduled a hearing for November 16, 1982, at which the court would receive oral and written
testimony. Order of Minnesota Supreme Court, In re Proposed Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court (Aug. 24, 1982). There were a number of briefs and petitions filed, and extensive oral testimony, virtually all of which centered on one
provision of the rules that would have extended the Mirandawarning requirement to "school personnel" Proposed Rule 6.01 provided that confessions, admissions, or statements would not be admissible if they were obtained "during
an interrogation of a child who is physically restrained by ... school staff per.
sonnel," unless the interrogators complied with certain procedural requirements. In re Proposed Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court, supra, Rule 6.01.
This provision was eliminated from the rules ultimately promulgated. See, e.g
Mi'. R.P. Juv. CT. 6.01 (limits Mirandarequirement to interrogations by peace
officers, probation officers, and parole officers).
The members of the Rules Drafting Task Force whose majority positions
within the Task Force had been overruled by the majority of the Supreme
Court's Juvenile Justice Study Commission filed a "Minority Report to the Proposed Juvenile Court Rules." The rules that the supreme court ultimately
adopted repudiated several of the Commission's proposals and reinstated the
Rules Task Force recommendations. See supra note 84.
87. The Rules establish two timetables for processing juvenile offenders
through the various stages of the justice system. The timetables vary depending upon whether the youth is being held in detention. For youths not held in
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dence. In promulgating these rules, the Minnesota Supreme
detention, the formal process is initiated by the filing of a delinquency petition.
MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.
The Rules are silent on what role an intake screening unit will perform in
deciding which cases are petitioned to the juvenile court. Traditionally, intake
involves a preliminary screening of cases prior to the filing of charges, typically
performed by the juvenile court's probation department, which may dismiss
the case, authorize the filing of a petition, or 'informally adjust the case." In
many juvenile courts approximately half the cases are informally adjusted at
intake, either by referral to another agency, by continuation on "informal probation," or in some other way. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME,
supra note 30, at 5; see also JuVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION: INTAKE AND PREDISPOsrIoN INVESTIGATIVE SERVICES, Standard 2.1 commentary at 31 (commenting
on the frequency of nonjudicial handling of cases).
Prior to the new rules, referrals to those Minnesota juvenile courts that had
intake units received a discretionary social evaluation, and the social services
staff then decided which cases to send to the county attorney for formal handling. The Rules may reverse the order of review by providing that "[ tI he discretionary decision as to whether a delinquency or petty matter should be
initiated lies with the county attorney." MINN. R.P. JUV. CT. 17; see also MINN.
R.P. Juv. CT. 19.02(2) (requiring the county attorneys to approve and endorse
all petitions). The enhanced role of the prosecutor in the juvenile justice process is one of the consequences of Gauls importation of the adversarial process into the juvenile court. See generally McCarthy, Delinquency Dispositions
Under the Juvenile Justice Standards: The Consequences of a Change of Rationale, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1093, 1099-1100 (1977) (discussing the enhanced role of
the prosecutor afforded by the Juvenile Justice Standards); Rubin, The Emerging ProsecutorDominance of the Juvenile Court Intake Process,26 CRIME & DELINQ. 299, 312-17 (1980) (discussing the emergence and significance of the
prosecutor's role at intake in California and Florida). Some county attorneys
have promulgated policies and guidelines to structure the relationship between
the intake social screening function and the legal charging function. See, e.g.,
HENNEPIN COUNTY ATrORNEY'S OFFICE-JUVENILE SECTION, POLICY AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 1-5 (Dec. 7, 1983). The Hennepin County Attorney allows intake
discretionary authority only for first offenders who have not committed serious
offenses.
Service of summons or notice must be by personal service or by mail and
must be made sufficiently in advance of the hearing to give the person time to
prepare. MINN. R.P. JUV. CT. 9.02(6). A child who is not being held in custody
must be arraigned within 20 days after the petition has been served and must
admit or deny the allegations of the petition at that time. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT.
20.02(2). If the child admits the allegations and the court accepts those admissions, the case will be set for disposition. Prior to the dispositional hearing, the
court may order the preparation of a social report, and this report must be
available for inspection 24 hours prior to the time set for the hearing. MINN.
R.P. Juv. CT. 30.03. For youths not in detention, the disposition hearing will occur within 45 days of the delinquency determination. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 30.02.
For youths who deny the allegations of the petition, a trial must commence
within 60 days. Prior to the trial and within five days of being notified by the
court that a youth has denied the petition, the county attorney shall give notice
of evidence and identification procedures, MINN. R.P. JUV. CT. 23.01, and additional offenses that it intends to offer at trial, MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 23.02. In addition, the Rules provide for the completion of reciprocal discovery procedures
between the county attorney and the defense attorney within five days of receipt of a request for the items governed by the Rules. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT.
24.01. The Rules also provide for a discretionary pretrial conference if re-
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Court made a number of fundamental policy choices about the
nature and theory of the juvenile court, choices that reflect
some of the philosophical tensions that existed between the
Task Force and the Study Commission. These philosophical
tensions are symptomatic of the basic questions surrounding
the administration of juvenile justice and the role of the juvenile court as an institution.
The remainder of this Article examines the evolution of the
juvenile court system from the benevolent, therapeutic institution envisioned by its Progressive creators to one that gives
juveniles neither the minimal procedural safeguards guaranteed to adults nor the special solicitude needed by children.88
quested by either party or the court, MnaN. R.P. Juv. CT. 25.01, and an evidentiary hearing either prior to or, more typically, as part of the trial to determine
the constitutional admissibility of evidence, Mumr. R.P. Juv. CT. 26.01. At the
conclusion of the trial, the court may withhold an adjudication of delinquency
for 90 days, and it may delay making an adjudication for an additional 90 days.
MINN. R.P..Juv. CT. 29.02. If the court does make a finding of delinquency, the
case will be sent on for disposition as described previously.
For a youth who is taken into custody and held in detention, the sequence
and timing of the stages of the process are accelerated and a detention hearing
is required. The detention hearing must be commenced within 36 hours after
the child is taken into custody, MINn. R.P. Juv. CT. 18.06, and a petition stating
probable cause also must be filed within this same 36-hour period. Following
arraignment, a detained youth must be brought to trial within 30 days rather
than the 60 days provided for youths who remain at liberty, and the various notice, discovery, and pretrial proceedings must be completed during this period.
Mnm. R.P. Juv. CT. 27.02(1) (a). Following trial, the court may withhold an adjudication of delinquency of a detained youth for 15 days or, if it makes a finding
of delinquency, make a disposition of the case within 15 days. MINN. R.P. Juv.
CT. 29.02; 30.02(a).
88. This thesis will be developed through an analysis similar to Professor
Herbert L. Packer's analytical framework. See H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE
CRn ENAL SANCTIoN 149-246 (1968); Packer, Two Models of the CriminalProcess,
113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964). Critiques of Packer's analysis include Grifiths, Ideology in Criminal Procedure or A Third "Model" of the Criminal Process, 79
YALE L.J. 359 (1970); Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial
Themes in American Criminal Procedure,26 STAN. L Rsv. 1009 (1974). Packer
distinguishes two sets of values, each conceptualized in a different modeh the
Crime Control Model and the Due Process Model. See H. PACKER, supra, at 153.
Packer's insight enables us "to recognize explicitly the value choices that underlie the details of the criminal [or juvenile] process. In a word, what we need
is a normative model, or rather two models, to let us perceive the normative
antinomy that runs deep in the life of the criminal law." Packer, supra, at 5.
The Crime Control Model is based on a belief that the repression of crime assures the liberty of the law-abiding and that the goal of liberty is accomplished
most efficiently by an administrative process heavily relying upon the professionalism and expertise of the various law enforcement officials. See H.
PACKER, supra, at 158-63. In Packer's Crime Control Model, the quest for efficiency-the expeditious apprehension, conviction, and disposition of offenders-is set in the context of a high volume of offenders and limited resources
with which to deal with them. Assuring the speedy and final resolution of
cases requires an administrative, rather than adversarial, model of justice in
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The Article discusses the Supreme Court decisions that underlay this evolution and analyzes the Minnesota Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Courts as a dramatic and troubling example
of states' responses to those decisions. 89 The Article concludes
that, in every instance in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
had the opportunity to provide juveniles with greater procedural safeguards than those afforded adult criminal defendants
and to recognize the special characteristics of youth, the court
chose not to furnish the safeguards but to treat juveniles just
like adult criminal defendants. Conversely, in every instance in
which the court had an opportunity to treat juveniles at least as
well procedurally as adult criminal defendants, it adopted juvenile court procedures with less effective safeguards. Thus, despite two decades of Supreme Court decisions, legislative
reform, and rule revisions, it is as true today as in 1966 that
"the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
which the professionalism of the police and prosecutors quickly will cull the innocent defendants out of the system. A heavy reliance on informal administrative decision making and discretion is crucial to the successful operation of the
system. See id. The Due Process Model, by contrast, is based on a belief that
the reliability of the process is more important than its efficiency and that reliability is best assured by a variety of formal procedures designed to fend off the
coercive powers of the state from all but the legally guilty. See id. at 163-71.
The Due Process Model rejects informal procedures, the inherent inaccuracy of
which are magnified when coupled with human fallibility. Instead, the Due
Process Model requires the development of elaborate procedural safeguards to
provide a check against such errors because of the adverse consequences of an
erroneous criminal conviction. The Due Process Model, to a far greater extent
than the Crime Control Model, recognizes the oppressive potential of the state
and imposes limitations on official power in order to assure individual liberty
and autonomy. See id. The two models differ significantly in their views of discretionary decision making, their beliefs about the importance of the availability of counsel, and their reliance on per se rules and procedural safeguards to
assure the orderly working of the process. See id. at 171-73.
The Progressives reformers' conception of the juvenile court exemplified
many of the procedural features of Packer's Crime Control Model, including
discretionary decision making, heavy reliance on professional expertise, and an
informal administrative process rather than a formal adjudicative one. The
Progressives, at least in theory, justified their emphasis on discretionary decision making and professional expertise with the "medical model" of treatment,
which required individualized evaluation. See D. RoTmeAN, supra note 2, at 59.
89. The following analysis will show that the Minnesota Supreme Court's
resolution of these issues, as reflected in the Minnesota Rules of Procedure for
Juvenile Court, closely corresponds to the assumptions embodied in the Crime
Control Model. See supra note 88. Unlike the Progressives' conception of the
juvenile court, however, see supra note 88, the Minnesota Supreme Court's contemporary version of the juvenile court is not premised on a "medical model"
of administrative expertise, but is simply a Crime Control Model applied to
youths charged with crimes.
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care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 90
Il.

WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND

THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
When the Supreme Court in In re Gault made the privilege
against self-incrimination applicable to juvenile court proceedings,9 1 the procedural safeguards developed in Mirandav. Ari-

zona92 also became applicable to juveniles. Accordingly, the
validity of a minor's waiver of fifth amendment rights, the voluntariness of any confession obtained, and the waiver of any
other constitutional right were determined by assessing
whether there was a "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver" under the "totality of the circumstances."9 3 Prior to
Miranda, only the "voluntariness" of a confession was determined by judicial review of the totality of the circumstances.9 4
90. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
91. 387 U.S. 1, 42-57 (1967); see supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
92. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Gault Court cited Mirandaas authority for the
assertion that persons, even juveniles, cannot be compelled to testify against
themselves. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 50 n.87, 56 n.97. Because Miranda
rights attach whenever an accused is in custody, presumably Gault extends
those same rights to juveniles, even though the decision itself was concerned
with adjudicatory rights. See id.at 13. Although the Supreme Court has never
explicitly held that Miranda applies to juvenile proceedings, the Court, in Fare
v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), "assume[d] without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the present [juvenile] proceedings."
Id. at 717 n.4.
93. Miranda,384 U.S. at 444; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742
(1970) (guilty pleas); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (waiver of counsel).
See generallyY. KAnsmsA, A Dissentfrom the Miranda Dissents, in PoLicE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS iN LAw AND PoucY 41-76 (1980) (inadequacy of "totality of circumstances" evaluations of voluntariness); Dix, Waiver
in CriminalProcedure: A Brieffor More Careful Analysis, 55 T-x. L. Rav. 193,
214-16 (1977) (discussing the distinction between "voluntarily" and "knowingly").
In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Supreme Court first established the "totality of the circumstances" test to determine the validity of a
waiver of rights:
A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment
of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there has
been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each
case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that
case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the
accused.
Id. at 464.
94. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1961); Ashcraft v.
Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153 (1944); Comment, Juvenile Confessions: Whether
State ProceduresEnsure ConstitutionallyPermissibleConfessions,67 J. CR.ms I.
& CRIMINOLOGY 195, 196 (1976). See generally Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARv.L. REV.935, 954-1030 (1966) (general discussion of the "voluntariness" issue prior to Miranda).
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Since Miranda, however, the validity of waivers of both the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the
sixth amendment right to counsel are evaluated under this test
95
as well.
Even before Miranda and Gault, the United States
Supreme Court instructed trial courts to be particularly solicitous of the effects that a youth's age and inexperience may
have on the validity of waivers and the voluntariness of confessions. 96 In re Gault reiterated and reemphasized that "admis95. Miranda,384 U.S. 436, 475-77 (1966); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 396-402 (1978) (detailing the circumstances of police interrogation of hospitalized accused that demonstrated that accused's will was overcome).
96. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), a fifteen-year-old "lad" was interrogated by police in relays beginning shortly after midnight, denied access to
counsel, and confronted by confessions of codefendants before he finally confessed at five o'clock a.m. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction, ruling
that a confession obtained under these circumstances was involuntary:
What transpired would make us pause for careful inquiry if a mature man was involved. And when, as here, a mere child-an easy victim of the law-is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record
must be used. Age 15 is a tender and difficult age for a boy of any race.
He cannot be judged by the more exacting standards of maturity. That
which would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens. This is the period of great instability
[W]e cannot believe
which the crisis of adolescence produces ....
that a lad of tender years is a match for the police in such a contest.
He needs counsel and support if he is not to become the victim first of
fear, then of panic.
The age of petitioner, the hours when he was grilled, the duration
of his quizzing, the fact that he had no friend or counsel to advise him,
the callous attitude of the police toward his rights combine to convince
us that this was a confession wrung from a child by means which the
law should not sanction.
Id. at 599-601.
In Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), the confession was obtained
from "a child of 14." The Court reiterated that the youth of the accused is a
special circumstance that may affect the voluntariness of a confession, and it
reemphasized the vulnerability of youth:
But a 14-year-old boy, no matter how sophisticated, is unlikely to have
any conception of what will confront him when he is made accessible
only to the police .... [W]e deal with a person who is not equal to the
police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how
to protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional rights.
Id. at 54. It then added.
A lawyer or an adult relative or friend could have given the petitioner
the protection which his own immaturity could not. Adult advice
would have put him on a less unequal footing with his interrogators.
Without some adult protection against this inequality, a 14-year-old boy
would not be able to know, let alone assert, such constitutional rights
as he had.
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sions and confessions of juveniles require special caution."91 In
Fare v. Michael C.,98 however, the Court seemed to retreat
somewhat from its solicitude for age, at least when the defendant was a 16-year-old with several arrests and considerable experience with the police and had served "time" in a youth
camp.9 9 Farereaffirmed the "totality of the circumstances" test
as the appropriate standard for evaluation of the validity of
waivers of rights and the admissibility of juvenile confessions.
It held that the juvenile's request to speak with his probation
officer while subjected to custodial interrogation was neither a
per se invocation of his Mirandaprivilege against self-incrimination nor the functional equivalent of a request to consult
with counsel, which would have required the cessation of further interrogation.1 0 0
The Minnesota Supreme Court has followed the "totality of
the circumstances" standard in determining the validity of a juvenile's waiver of Miranda rights, other constitutional rights,
and the voluntariness of any statement, both in its decisions
and in its rules.1Ol In State v. Nunn,1 02 for example, the Minne-

sota Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument that no
confession by a juvenile should be admitted unless a parent or

guardian was present at the time that the juvenile waived his
rights.103 The court in Nunn quoted the Supreme Court deci97. Gaul; 387 U.S. at 45.
98. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
99. See id. at 726-27.
100. See id. at 722-24. Analytically, Fare is not even a juvenile case, but simply an interpretation of Mirandafocusing on whether a request to consult with
a probation officer is the equivalent of a request to meet with an attorney. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (police cannot continue interrogation after an accused has requested counsel until counsel is made available).
In holding that a child's request to speak with someone other than an attorney
was simply one of many factors in determining the validity of a Miranda
waiver, the Fare Court expressly declined to give children greater protection
than adults. See Fare,442 U.S. at 724-27; see also Rosenberg, supra note 42, at
686-90 (analyzing effect of Fares presumption that Miranda rights extend to
delinquency actions).
101. See, e.g., In re MA, 310 N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1981); In re Welfare of
S.W.T, 277 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 1979); State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671
(1973); State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 212 N.W.2d 664 (1973). The Minnesota
Supreme Court's contribution to the jurisprudence of juvenile confessions primarily consists of the recognition that juveniles interrogated in the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court may be lulled into confessions, which may be to
their detriment, As the Loyd court noted, however, as long as it is made clear
to juveniles that the questioning authorities are not operating as their friends,
but as their adversaries, the confidential atmosphere of the juvenile court poses
no danger. 297 Minn. at 450, 212 N.W.2d at 676-77.
102. 297 N.W.2d 752 (1980).
103. See id. at 755. The court characterized the presence of parents simply
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sion in Fare with approval and reaffirmed its own adherence to
the "totality" approach in determining the validity of a waiver
of Mirandarights by a juvenile. 0 4
Minnesota's new rules also reflect this stance. Rule 6 provides that confessions, admissions, or statements obtained
from a child in custody will be admissible only to "the extent a
statement is admissible against an adult defendant in a criminal matter"'0 5 and requires, as a prerequisite to admissibility,
that a child receive Mirandawarnings "to the same extent that
an adult in a criminal matter is advised prior to custodial interrogation."' 06 Rule 15 governs waivers of the right to counsel
and constitutional rights other than the privilege against selfincrimination. In determining whether a child "voluntarily and
intelligently" confessed or waived the right to counsel, Rules 6
and 15 require the court to look at the "totality of the circumstances," which is defined as including but not limited to "the
presence and competence of the child's parent(s) or guardian,
the child's age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience,
0 7
and ability to comprehend."'
In adopting this standard, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed the principle that juveniles are legally capable of waiving the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, the
sixth amendment right to counsel, or any other constitutional
right when the circumstances indicate that they did so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. The court's position is also
consistent with the legislature's judgment that youths twelve
years of age or older are capable of making informed decisions
regarding waiver of rights without parental concurrence. 08
as one factor in the totality of the circumstances bearing on the voluntariness
issue. See id. The Minnesota Supreme Court had, on previous occasions, rejected defendants' requests that parental presence be an absolute prerequisite
for the admissibility of statements obtained from juveniles:
Although we recognize that the presence of parents and their guidance
during interrogation of a juvenile is desirable, we reject the absolute
rule that every minor is incapable and incompetent as a matter of law
to waive his constitutional rights. In determining whether a juvenile
has voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional rights, parental presence is only one factor to consider and is not an absolute
prerequisite.
State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 440, 212 N.W.2d 664, 671 (1973).
104. See Nunn, 297 N.W.2d at 755 (quoting with approval Fare v. Michael C.,
442 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1979)).
105. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 6.01.
106. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 6.01(1).
107. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 6.01(2); 15.02(1); 15.03.
108. Minnesota law provides:
Waiver of any right which a child has under this chapter must be an
express waiver intelligently made by the child after the child has been

1984]

JUVENILE JUSTICE

There are problems, however, in applying such standards.
When evaluating the validity of a waiver under the totality of
the circumstances, courts tend to focus on characteristics of the
juvenile, such as age, education, and LQ., and on circumstances
surrounding the interrogation, such as methods and length of
the interrogation and any subsequent repudiation of the statement. 0 9 Courts have identified factors relevant to the determination of "voluntariness" but have declined to give controlling
weight to any particular factor, instead remitting the weighing
of different factors to the unfettered discretion of the trial
court.11 0 Consequently, there are "no clear-cut rules which
could protect a child who is not as mature or knowledgeable as
an adult, [and] courts are left without clear touchstones by
which to evaluate a particular confession."'1 1 Similarly, the police who interrogate a juvenile may be unable to determine in
advance whether a waiver will be admissible at trial. Indeed,
the factors invoked in the "totality of the circumstances" test
have been characterized as "amorphous, illusive, and largely
unreviewable."1 12
Despite the judicial determinations, both by decision and
fully and effectively informed of the right being waived. If a child is
under 12 years of age, the child's parent, guardian or custodian shall
give any waiver or offer any objection contemplated by this chapter.
MINN.STAT. § 260.155(8) (1982).
109. See, e.g., West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1102 (1969); People v. Lara, 67 Cal. 2d 365, 376-77, 432 P.2d 202, 21718, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 599 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968); State v. White,
494 S.W.2d 687, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973). The factors that emerge from the cases
include the age of the juveniles, their education, the "criminal sophistication"
and experience of the youths that bear on their knowledge of their rights,
whether the youths were questioned incommunicado, whether the interrogation occurred before or after the filing of formal charges, the methods and
length of interrogation, and whether the youths subsequently repudiated their
statements. See, e.g., Wes4 399 F.2d at 469.
110. See, e.g., Grisso, Juveniles' Capacitiesto Waive Miranda Rights: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 CALiF. L. REV. 1134, 1138-39 (1980). 'There is no case
law, however, which suggests how to evaluate all the considerations systematically. The manner in which the factors are weighed and combined has always
been a matter of judicial discretion." Id. at 1138.
111. Comment, supra note 94, at 202. Professor Thomas Grisso, after surveying all of the relevant juvenile waiver decisions between 1948 and 1979 to
identify whether a youth's characteristics affected a court's ruling on the validity of a waiver, concluded that no single variable is determinative since constellations of variables are usually cited in conjunction with one another. He notes
that confessions obtained from juveniles 12 years of age or younger frequently
are excluded, as well as those from juveniles with LQ. scores below 75, but that
no single factor is treated by courts as conclusive. See Grisso, supra note 110,
at 1138 n.24.
112. See Y. KAmisAR, supra note 93, at 43-44, 64-76; see also Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L REV. 865, 867-71 (1981) (reviewing Y.
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by rule, that the "totality of the circumstances" test is an adequate tool for assessing a youth's ability to understand and
waive constitutional rights, considerable doubt remains as to
whether a typical juvenile's waiver is, or even can be, "knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Empirical studies evaluating
juveniles' understanding of their Miranda rights indicate that
most juveniles who receive the Miranda warning may not understand it well enough to waive their constitutional rights in a
"knowing and intelligent" manner.11 3 Such lack of comprehension by minors raises questions about the adequacy of the Miranda warning as a safeguard. The Miranda warning was
KArIisAR, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY (1980)).

This emphasis on discretion parallels Packer's Crime Control Model, see
supra note 88, which accepts the legitimacy of police interrogation, particularly
in the initial stages of an investigation, and which emphasizes the reliability
and trustworthiness of statements obtained rather than the interrogation circumstances that produced them. See H. PACKER, supra note 88, at 187-88. Accordingly, "no hard and fast rule can be laid down about how long the police
[nor] about what kinds of
should be permitted to interrogate the suspect ...
police conduct are coercive. It is a factual question in each case . . . ." Id. at
188-89. The Due Process Model, on the other hand, would oppose such discretion. It would suggest that custodial interrogation conflicts with the premises
of an adversary process that imposes the burden on "the state to make its case
against a defendant without forcing him to cooperate in the process, and without capitalizing on his ignorance of his legal rights." Id. at 191 (emphasis added). The goals of the Due Process Model are achieved through "the
substitution of broad, quasi-legislative rules of administration for the more
traditional case-by-case adjudication;" greater equality between the state and
the accused, primarily through the assistance of counsel; and "restriction[s] on
law enforcement discretion." Id. at 194. The Due Process Model would favor a
per se rule, preferably one mandating consultation with counsel prior to police
interrogation, to avoid the discretionary problems associated with case-by-case
adjudications of the admissibility of confessions. Id. at 201.
113. See, e.g., T. Gaisso, JUVENILES' WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981); Ferguson & Douglas, A Study of Juvenile Waiver,
7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 39, 54 (1970); Grisso, supra note 110, at 1160. One study
found that over 90% of the juveniles interrogated waived their rights, that an
equal number did not understand the rights they waived, and that even a simplified version of the language in the Miranda warning failed to cure these defects. Ferguson & Douglas, supra,at 53. Another study found that the problems
of understanding and waiving rights were particularly acute for younger
juveniles:
As a class, juveniles younger than fifteen years of age failed to meet
both the absolute and relative (adult norm) standards for comprehenThe vast majority of these juveniles misunderstood at least
sion ....
one of the four standard Miranda statements, and compared with
adults, demonstrated signicantly poorer comprehension of the nature
and significance of the Miranda rights.
Grisso, supra note 110, at 1160. Grisso also reported that although "juveniles
younger than fifteen manifest significantly poorer comprehension than adults
of comparable intelligence," the level of comprehension exhibited by youths
sixteen and older, although comparable to that of adults, left much to be desired. See id. at 1157.

1984]

JUVENILE JUSTICE

designed to inform and educate a defendant to assure that subsequent waivers would indeed be "knowing and intelligent."u14
If most juveniles lack the capacity to understand the warning,
however, its ritual recitation hardly accomplishes that
purpose."15
Empirical research also suggests that juveniles are simply
not as competent as adults to waive their rights in a "knowing
and intelligent" manner. Indeed, it is this "developmental fact"
that accounts for many of the legal disabilities imposed upon
children.116 The alternative policies that might respond to this
114. Miranda requires advising the accused of his or her constitutional
rights in order to assure that any subsequent waiver is made in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner. The Court reasoned that unless the protective
warning is given to dispel "the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,"
no statement could be truly voluntary. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458
(1966). By providing for an automatic advisory, courts also were relieved from
examining the facts and circumstances surrounding each confession to determine whether its maker "knew" of his or her rights. Thus, Miranda not only
introduced a mandatory, "per se" procedure, but focused judicial scrutiny on
the issue of waiver. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 94, at 197.
115. 'The purpose of the Mirandawarnings is to convey information to the
suspect. Plainly, one who is told something he does not understand is no better off than one who is told nothing at all" United States v. Frazier, 476 F.2d
891, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 911
(1973).
116. The recognition that children stand on a different legal footing than
adults is reflected in the host of legal disabilities imposed on children for their
own protection. As one court noted:
The concept of establishing different standards for a juvenile is an accepted legal principle since minors generally hold a subordinate and
protected status in our legal system. There are legally and socially recognized differences between the presumed responsibility of adults and
minors.... [M]inors are unable to execute a binding contract..,
unable to convey real property .... and unable to marry of their own
free will .... It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that

one whom the State deems incapable of being able to marry, purchase
alcoholic beverages.

.

., or even donate their own blood.

.

., should be

compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked to
waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.
Lewis v. State, 259 Ind.431, 437-38, 288 N.E.2d 138, 141-42 (1972) (citations omitted). The same factors of age and relative immaturity that have resulted in various legal doctrines to protect minors from their own incapacity would appear
to apply to waivers of constitutional rights and their attendant consequences as
welL If children are legally incapable of making a contract, executing a valid
will, or entering into a marriage, the disability seemingly would also attend the
making of incriminating statements. See, e.g., Bailey & Soderling, Born to
Lose-Waiver of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights by Juvenile Suspects, 15
CLEARmGHousE REV. 127, 129 (1981). Courts have, however, indulged the view
that minors can intelligently waive their rights, at least to incriminate themselves, because the judiciary views confessions as an important tool of law enforcement. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 94, at 201; see also People v. Lara, 67
Cal. 2d 365, 379-81, 432 P.2d 202, 212-13, 62 Cal. Rptr. 586, 596-97 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 945 (1968).
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difficulty, however, raise other troublesome issues.11 7 The option adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Courti is to continue
to use a "totality of the circumstances" test, raise judicial
awareness about the particular vulnerabilities of youth, and
hope that juvenile court judges conscientiously reviewing waivers under the totality of the circumstances will be able to distinguish between competent and incompetent waivers and
confessions by juveniles." 9 This solution, however, is weakened by the multitude of factors implicated by the "totality" approach, the lack of guidelines as to how the various factors
should be weighed, and the myriad combinations of factual situations that make almost every case unique. These factors result in virtually unlimited and unreviewable judicial
discretion.120 Thus, when the "totality" test is viewed in its procedural context, it appears to exclude only the most egregiously obtained confessions and then only on a haphazard
basis.121
117. For example, one commentator identifies five policy strategies for assessing the validity of a juvenile's waiver:. 1) continued adherence to the adult
"totality of the circumstances" test; 2) exclusion of confessions obtained from a
juvenile who is under juvenile court jurisdiction from admission in an adult
criminal prosecution following waiver; 3) an "Atmospheric Requisite Standard," or a requirement that the relationship between the juvenile and the interrogator be sufficiently adversarial, so that the youth would not be lulled into
confessing by the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court; 4) a statutory requirement that parents be promptly called or a youth promptly arraigned as a
prerequisite to police interrogation; and 5) a mandatory requirement of parental presence during police interrogation. See Comment, supra note 94, at 201-07.
118. See supra notes 101-07.
119. See MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 6.01; cf. Commonwealth v. Roane, 494 Pa. 389,
396-98, 329 A.2d 286, 289-90 (1974) (Eagen, J., dissenting) (parental presence requirement is "a prophylactic rule [that] is unrealistic").
120. See, e.g., Y. KAMISAR, supra note 93, at 43-44, 64-76; Comment, supra
note 94, at 202. Grisso notes that "[tlhe degree to which judges can weigh
these factors consistently, however, is difficult to discern. There are numerous
combinations of factors possible and no guidelines as to how they should be
weighed and balanced. This results in almost unlimited judicial discretion."
Grisso, supra note 110, at 1138-39. Indeed, in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707
(1979), in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the applicability of
the totality of the circumstances test, there were substantial divisions within
the Court over its meaning as applied to the facts of the case itself. Both dissenting opinions concluded that the youth did not understand the rights he
purportedly waived. Compare id. at 724-27 (the youth made an intelligent
waiver) with id. at 733-34 (Powell, J., dissenting) (discussing evidence suggesting that the youth did not understand his rights) and id. at 730 & n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (the police did not attempt to allay the youth's concern
that the police would erroneously tell him that a police officer was an attorney
in order to elicit information).
121. Even a cursory review of the cases suggests the extreme facts required
to find that a juvenile's waiver is invalid. See, e.g., People v. Baker, 9 Ill. App. 3d
654, 292 N.E.2d 670 (1973) (15-year-old, I.Q. of 72, first grade reading level, non-
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In light of the difficulties of the "totality" test, several jurisdictions have attempted to develop some concrete guidelines or

per se rules requiring the presence of an "interested" adult,
such as a parent or an attorney, at the interrogation of a juvenile before the confession or waiver can be valid.122 The per se
approach, as advocated by commentators and adopted by
courts, excludes any waiver or confession made by a juvenile
23
without adherence to the requisite procedural safeguards.1
Courts and commentators have advanced a variety of reasons for such a per se requirement. In In re Dino,124 for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court asserted that
the rights which a juvenile may waiver [sic] before interrogation are so
fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of
requiring the advice of a parent, counsel or advisor so relatively simple
and well established as a safeguard against a juvenile's improvident judicial acts, that we should not pause to inquire in individual cases
whether the juvenile could, on his own, understand and effectively ex125
ercise his rights.
functional student). Juvenile's confessions typically are admitted by trial
courts, and only extreme facts will overturn those admissions on appeal. For
examples of the facts required to overturn a confession, see, e.g., Thomas v.
State, 447 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir. 1971) (15-year-old, LQ. of 72, fifth grade dropout, 19
hours of incommunicado interrogation, not taken before a judge for two days,
and not given adequate explanation of his constitutional rights); In re Estrada,
1 Ariz. App. 348, 403 P.2d 1 (1965) (14-year-old, low education and literacy, serious and complex charges, hasty proceedings); In re P., 7 Cal. 3d 801, 500 P.2d 1,
103 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1972) (14-year-old, retarded, immature, first offender).
122. See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.W.2d 138 (1972) (parental
presence an absolute prerequisite to admissibility); In re Dino, 359 So. 2d 586
(La.) (same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978). See generally Levy & Skacevic,
What Standard Should be Used to Determine a Valid Juvenile Waiver, 6 PERPERDmE L, REv. 767 (1979); Note, Interrogationof Juveniles: The Right to a Parent's Presence,77 DicK. L, REV. 543 (1973); Note, Waiver of Miranda Rights by
Juveniles: Is ParentalPresence a Necessary Safeguard, 21 J. FAb. L. 725 (1982);
Comment, The Judicial Response to Juvenile Confessions: An Examination of
the Per Se Rule, 17 DuQ. L, REv. 659 (1978).
123. The difference between the totality test and the per se approach reflects the tensions between the Crime Control and Due Process Models. See
supra note 88. The totality approach allows courts discretion to consider a
youth's maturity, but imposes minimal interference with police investigative
work. The per se approach assumes that most juveniles are immature and
hence require special protections to assure their understanding of the process.
Although the per se requirement greatly simplifies the role of courts in the administration of the juvenile process, see Allen, supra note 48, at 532, it may provide unnecessary protection for the occasional sophisticated youth in order to
afford adequate protection for the vast majority of unsophisticated juveniles,
see Grisso, supra note 110, at 1135.
124. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).
125. Id. at 592. The Dino court also observed that reliance on the "totality of
the circumstances" test
tends to mire the courts in a morass of speculation similar to that from
which Miranda was designed to extricate them in adult cases. Although the Mirandacourt did not express itself specifically on the spe-
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The perceived virtues of a per se parental presence requirement include mitigating the dangers of untrustworthiness, reducing coercive influences, providing an independent witness
who can testify in court as to any coercion that was present, assuring the accuracy of any statements obtained, and relieving
police of the burden of making subjective judgments on a caseby-case basis about the competency of the youths they are
questioning. 126 Indiana127 and Georgia128 also have judicially
created per se requirements, as did Pennsylvania until very recial needs of juveniles confronted with police interrogation, the reasons
given for making the warning an absolute prerequisite to interrogation
point up the need for an absolute requirement that juveniles not be
permitted to waive constitutional rights on their own.
Id. at 591.
126. The problem of the inability of police to anticipate in advance whether
a statement obtained from a juvenile will be admissible has been a concern of
other courts as well. As the Indiana Supreme Court noted in Lewis v. State,
259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972):
The authorities seeking to question a juvenile enter into an area of
doubt and confusion when the child appears to waive his rights to
counsel and against self-incrimination. They are faced with the possibility of taking a statement from him only to have a court later find that
his age and the surrounding circumstances precluded the child from
making a valid waiver. There are no concrete guidelines for the authorities to follow in order to insure that the waiver will be upheld. The
police are forced to speculate as to whether the law will judge this accused juvenile on the same plane as an adult in regard to the waiver of
his constitutional rights, or whether the court will take cognizance of
the age of the child and apply different standards....
...
Clearly defined procedures should be established in areas
which lend themselves to such standards in order to assure both efficient police procedure and protection of the important constitutional
rights of the accused. Age is one area which lends itself to clearly defined standards.
Id. at 436-37, 288 N.E.2d at 141; see also Dino, 359 So. 2d at 591.
127. See Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142 (1972) (requiring
the presence of a parent or guardian is a safeguard that recognizes "the inherent differences between adults and minors" and ensures that any waiver is
truly voluntary). The Lewis court emphasized that it was not erecting a bar to
juvenile confessions, but rather establishing a procedure by which to gauge
their admissibility:
The rule adopted here does not mean that a minor's confession is
per se inadmissible but merely holds that, as a result of the age of the
accused, the law requires certain specific and concrete safeguards to
insure the voluntariness of a confession. The long standing tradition
that juveniles can waive their right to silence or to an attorney is continued, but at the same time another long termed tradition, that such
waivers require special precautions to insure it be done knowingly and
intelligently, is recognized.
Id. at 440, 288 N.E.2d at 142-43.
128. Cf Freeman v. Wilcox, 119 Ga. App. 325, 329, 167 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1969)
(both parent and child must be advised of the child's right to have counsel
present during interrogation).

1984]

JUVENILE JUSTICE

179

cently. 2 9- The California Supreme Court created a slightly dif129. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has come full circle on its view of
the procedural safeguards required at the interrogation of a juvenile. Initially,
the standard for determining the admissibility of a juvenile's waiver and confession-was the traditional totality of the circumstances test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Porter, 449 Pa. 153, 159, 295 A.2d 311, 317 (1972); Commonwealth v.
Moses, 446 Pa. 350, 354, 287 A.2d 131, 133 (1971). It then created a per se "interested adult" rule which provided that juveniles could not waive their right to
silence or to the assistance of counsel without first being provided opportunity
to consult with an "interested adult," who is informed of the juvenile's rights
and is interested in the welfare of the child. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Markle, 475 Pa. 266, 269, 380 A.2d 346, 348 (1977); Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463
Pa. 90, 93, 343 A.2d 669, 670 (1975), cert. denied,424 U.S. 934 (1976), overruled,
People v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218,465 A.2d 989 (1983); Commonwealth v. Starkes,
461 Pa. 178, 185-86, 335 A.2d 698, 701 (1975); Commonwealth v. Roane, 459 Pa. 389,
394-95, 329 A.2d 286, 289-90 (1974).
In Roane, 459 Pa. 389, 329 A.2d 286 (1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
relied upon language in Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1962), see supra
note 96, suggesting that an immature youth needs the opportunity to consult
with a lawyer or other adult. The court excluded a juvenile's confession because a request by the boy's mother for counsel for her son was ignored.
Roane, 459 Pa. at 394-95, 329 A.2d at 288. In Marle, 475 Pa. 266, 380 A.2d 346
(1977), the court emphasized the per se nature of the parental consultation requirement. 'When a juvenile has not been given this opportunity for consultation, we need not look to the totality of the circumstances to determine the
voluntariness of the confession." Id. at 270, 308 A.2d at 348. Then, in Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218,465 A.2d 989 (1983), the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court retreated from its "overly protective and unreasonably paternalistic" per
se rule in order to give 'more adequate weight to the interests of society." Id.
at 223, 465 A.2d at 992. According to the Christmasformulation, there is a rebuttable presumption of a juvenile's incompetence to waive his or her rights.
[W] e presume that a juvenile is incompetent to waive his rights without opportunity for consultation with an informed and interested adult
this presumption must be tested against the totality of the circumstances surrounding a given waiver to determine whether the particular juvenile might in fact be competent to waive his rights without such
opportunity.
Id. at 223, 465 A.2d at 992.
Because the prosecution already bears the burden of establishing the voluntariness of confessions, see, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,489 (1972), it is
unclear how a presumption of incompetence differs from a requirement that
the prosecution affirmatively establish the validity of a waiver under the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. at 22526, 465 A.2d at 993 (Larsen, J., concurring). Finally, in Commonwealth v. Williams, - Pa. -, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court repudiated the rebuttable presumption it had created in Christmas, and returned to
the traditional totality of the circumstances analysis.
The requirements of due process are satisfied, and the protection
against the use of involuntary confessions which law and reason demand is met by application of the totality of circumstances analysis to
all questions involving the waiver of rights and the voluntariness of
confessions made by juveniles. All of the attending facts and circumstances must be considered and weighed in determining whether a juvenile's confession was knowingly and freely given. Among those
factors are the juvenile's youth, experience, comprehension, and the
presence or absence of an interested adult.
Id. at -, 475 A.2d at 1288.
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ferent per se rule in People v. Burton,130 treating a juvenile's
request to see his parents as the functional equivalent of an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege and analogous to a
request to consult with an attorney.131 A number of other
states have enacted statutes that make the opportunity for a
youth to consult with an interested adult a prerequisite to the
32
admissibility of any confession.1
The Minnesota Supreme Court's Juvenile Justice Study
Commission, hoping to achieve a similar result, proposed a per
se rule requiring parents or guardians to be present at any interrogation and to agree in writing to any waiver of rights by
the juvenile.133 Without such an adult presence, no statement
130. 6 Cal. 3d 375, 491 P.2d 793, 99 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971).
131. See id. at 383-84, 491 P.2d at 798, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 6; see also People v.
Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 954, 464 P.2d 114, 117-18, 83 Cal. Rptr. 658, 661-62 (1970)
(" 'If the individual [in an adult criminal case] indicates in any manner, at any
time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his
.' ") (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
Fifth Amendmant privilege ...
473-74 (1966)). The California Supreme Court held in Burton that when a child
who is in custody and who is interrogated without the presence of counsel requests to see one of his or her parents, further questioning must cease. That
holding presaged the United States Supreme Court's decision in Fare v.
Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
In In re Michael C., 21 Cal. 3d 471, 579 P.2d 7, 146 Cal. Rptr. 358 (1978), rev'd sub
nom., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), the California Supreme Court extended Burton's "parental request" rule to a youth's request to consult with his
or her probation officer. The California court reasoned that because the probation officer is a "trusted guardian figure" who exercises the parens patriae authority of the state, a minor's request for his or her probation officer is the
same as a request to consult with parents during an interrogation which, under
Burton, constitutes an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege. See id. at
476, 579 P.2d at 10, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 361. The United States Supreme Court rejected this position in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), distinguishing the
role of counsel from that of probation officers in the Miranda process. See id.
at 718-24.
132. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(3) (c) (I) (1978); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-137(a) (West Supp. 1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-27(E)(8) (1978);
OKL.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1109(A) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
133. The proposed rules that the Juvenile Justice Study Commission originally submitted to the Minnesota Supreme Court recommended a per se requirement that parents or guardians be present at any juvenile's interrogation
and also would have required that the parents agree to any waiver of rights.
See In re Proposed Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court, supra note 86, Rule
6.02 ("[A] waiver made out of court must be in writing and signed by the child
and the child's parent(s) or guardian.") (emphasis added). Proposed Rule
15.02, governing the waiver of counsel, included a similar per se parental concurrence requirement. The Proposed Rules' inclusion of a per se parental presence requirement was one of the philosophical and procedural issues dividing
the Rules Drafting Task Force and the Juvenile Justice Study Commission.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's reinstatement of the totality of the circumstances test represents one of the instances in which the court had a clear
choice between providing an additional safeguard that recognized the immatur-
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by the juvenile would have been admissible.134 The proponents
of the rule, like the jurisdictions requiring per se parental presence, viewed juveniles as neither mature enough to understand
their rights nor competent enough to waive them without prior
consultation with a knowledgeable adult. Advocates of paren-

tal presence believe that it reduces the juvenile's sense of isolation, pressure, and fear in the interrogation process and
provides legal advice about the consequences of a waiver that
the juvenile otherwise might not appreciate.
A per se requirement assumes both that the presence of
parents would benefit the child, because of an identity of interests, and that parents can adequately understand their child's

legal rights and function as effective advisors. Such assumptions, however, may not be valid. Requiring parental presence
during interrogation may not benefit the child because it may
increase rather than decrease the coercive pressures to which
the youth is subjected.13 5 The parents' potential conflict of interest with the child, their emotional reactions to their child's
arrest, or their own intellectual or social disabilities may make
them unable to play the envisioned supportive role for the
child.136 One study found that most parents did not directly advise their children about the waiver decision and that those
that did almost always urged the child to waive rights.137 Moreover, research on the extent to which adults understand and intelligently waive their own Miranda rights casts doubt on
whether even well-intentioned parents can provide much
assistance; they seldom have legal training and may not understand the problems facing the child.138 Indeed, the case law is
ity and lack of capacity of most juveniles, or treating youths like adult criminal
defendants, and chose the latter course.
134. In re Proposed Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court, .supra note 86,
Rule 6.03.
135. One critic of the parental presence requirement noted:
[Will] the presence of this "friendly adult".. . create the intended results[?] Parents, possibly ashamed and/or angered that their child is
in custody, may further coerce the child into owning up to the alleged
offense, instead of affording the youth shelter. Moreover, a parent may
be no more knowledgable than the juvenile about constitutional rights
and the consequences of a confession.
Comment, supra note 94, at 205.
136. See Grisso, supra note 110, at 1142; Comment, supra note 94. at 205.
137. T. Giusso, supra note 113, at 187, 200. This empirical observation was
bolstered by questionnaire surveys that found that a substantial majority of the
parents felt that juveniles should never be allowed to withhold from police any
information about their involvement in a crime. Id. at 175, 179.
138. Professor Grisso explained:
The most serious objections to this [parental presence] alternative
concern the ability of laymen to provide effective assistance in a
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replete with instances of parents coercing their children into
confessing to the police.139 Rather than mitigating the pressures of interrogation, parents appear predisposed to coercing
their children to waive the right to silence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately rejected the
Study Commission's proposed per se rule requiring parental
presence. The court's decision seems wise, because the proposed rule would not adequately safeguard a child's rights and
preinterrogation setting. Commentators have observed that many parents do not care, and that "[olften the parents are, at best, only equal
in capacity to the child and therefore poorly equipped to comprehend
the complexities confronting them." In one recent empirical study,
nearly three-quarters of a sample of parents disagreed with the premise that children should be allowed to withhold information from the
police when suspected of a crime. In another study, more than twothirds of the parents present during actual preinterrogation waiver proceedings offered no comments or advice to their children. When these
findings are coupled with those of the instant studies, which indicate
that many adults do not themselves adequately understand their Miranda rights, the "interested adult" alternative becomes even less
attractive.
Grisso, supra note 110, at 1163 (quoting McMillian & McMurtry, The Role of the
Defense Lawyer in the Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 S'r.
Louis U.L.J. 561, 570 (1970)); see also T. Giusso, supranote 113, at 170-82; Grisso
& Ring, Parents' Attitudes Toward Juvenile's Rights in Interrogation, 6 Cum.
JUST. & BEHAV. 211, 224 (1979) (citing studies that suggest "that parental guidance in such matters often is not an adequate substitute for the advice of
trained legal counsel").
Research evaluating the extent to which adults understand and intelligently waive their Mirandarights raises the question whether parents can provide their children with much technical, legal assistance. See, e.g., Driver,
Confessions and the Social Psychology of Coercion, 82 HARv. L. Rsv. 42, 59
(1968) ("even highly educated men may make incriminating admissions simply
because they fall to comprehend the legal significance of their remarks"); Griffith & Ayres, A Postscriptto the Miranda Project: Interrogationof Draft Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 305-10 (1967) (even sophisticated subjects failed to
understand the nature and function of their constitutional rights); Medalie,
Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogationin Our Nation's Capital: The
Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 1347, 1372-75 (1968) ("ratings
indicated that 15 percent of the eighty-five 'post-Mirandadefendants' failed to
understand the warning of the right to presence of counsel, and 24 percent
failed to understand the warning of the right to appointed counsel"); Project,
Interrogationsin New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1613
(1967) ("Warnings are not useless, but neither can they eliminate whatever 'inherently coercive atmosphere' the police station may have.").
139. See, e.g., United States v. Fowler, 476 F.2d 1091, 1093 (7th Cir. 1973).
Some courts have held that when a child responds to a question from his or her
parent in the presence of police officers, he or she is not subjected to custodial
interrogation and Miranda does not apply. See, e.g., In re C.P.D., 367 A.2d 133,
135 (D.C. 1976). Others have ignored reality in order to avoid finding coercion.
See, e.g., Anglin v. State, 259 So. 2d 752, 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (mother
repeatedly urged her fifteen-year-old boy "to tell the truth" or "she would clobber him," but the court concluded that "the motherly concern for ... the basic
precepts of morality are to be commended .... [and there was nol threat or
coercion on [her] part").
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might even aggravate the problem. Moreover, it would have introduced an additional tier of litigable issues, requiring courts
to determine whether the parent was informed of the juvenile's
rights, whether the parent understood those rights, and
whether the parent and child had an adequate opportunity to
confer. This might have diverted judicial attention from an assessment of the validity of the confession itself to a mechanical
inquiry into the parents' presence and understanding. The
court's decision to reinstate the "totality of the circumstances"
test is hardly an adequate alternative, however, because of the
inability to adequately consider the child's immaturity and because appellate courts are unable to continually monitor the
discretionary decisions of trial judges. 140 In addition, the new
Minnesota rules on waivers of rights may constitute a regression from the safeguards previously afforded juveniles. The
previous juvenile rules of procedure used in the nonmetropolitan counties prohibited a child from waiving the "right to
counsel at a hearing to determine whether a delinquency cause
shall be referred for prosecution, when the cause involves an
alleged act by the child that would be a felony if committed by
an adult" and required that the child have access to counsel at
reasonable times whenever in custody or detention.141
Although the preceding discussion has focused on waivers
of Mirandarights during police interrogation, similar problems
exist with respect to analyzing waivers of the right to counsel
under Minnesota's Rule 15 as well. There is both a 'ffth
amendment right to counsel" and a sixth amendment right to
the assistance of counsel at trial.142 The Minnesota Rules of
Procedure for Juvenile Court use the same "totality of the circumstances" to evaluate waivers of both types of rights. Although a waiver of Miranda rights may provide the state with
additional evidence it would not otherwise have, a waiver of the
right to counsel fundamentally alters both the structure and
function of the entire juvenile justice process and the ability of
a defendant to participate in adversarial proceedings. The need
to insure that waiver of the right to counsel is "knowing" and
"voluntary" is thus even more compelling than for waiver of
Mirandarights.
Instead of relying on a discretionary review of the circum140. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
141. Minn. P P. Prob.-Juv. Cts. 1-5(1).
142. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (fifth amendment right
to have counsel present during custodial interrogation); United States v. Henry,
447 U.S. 264 (1980) (sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel at trial).
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stances, a better way to "assure that the constitutional rights of
the child are protected and to promote the rehabilitation of the
child"'143 would be the adoption of a per se rule that requires
consultation with counsel and the presence of an attorney at
every interrogation of a juvenile and prior to any waiver of the
right to counsel.144 Since waivers of both Miranda rights and
the right to counsel involve legal and strategic considerations
as well as knowledge and understanding of rights and an appreciation of consequences, it is difficult to see how any other
alternative could be as effective. A per se requirement of consultation with counsel prior to a waiver takes account of the immaturity of youths and their lack of experience in law
enforcement situations. In addition, however, it recognizes that
attorneys rather than parents possess the skills and training
necessary to assist the child in the adversarial process.145 Both
the Juvenile Justice Standards Project and the Gault and Fare
Courts emphasized the importance of adequate legal counsel in
situations where a juvenile's waiver of rights is likely to affect
143. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 1.02.
144. See T. Grusso, supra note 113, at 200.
145. The Juvenile Justice Standards Project recommended that "[t]he right
to counsel should attach as soon as the juvenile is taken into custody ....
when a petition is filed. . ., or when the juvenile appears personally at an intake conference, whichever occurs first." JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra
note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, Standard 5.1 at
89. In addition, "[the juvenile] should have 'the effective assistance of counsel
at all stages of the proceeding"' and this right to counsel is mandatory and

nonwaivable. Id.
The commentary to the Standards does qualify the absolute, nonwaivable
nature of the right to counsel. "In recommending that the respondent's right to
counsel in delinquency proceedings should be nonwaivable, this standard is
not intended to foreclose absolutely the possibility of pro se representation by
a juvenile." JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING

TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEDURES, Standard 5.1 commentary at 93. The United
States Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), held that a
defendant in a state criminal trial has a constitutional right to proceed without
counsel when he or she voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. Id. at 83536. The Faretta Court emphasized that the sixth amendment guarantees defendants the "assistance of counsel."

It speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed
by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendant-not an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his
right to defend himself personally.
Id. at 820. The crucial issue for juveniles, as for adults, is whether such a
waiver can occur "voluntarily and intelligently," particularly without prior consultation with counsel. It would be an extraordinary juvenile who should be
able to persuade a court that he or she possesses sufficient maturity and legal
sophistication to effect pro se representation and still obtain a fair trial.
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the result of a proceeding.

46

Mandatory, nonwaivable repre-

sentation by counsel not only protects the rights of the juvenile, but also helps the courts by assisting in the efficient
handling of cases and assuring that any waivers that the juvenile is entitled to make are in fact made knowingly and
intelligently.147
146. The Supreme Court in Gault mandated the right to counsel because "a
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent'
and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to
a felony prosecution." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967). Because the decision to
waive the privilege against self-incrimination and confession often is determinative of the outcome of the proceeding, "the juvenile needs the assistance of
counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts,
[and] to insist upon regularity of the proceedings ....
The child 'requires the
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.'" Id. at
36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)) (emphasis added).
The Gault Court noted that the President's Crime Commission recommended that "in order to assure 'procedural justice for the child,' it is necessary that '[ci ounsel... be appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive
action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent"' Id. at 38 (quoting PRESmENT'S Cobnsso ON LAw ENFORCEMENr AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SoctETy 86-87

(1967)). The Court also observed that the Commission emphasized that the
right to counsel was the cornerstone of the entire procedural apparatus of juvenile justice, "the keystone of the whole structure of guarantees that a minimum
system of procedural justices requires." Id. at 38 n.65 (quoting PRESMENr'S
COMMsiSIoN ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOcIETY 86 (1967)).

Similarly, the Supreme Court in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979),
based its decision that a request for a probation officer was not a per se invocation of the right to counsel on the crucial role of counsel in the criminal and
juvenile processes. "It is this pivotal role of legal counsel that justifies the per
se rule established in Miranda, and that distinguishes the request for counsel
from the request for a probation officer, a clergyman, or a close friend." Id. at
722. The Fare Court elaborated on the crucial role of counsel by noting that
the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of
his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation. Because of this special ability of the
lawyer to help the client preserve his Fifth Amendment rights once the
client becomes enmeshed in the adversary process, the Court found
that "the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system" established by the Court Moreover, the lawyer's presence helps
guard against overreaching by the police and ensures that any statements actually obtained are accurately transcribed for presentation
into evidence.
The per se aspect of Miranda was thus based on the unique role
the lawyer plays in the adversary system of criminal justice in this
country. Whether it is a minor or an adult who stands accused, the
lawyer is the one person to whom society as a whole looks as the protector of the legal rights of that person in his dealings with the police
and the courts.
Id. at 719 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)).
147. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, Standard 5.1 commentary at 92. Commentators
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The requirements of assistance of counsel, nonwaivability
of counsel, and consultation with counsel prior to the waiver of
other rights is not just the "idealistic" recommendation of policy groups and commentators. For several years, the Texas
Family Code had a provision invalidating juvenile waivers of
rights made without assistance of counsel. 48 The Texas courts
interpreted the legislation to include an absolute right to counsel unless the child waived the right with the assistance of an
attorney.14 9 One court concluded that
the Legislature was taking every precaution to protect the rights of minors from those who might unintentionally or perhaps in some cases
intentionally take advantage of one who is young, inexperienced and
perhaps unable to exercise his constitutional
rights until he finds it is
1 50
too late to have those rights protected.

Legislative amendments in 1975 eliminated the absolute assistance of counsel, substituting instead the conventional Miranda
have suggested other advantages that could follow from mandatory representation of juveniles. Professor Grisso, for example, has observed:
[W]hile defense counsel would almost always advise a client to remain
silent until the attorney has had the opportunity to review the case
fully, the per se proposal would not always reduce the amount of information the police acquire about juvenile offenses. In some instances,
the lawyer might assist the suspect to explain clearly his noninvolvement in the incident; in other cases, the lawyer might help the juvenile
make a statement that is not susceptible to an inaccurate or adverse
interpretation by the police. At all events, since information gathered
from police interrogations of juveniles is often inaccurate and therefore
useless, the proposed per se rule could only serve to increase the accuracy of any information imparted.
Grisso, supra note 110, at 1163-64.
148. The Texas law provided that:
Unless a contrary intent clearly appears elsewhere in this title, any
right granted to a child by this title or by the constitution or laws of
this state or the United States may be waived in proceedings under
this title if:
(1) the waiver is made by the child and the attorney for the child;
(2) the child and the attorney waiving the right are informed of and
understand the right and the possible consequences of waiving it;
(3) the waiver is voluntary; and
(4) the waiver is made in writing or in court proceedings that are
recorded.
Txx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.09 (Vernon 1975) (amended 1975); see infra note 151
and accompanying text; see also Dawson, Delinquent Children and Children in
Need of Supervision: Draftsman's Comments to Title 3 of the Texas Family
Code, 5 Txx. TECH L. REv. 509, 524-25 (1974) (the Texas legislature felt that the
child's attorney is the only appropriate adult who may effectively concur with a
waiver of a right by a child); Comment, Waiver of ConstitutionalRights by a
Juvenile Under the Texas Family Code: The 1975 Amendment to Section 51.09,
17 S. Tux. L.J. 301, 303 (1975) (the Texas statute gave rise to the most progressive provisions of juvenile law before its scope was limited by the 1975
amendments).
149. See, e.g., In re S.E.B., 514 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); In re
LE.J., 511 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
150. In re S.E.B., 514 S.W.2d 948, 950-51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).

19841

JUVENILE JUSTICE

warning/waiver formula.'15

Several other jurisdictions, how-

ever, including Iowa and Wisconsin, maintain significant restrictions on the circumstances under which a juvenile may
waive either Miranda rights or the right to the assistance of
counsel in all stages of the juvenile process. 152 These states
have also recognized that uncounseled delinquency convictions
cannot lead to out-of-home dispositions of such youths.15 3

Affording mandatory, nonwaivable counsel to juveniles
during interrogation and at all court proceedings is not, however, a panacea. Attorneys may not be capable of or committed
to representing juvenile clients in an effective adversarial man-

ner. Organizational pressures to cooperate, judicial hostility toward adversarial litigants, role ambiguity created by the dual
goals of rehabilitation and punishment, reluctance to help
juveniles "beat a case," or an internalization of a court's treat-

ment philosophy may compromise the role of counsel in juvenile court.154 Although Gault was premised on the ability of
151.

See Tx. FAL. CODE ANN. § 51.09(b) (Vernon Supp. 1975-1983). The leg-

islative changes provoked one writer to note:
Under the new amendment, the child is subjected to the same pressure
and police chicanery that has diluted the protection of Miranda for
adults, but the juvenile does not have the same presence of mind as
the more mature adult violator. The juvenile's right to counsel, which
was so effectively safeguarded by prior § 51.09, has now been denied
him ....
One might surmise that the amendment is worded to ensure swift and easy confessions and, therefore, convictions.
Comment, supra note 148, at 310.
152. See IowA CODE ANN. § 232.11 (West Supp. 1984-1985); VIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.23 (West 1983). Iowa prohibits the waiver of counsel at interrogation by
any youth under sixteen years of age without written parental concurrence.
Regardless of any Miranda waivers, no child of any age may waive the assistance of counsel at any of the various stages and hearings of the juvenile justice
process. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11. Alabama has also experimented with measures to secure effective legal advice to juveniles prior to interrogation. See ALA.
CODE § 12-15-57 (1975) (repealed 1981).
153. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.23(1) (a) (West Supp. 1983-1984); cf. Scott
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (no indigent defendant may be imprisoned unless
the state has afforded him the assistance of appointed counsel).
154. The co-optation of defense attorneys in the adult criminal process has
been described in Blumberg, The Practiceof Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a Profession LAW & Soc'y REV., June 1967, at 15, 19-20.
Blumberg argues that certain institutional pressures and the need to maintain
stable, cooperative relationships with other personnel in the system are inconsistent with effective advocacy and an adversary position. Defense attorneys
are involved in ongoing relations with prosecutors and judges and become dependent on their cooperation. Similarly, prosecutors and the court depend on
defense attorneys to cooperate in order to expedite a large volume of cases.
The result is a system of informal relationships in which maintaining organizational stability may become more important than the representation of any
given client See id. at 18-24. The same analysis has been applied to the role of
attorneys in juvenile court. See, e.g., A. PLATr, supra note 2, at 163-75. See gen-
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lawyers to manipulate formal procedures for the benefit of
their clients, many commentators have noted that this does not
always happen in juvenile proceedings. 5 5 Indeed, there are
some indications that representation of juveniles by lawyers in
more traditional "therapeutic" juvenile courts may actually redound to the disadvantage of the client in adjudications or
dispositions. 5 6
A rule mandating nonwaivable assistance of counsel for

juveniles prior to interrogation as well as throughout the process would have substantial implications for the juvenile court.
It would probably restrict the ability of police to obtain waivers
from and interrogate youths who are criminally sophisticated
as well as those too immature to protect themselves. Indeed,
courts have decried the effects that procedural safeguards and
per se rules would have on the efficient repression of crime. "It
is apparent most courts, required to deal pragmatically with an
ever-mounting crime wave in which minors play a disproportionate role, have considered society's self-preservation interest
erally Duffee & Siegel, The Organization Man: Legal Counsel in the Juvenile
Court,7 CRim. L. BULL. 544, 548-53 (1971) (juveniles with counsel are more likely
to be incarcerated than juveniles without counsel); Platt & Friedman, The Limits of Advocacy: Occupational Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REV.
1156, 1184 (1968) (private lawyers do not enhance juveniles' bargaining power
or rights); Platt, Schechter & Tiffany, In Defense of Youth: A Case Study of the
Public Defender in Juvenile Court, 43 IND. L.J. 619, 629 (1968) (informal relationships in juvenile court influence judges to dispose of cases based on their personal feelings about counsel). Other studies have questioned whether lawyers
can actually perform as adversaries in a system rooted in parens patriae and
benevolent rehabilitation. See, e.g., W. STAPLETON & L TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE
OF YOUTH 37-39 (1972); Fox, supra note 2, at 1236; Genden, Separate Legal Representationfor Children. Protectingthe Rights and Interests of Minors in Judicial Proceedings,11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 565, 587-93 (1978); Kay & Segal, The
Role of the Attorney in Juvenile Court Proceedings: A Non-Polar Approach, 61
GEo. L.J. 1401, 1410 (1973); Lefstein, Stapleton & Teitelbaum, In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its Implementation, 3 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 491, 561 (1969);
Lemert, Legislating Change in the Juvenile Court, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 421, 430-34;
see also Ferster, Courtless & Snethen, The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of
the Role of Counsel, 39 FoRDHAm L. REV. 375, 411 (1971) (it is sometimes the
proper role of counsel to seek the least serious disposition rather than to defend zealously); McMillian & McMurtry, The Role of the Defense Lawyer in the
Juvenile Court-Advocate or Social Worker?, 14 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 561, 597-98
(1970) (role of counsel as advocate unclear when placement appears to be best
for the child).
155. See, e.g., D. HORowrrz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 171-219 (1977);
W. STAPLETON & L. TErrELBAUM, supra note 154, at 63-96; Fox, supra note 2, at
1236.
156. See, e.g., D. HoRowrrz, supra note 155, at 191-94; W. STAPLETON & L. TEiTELBAUM, supra note 154, at 63-96; Clarke & Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or
Crime Contro and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 263,
304-06 (1980).
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in rejecting a blanket exclusion for juvenile confessions." 5 7
burdens on the
Such an exclusion would impose substantial
15 8
delivery of legal services in rural areas.
The response to all of these objections, however, is that
every defendant is already entitled by Gault and Miranda to
the assistance of counsel during interrogation and at every critical stage of the process, that only "an inexperienced person in
the toils of the law" will cooperate with the police to the person's own detriment, and that only an attorney can redress the
imbalance between a vulnerable youth and the state.15 9 The issue is not one of entitlement, but rather the ease or difficulty
with which waivers of counsel are found, which in turn has the
enormous implications for the entire administration of the juvenile justice process discussed above.
Despite these difficulties, however, the one inescapable fact
of juvenile justice administration in Minnesota is that a majority of all youths prosecuted as delinquents are not represented
by counsel during the process. 1

6

0

Nearly half the juveniles

charged with felonies and more than a quarter of those sentenced to correctional facilities had no lawyer,16 1 and the
county-by-county variations in rates of representation suggest
that nonrepresentation reflects judicial policies rather than
157. In re Thompson, 241 N.W.2d 2, 5 (Iowa 1976); see also Commonwealth v.

Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983) (adopting a presumption that no person under eighteen years of age is competent to waive the right to counsel).
158. JUVENILE JUSrICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PRETRI.A COURT PROCEEDINGS, Standard 5.1 commentary at 93 (inadequate

availability of legal services in rural areas may make compliance with
mandatory counsel recommendation difficult).

159. See H. PACKER, supra note 88, at 203. As Professor Grisso explained:
The beneficial effects of a per se requirement of counsel in juvenile
waiver proceedings should be enhanced as the juvenile justice system
increases its own support of a strong advocacy role for these attorneys.
At a minimum, the requirement provides a reasonable level of protection for younger juveniles; without this protection, they would be subjected to the very circumstances that Miranda sought to eliminate.
Grisso, supra note 110, at 1164.
160. "In the majority of delinquency/status offense cases (627) there is not
representation." K. FINE, OUT OF HOME PLACEMENT OF CuIDRN IN MINNEOTA:
A RESEARCH REPORT 48 (1983).

161. Data collected in 1983, which does not include Hennepin County, indicates that juveniles appear without counsel in 48% of delinquency adjudications and 68% of status adjudications. Data provided by Dr. Stephen Coleman,
Stastical Analysis Center of the Minnesota State Planning Agency 1 (1984) (a
copy of the tables is on file with the author). Forty-five percent of the youths
adjudicated for the felony of burglary were convicted without counsel, and 287
of the youths sentenced to juvenile correctional facilities had no lawyers. Id at
2.
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youthful competencies.162 Although national statistics are not
available, surveys of representation by counsel in other jurisdictions suggest that "there is reason to think that lawyers still
63
appear much less often than might have been expected."1
There may be several reasons so many youths are unrepresented-parental reluctance to retain an attorney, inadequate
public-defender legal services in nonurban areas, a judicial encouragement of and readiness to find waivers of counsel in order to ease judges' administrative burdens, or a judicial
predetermination of dispositions with nonappointment of counsel where probation is the anticipated outcome. Whatever the
reason, and despite Gault's requirement of a right to counsel
for juveniles facing potentially coercive action,164 most youths
never see a lawyer, waive their rights without any appreciation
of the legal consequences, and thus face the prosecutorial powers of the State alone and unaided.
The constitution does not require mandatory, nonwaivable
counsel for minors, or prohibit minors from waiving their fifth
amendment rights without prior consultation with their attorneys, or prevent minors from confronting the coercive power of
the state without the assistance of counsel. These requirements and prohibitions are nonetheless policy options available to the courts. The Minnesota Supreme Court's rejection of
a parental presence requirement in the Proposed Rule in favor
of the "totality of the circumstances" analysis is constitutional
as well as clearly consistent with the law of Minnesota and a
majority of other jurisdictions. As a matter of policy, however,
the court's choice to put juvenile offenders on the same procedural footing as adult criminal defendants ignores the
juveniles' relative immaturity, inexperience, and vulnerability
to adult coercion.
162. There are enormous county-by-county variations in the rates of nonrepresentation, ranging from a high of over 90% to a low of less than 10%. Id. at
2.
163. D. HORowrrz, supra note 155, at 185. Although the rates of representation vary widely from county to county within a state, Horowitz' survey of the
available data failed to find one state in which even 50% of the juveniles were
represented by counsel. Id. at 185-86; see also Clarke & Koch, supra note 156, at
297 (in 1976, the Juvenile Defender Project represented 22.3% of all juvenile
cases in Winston-Salem, N.C. and 45.8% in Charlotte).
164. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
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IV. DETENTION AND IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
A.

PREVENTivE DETENTION
The Queen observes that the King's Messenger is "in prison now, being
punished, and the trial doesn't even begin till next Wednesday; and of
course the crime comes last of all" Perplexed, Alice asks, "Suppose he
never commits the crime?" 'That would be all the better, wouldn't it?"
The Queen replied.1 65

Preventive detention on a predictive basis raises several
controversial issues. 166 First, controversy arises from the technical difficulty of accurately predicting which offenders should
be detained in order to prevent their commission of further offenses before trial.167 In addition, the detainee experiences
preventive detention as punitive confinement, regardless of the
stated regulatory purposes of the practice. Finally, there are issues of the propriety of incarceration prior to the determination
of guilt, the compatibility of pretrial detention with the presumption of innocence, and the procedural safeguards that
must be afforded to legitimate such a practice.68
The constitutionality of preventive detention was recently
1 69
affirmed in Schall v. Martin.
In Schall, the United States
Supreme Court divorced law from reality and upheld a New

York statute that authorized the preventive detention of a juvenile if a court found that there was a "serious risk" that the
child "may... commit an act which if committed by an adult
would constitute a crime."67 0 In reversing the lower courts and
165. 1. CARROLL,THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 88 (Harper &Bros. ed. 1902).
166. See, e.g., Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement A Suggested Framework
for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1277 (1973); Ervin, Foreword- Preventive Detention-A Step Backwardfor CriminalJustice, 6 IIAv. C.R.-C.L. L
REv. 291 (1971); Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World
of John Mitchell, 56 VA. I REV. 371 (1970); Note, Preventive Detention: An EmpiricalAnalysis,6 HARv. CJL-C.L L REv. 289 (1971).
Preventive detention of juveniles has been considered by a number of commentators. See, e.g, M SAR, UNDER LOCK AND KEY- JUVENILES IN JAILS AND
DETENTON 37 (1974); Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 154; Guggenheim, Paternalism, Prevention, and Punishment: Pretrial Detention of
Juveniles, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1064 (1977); Wald, PretrialDetentionfor Juveniles,
in PURSUING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 119; Comment, The Supreme Court and
PretrialDetention of Juveniles: A Principled Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L REV. 95 (1983).

167. See infra notes 187-91 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 197-209 and accompanying text.
169. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
170. Id. at 2405. The district court held that the statute violated due process
beause
(1) it gives the judge a license to act arbitrarily and capriciously in a
§ 789 prediction of the likelihood of future criminal conduct which cannot result from a reasoned determination, (2) pretrial detention without a prior adjudication of probable cause is, itself, a per se violation of
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upholding the statute, Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion
held that '"preventive detention under the Family Court Act
serves a legitimate state objective, and that the procedural protections afforded pre-trial detainees" satisfies the requirements
of due process. 171
The Court identified a number of "legitimate state objectives" advanced by the preventive detention provisions. It
noted that crime prevention is "a weighty social objective," that
juveniles account for a substantial number of crimes, and that
the "harm suffered by the victim of a crime is not dependent
upon the age of the perpetrator."172 The Court also asserted
due process, and (3) in addition, [pretrial detention] constitutes punishment that is constitutionally impermissible under the due process
clause.
United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the statute, as administered, imposed punishment without a finding of guilt. See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d
365, 372 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
171. See Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2406. In framing the issue as it did, the majority
departed from the three factor due process analysis in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319 (1976), which calls for a consideration of "the private interest that will
be affected by the official action; . . . the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the:additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id.
at 335. Instead, the Court emphasized that juveniles do not enjoy the same liberty interests as adults.
The juvenile's countervailing interest in freedom from institutional restraints, even for the brief time involved here, is undoubtedly substantial as well. But that interest must be qualified by the recognition that
juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody. Children,
by definition, are not assumed to have the capacity to take care of
themselves. They are assumed to be subject to the control of their parents, and if parental control falters, the State must play its part as
parens patriae. In this respect, the juvenile's liberty interest may, in
appropriate circumstances, be subordinated to the State's "parenspatriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child."
SchaI4 104 S. Ct. at 2410 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982))l
see also Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan. App. 2d 736, 742, 574 P.2d 234, 240 (1977) ("When
[a juvenile is] so detained, he is not really deprived of anything as he, unlike
an adult, is already subject to parental or some substituted control."). It was
only by minimizing the liberty interests of children, deprecating the consequences of preventive incarceration, and ignoring the values of additional procedural safeguards that the Court was able to reach the result that it did.
172. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410. Although the majority noted that juveniles account for 7.5% of arrests for violent crimes, 19.9% of arrests for serious property
crimes, and 17.3% of arrests for violent and serious property crimes, id. at 2410
n.14, virtually every study of juvenile detention practices has found that a substantial portion of juveniles who are actually confined in pretrial detention
were not charged with serious crimes, and many were status offenders who had
committed no crimes at all. See, e.g. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED
FEDERAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO CHANGE JUVENILE DETENTION PRACTICES 6

(1983);
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that, although the statute aimed primarily at crime prevention,
it also "protect[ed] the juvenile from his own folly" by preventing the injury that a juvenile offender might suffer from victim
resistance or police arrest and by halting a youth's downward
spiral into criminal activity. 7 3 The Court's finding of substantial state interest in preventive detention of juveniles was bolstered by the presence of comparable provisions for juvenile
pretrial incarceration in every state.1 7 4 The Court in Schall was
clearly concerned that a contrary constitutional holding would
invalidate the practice of every state in the nation.
The court of appeals in Schall had concluded that the large
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AN YOUTH CRM.E, supra note 30, at 36; R. SARIU, supra
note 166, at 19-20; Guggenheim, supra note 166, at 1072.
173. Schal4 104 S. Ct. at 2410-11. The Court relied upon the New York Court
of Appeals decision in People ex reL Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350
N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976), which held that the New York statute authorizing pretrial detention of youths when there was a "serious risk" of further
criminal acts before the time of trial did not violate equal protection or due process. Schupf,39 N.Y.2d at 688-89, 350 N.E.2d at 909-10, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 520-21. The
Wayburn court found a compelling state interest that justified the detention of
juveniles under circumstances that would not be allowed for adults. Noting
that juveniles are immature and "not held to the same standard of individual
responsibility for their conduct as are adult members of our society," the court
concluded that their lack of self-restraint, experience, and comprehension rendered them more likely than adults to commit further crimes if released. Id. at
687-88, 350 N.E.2d at 908-09, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 520. Therefore, "Jiln consequence of
these and other like considerations, protection of the public peace and general
welfare justifies resort to special procedures designed to prevent the commission of further criminal acts on the part of juveniles as differentiated from
adults." Id at 688, 350 N.E.2d at 909, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 521. Without further analysis, the Wayburn court concluded that because it is a legitimate state interest
"to prevent the commission of further criminal acts," it is an acceptable means
to "remove the offender from the arena of possible action." Id. at 689, 350
N.E.2d at 910, 385 N.Y.S. 2d at 521.
174. See SchaU4 104 S. Ct. at 2411 n.16. The Supreme Court also noted that a
number of model juvenile justice acts contained provisions for preventive detention. Id. at 2411 n.17 (collecting statutes). Most of the model statutes, however, recommend restrictive detention criteria and procedures far more
rigorous than those at issue in the New York statute. See, e.g., JUVENmLE JUSTiCE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STAmNARns RELATING TO INTEMTi STATUS, Standard 6.6; NATIONAL ADVISORY COMUTTEE, TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSMcE
§ 12.7 (1976).
One commentator has noted that one of the underlying assumptions sustaining this practice
is that pretrial detention is no more inimical to the interests of the
child than release. But the legislators and judges who make that assumption-that is, those who are willing, as an exercise of their parers
patriaepower, to lock up children in the jails and detention facilities
currently in use in this country--are either deliberately myopic or
frighteningly cynical. Every respected report on pretrial detention of
juveniles has concluded that far too many children are detained, for
the wrong reasons, in deplorable conditions.
Guggenheim, supra note 166, at 1071.
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number of detained youths whose cases were dismissed prior
to trial or who were returned to the community following adjudication indicated that courts used preventive detention primarily to impose punishment prior to a determination of
guilt.175 The Supreme Court, however, found that preventive
detention was merely an incident of legitimate governmental
regulation and not a pretrial imposition of punishment. 76 The
Supreme Court suggested that a number of considerations collateral to the merits of the petition could lead to high dismissal
rates following pretrial detention.177 The Court also insisted
that an initial decision to detain and a later decision to release
on probation after more information is available were not inconsistent.178 The Court thus concluded that detention was
175. See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 373-74 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub
nom Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
176. See Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2412. The Court noted that:
Even given, therefore, that pretrial detention may serve legitimate regulatory purposes, it is still necessary to determine whether the terms
and conditions of confinement . . . are in fact compatible with those
purposes. "A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for
purposes of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other
legitimate governmental purpose."
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979))(citations omitted); see also
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1331-34 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1022 (1982) (preventive detention of adults is regulatory, and not punitive).
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the United States Supreme Court was
called upon to evaluate the conditions of confinement of adult pretrial detainees, all of whom remained in custody because they were unable to afford bail
or qualify for other nonmonetary conditions of release. The only justification
for pretrial detention asserted by the Government was the need to ensure the
detainees' presence at trial. Id. at 534 n.15. The Court adverted to its distinction between "punitive measures that may not constitutionally be imposed
prior to a determination of guilt and regulatory restraints that may." Id. at 537.
The Court reiterated the test it had announced in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963): whether a governmental imposition constituted
punishment or "whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction I may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose. . . ." Wofish, 441 U.S. at 538. The Wo(fish
Court concluded that because ensuring the defendant's presence at trial was a
legitimate governmental objective, the detention of offenders pending trial was
regulatory rather than penal. Id. at 540. In Wolfish however, the petitioners
did not challenge the constitutionality of the initial decision to detain, and the
Court specifically reserved the question whether any governmental interest besides assuring the accused's presence at trial could justify pretrial detention in
order to challenge the conditions of confinement. Id. at 534 & n.15. Schall provides an answer to this question, at least for juveniles.
177. See Schal4 104 S. Ct. at 2414-15.
178. Id. Several commentators have noted that of all juveniles detained
pending trial, only a small percentage were removed from the community following their adjudication. See Ferster, Snethen & Courtless, supra note 154, at
189 (Massachusetts, 25.9o; Illinois, 22%; Ohio, 19.5%; Texas, 9.7%); see also
Guggenheim, supra note 166, at 1067 n.13 (New York City, 23%). The Schall
Court chastened the court of appeals for invalidating a legislative judgment
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"consistent with the regulatory and parens patriae objectives
relied upon by the State and was not used or intended as
pumshment."179

The Court then considered whether the procedures used
for the detention decision provided adequate "protection
against erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of liberty"18 0
by comparing them with the Court's requirements for a probable cause determination for arrested adults as established in
Gerstein v. Pugh.181 Gerstein held that the constitution requires a judicial determination of probable cause before extended postarrest restraints on liberty because prolonged
182
detention entails a fourth amendment seizure of the person.
The Gerstein Court noted, however, that such a probable cause
determination need not occur in an adversarial hearing. 8 3
The majority in Schall concluded that the New York procedures for juvenile preventive detention satisfied the Gerstein
requirements because the juvenile received notice of the
charges at an informal initial appearance, a stenographic record
of the appearance was made, the juvenile was accompanied by
a parent or guardian, and the juvenile was advised of the right
to remain silent and the right to counseLl8 4 The Court implied
that a probable cause determination occurred at the initial appearance, 8 5 but it also noted that a petition stating probable
that preventive detention serves an important and legitimate function in the juvenile justice system on the basis of "some case histories and a statistical
study" and a "rather cavalier equation of detentions that do not lead to continued confinement after an adjudication of guilt and 'wrongful' or 'punitive' pretrial detentions." Schall, 104 S. Ct at 2414.
179. Schcall 104 S. Ct. at 2413.
180. Id. at 2415.
181. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
182. Id at 114.
183. See id. at 120-21. The Court also noted that all of the exigencies that
justify arrests without a prior judicial determination of probable cause and a
warrant dissipated once the defendant was in custody:
The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than
the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his
family relationships.... Even pretrial release may be accompanied
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty....
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a
neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish
meaningful protection from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of
liberty following arrest.
Id. at 114 (citations omitted).
184. See SchaU4 104 S. Ct. at 2416.
185. See id at 2416 n.27. The dissent in Schall disputed the majority's implication that there was a probable cause determination at the initial appearance.
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cause had to be filed in any event and that a formal probable
cause hearing was held within three days of the initial
86
appearance.1
The Schall majority also found nothing improper in the
preventive detention of a juvenile based solely on a finding that
there was a "serious risk" that the juvenile would commit another crime prior to the juvenile's next court appearance. It rejected the district court's view that it is "virtually impossible to
predict future criminal conduct with any degree of accuracy"
and insisted that "from a legal point of view" there are no
problems with predicting future criminal conduct. 8

7

The Court

It pointed out that "[t]he judge ordinarily does not interview the juveniles
....
makes no inquiry into the truth of allegations in the petition . . . , and
does not determine whether there is probable cause to believe the juvenile
committed the offense." Id. at 2421 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). It characterized the majority's conclusion that there is a probable cause determination prior to detention as a
"novel reading of the statute" that provides "only shaky support for its contention." Id. at 2421 n.6 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). The dissent concluded that "[tihe lesson of this foray into the tangled
provisions of the New York Family Court Act is that the majority ought to adhere to our usual policy of relying whenever possible for interpretation of a
state statute upon courts better acquainted with its terms and applications."
Id. at 2421 n.6 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
A number of lower courts previously had decided that juvenile detention
decisions required a determination of probable cause. See, e.g., R.W.T. v. Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1230 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1984); Moss v.
Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976); Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347, 1353 (6th
Cir. 1974); Cooley v. Stone, 414 F.2d 1213, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1969); J.T. v. O'Rourke,
651 P.2d 407, 409 (Colo. 1982).
186. See Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2416-17. An additional three day extension was
possible for good cause shown. Id. While the delay in determining probable
cause exceeded the time limits envisioned in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 124
n.25, the Court suggested that prolonged detention actually benefitted juveniles
because it gives their counsel additional time to prepare. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at
2417 n.28. But see infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
187. See Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2417.
[F]ron a legal point of view there is nothing inherently unattainable
about a prediction of future criminal conduct. Such a judgment forms
an important element in many decisions, and we have specifically rejected the contention, based on the same sort of sociological data relied
upon by appellees and the district court, "that it is impossible to predict future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be
meaningless."
Id. at 2417-18 n.30 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (opinion of
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)) (footnote omitted). The Court noted that
predictions of dangerousness or future criminality were implicated in death
sentence decisions, see Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the granting and revoking of parole, see Greenholtz v. Nebraska Panel Inmates, 442 U.S. 1 (1979);
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and sentencing under "dangerous special offender" statutes, see 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (1982).
Similarly, the defendant's challenge to the District of Columbia's preventive detention statute in United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. 1981),
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nevertheless declined to itemize or codify the predictor variables on which a court should rely in making this prediction,
emphasizing that such a list was not necessary. 188
The Schall dissent questioned both the substantive goals
advanced by preventive detention and the adequacy of the procedures used. The dissenters agreed with the district court's
finding that identifying persons who would commit crimes if released is technically difficult and noted that this difficulty made
it impossible for the statute as administered to achieve the legitimate public objective of crime prevention. 8 9 Indeed, the
cert. denied,455 U.S. 1022 (1982), on the ground that inability to predict dangerousness or future criminality rendered the statute overbroad and a violation of
due process also was rejected. See infra notes 213-20.
Prediction of the likelihood of certain conduct necessarily involves a
margin of error, but is an established component of our pretrial release
system. Trial judges have been engaged in predicting the likelihood of
flight for all defendants ....
Appellant's argument relies on the assumptions, which we do not share, that the judicial prediction of dangerousness, as distinguished from the likelihood of flight, is both a
denial of a fundamental right and the imposition of punishment.
Edwards,430 A.2d at 1342 (citations omitted).
188. The Court emphasized that since the juvenile is entitled to a hearing,
"there is no reason that the specific factors upon which the Family Court judge
might rely must be specified in the statute." Schal4 104 S. Ct. at 2418.
The Supreme Court has, however, attempted to specify criteria to guide the
juvenile court's decision making in other contexts. In Kent v. United States,
383 U.S. 541 (1966), the juvenile court waived the juvenile for prosecution as an
adult after a "full investigation." Id. at 546. Although the decision was based
on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court attached a lengthy appendix in
which it enumerated a host of factors that a juvenile court should properly consider in deciding to waive jurisdiction. See id. at 565-68 app. Although the Kent
criteria have been faulted for their excessive generality, see infra notes 517-21
and accompanying text, the Schall Court declined to give even that much
guidance.
189. Schal4 104 S. CL at 2425-29 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ, dissenting). In United States ex rel Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp.
691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), a.Dd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub noan. Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984), the district court examined this issue in depth
and concluded that the inability to predict dangerousness was the most pernicious defect of the entire preventive detention scheme.
The judge is empowered to make a prediction about the probability of
an individual committing a crime if released. No guidelines for making
that determination are set out in the statute, and none has been
adopted by the court. The judge's determination is moored to no concrete or reasonably determinable yardsticks ....

[E]ach judge utilizes

his own personal standards.
513 F. Supp. at 707. Following its review of the prediction literature and the expert testimony, see id. at 708-12, the district court concluded that any effort to
predict future dangerousness based on the present state of the art is necessarily doomed to failure, see id. at 712.
Numerous commentators raise similar concerns about a court's ability accurately to predict human behavior, especially behavior that is unusual or violent. See, e.g., J. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR (1981); N. MORRI,
THE FUTURE OF IMPnSONMEr 62-73 (1974); S. PFOHL, PREDICTING DANGEROUS-
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majority's position that such predictions occur often' 90 ignores
the important issue of whether those predictions can be made
with acceptable accuracy, particularly where the subjects of the
prediction have not yet been found guilty of any criminal
offense. 191
NESS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF PSYCHIATRIC REALITY

(1978); Dershowitz,

The Law of Dangerousness: Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 24 (1970); Dix, ClinicalEvaluation of the "Dangerousness"of "Normal"
Criminal Defendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 523 (1980); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 Calif. L.
Rev. 693, 711-16 (1974); Gottfredson, Assessment and Prediction Methods in
Crime and Delinquency, in JUVENILE DELIQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, supranote
30, at 181-82; Livermore, Mahlmquist & Meehl, On the Justificationsfor Civil
Commitmen 117 U. PA. L. REV. 75, 81-83 (1968); Monahan, The Predictionof Vi-

olence, in VIOLENCE

AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

17-20 (D. Chappell &J. Monahan eds.

1975); Shah, Dangerousness and Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Some
Public Policy Considerations,132 AM. J. PSYCH. 501 (1975); Shah, Dangerousness and Mental Illness: Some Conceptual, Prediction,and Policy Dilemmas, in
DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR:

A

PROBLEM IN LAW AND MENTAL HEALTH

177-79 (C.

Frederick ed. 1978); Shah, Some Interactionsof Law and Mental Health in the
Handling of Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674, 700-12 (1974); Steadman,
Some Evidence on the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determinationof Dangerousness in Law and Psychiatry, 1 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1973); Underwood, Law
and the Crystal Ball: PredictingBehavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgmen4 88 YALE L.J. 1408 (1979); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence be Predicted?, 17 CRIME & DELiNQ. 393 (1972).
Psychiatrists as well as lawyers have criticized the assumption of mental
health professionals that they are able to predict dangerousness. One author,
for example, observes that there is no empirical basis for the assumption that
psychiatrists can predict dangerous behavior and that even with "the most
careful, painstaking, laborious, and lengthy clinical approach to the prediction
of dangerousness, false positives [or erroneous prediction] may be at a minimum of 60% to 70%." Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill
Criminals,27 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 397, 397-98 (1972).
The dissent in Schall relied upon these authorities to support its conclusion that "'no diagnostic tools have as yet been devised which enable even the
most highly trained criminologists to predict reliably which juveniles will engage in violent crime."' Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2425 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (quoting United States ex rel. Martin v.
Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), affid, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982),
rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984)).
190. 104 S. Ct. at 2417-18; see supra note 187.
191. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2426 n.20 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
Whatever the merits of the decisions upon which the majority relies
[affirming the validity of making decisions on a prediction of future
criminal conduct], they do not control the problem before us. In each
of the cases in which the Court has countenanced reliance upon a prediction of future conduct in a decision-making process impinging upon
life or liberty, the affected person had already been convicted of a
crime.... The constitutional limitations upon the kinds of factors
that may be relied on in making such decisions are significantly looser
than those upon decision-making processes that abridge the liberty of
presumptively innocent persons.
Id. (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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The prediction problem is compounded by the New York
statute's lack of criteria to structure the initial detention decision and the Schall majority's express refusal to impose any
such criteria.192 Although the majority's selective description of
certain members of the class of plaintiffs in Schall implies that
they were a group of uniformly "dangerous" offenders,19 3 few
offense characteristics typically distinguish detained juveniles
from nondetained juveniles.19 4 Evaluations of the detention
process also indicate that the majority of juveniles who are
5
preventively detained are not charged with serious offenses.19
In this regard, the dissent is certainly correct that
the public reaps no benefit from incarceration of the majority of the detainees who would not have committed any crimes had they been released. Prevention of the minor offenses that would have been
committed by a small proportion 196
of the persons detained confers only a
slight benefit on the community.

The dissent also criticized the majority's characterization
192. See 104 S. Ct. at 2412 n.18. The majority notedAppellees argue that some limit must be placed on the categories of
crimes that detained juveniles must be accused of having committed or
being likely to commit. But the discretion to delimit the categories of
crimes justifying detention, like the discretion to define criminal offenses and prescribe punishments, resides wholly with the state
legislatures.
Id.
193. Id. at 2414 n.21. But see id. at 2421 n.7 (Marshall, J. joined by Brennan
and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). See generally United States ex rel. Martin v.
Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 695-700 (S.DN.Y. 1981) (detailed description of the
characteristics of the 34 members of the plaintiff class), a.d,689 F.2d 365 (2d
Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
194. See, e.g., I COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, DIVERSrY IN A YOUTH CORECTIONAL SYSTEM 65-67 (1978) (current offense, offense history, and prior experience in youth corrections do not appear to be strongly related to the

decision to detain, and youths detained prior to commitment are not significantly more dangerous than youths committed without pretrial detention); see
also Bookin-Weiner, Assuming Responsibility: Legalizing PreadjudicatoryJuvenile Detention,30 CRIuE & DELINQ. 39 (1984); Cohen & Kluege, The Detention
Decision: A Study of the Impact of Social Characteristicsand Legal Factorsin
Two MetropolitanJuvenile Courts, 58 Soc. FORCES 146, 151 (1979); Krisberg &
Schwartz, Rethinking Juvenile Justice,29 CRIME & DELINQ. 333, 355 (1983) (decision to detain strongly inuenced by space availability in detention centers);
Pawlak, Differential Selection of Juvenilesfor Detention, 14 J. RlsEAncH Cwu
& DELINQ. 152, 154-55 (1977) (primary determinant of rates of detention are the
availability of detention bedspaces).
195. See, e.g., GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPROVED FEDERAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO CHANGE JUVENILE DETENTION PRACTICES 9-10 (1983); L. COHEN, PRE-AlJtDICATORY DETENTION IN THREE JUVENILE CouRTS 29-32 (1975).
196. Schal4 104 S.Ct. at 2427 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting). The district court had also noted the dangers of erroneous predictions and the resultant over-incarceration:
[N]ot only does it appear that one cannot predict dangerousness with
an acceptable degree of accuracy, but, to the extent that dangerousness
can be predicted at all, there is a substantial problem of overprediction,
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of juveniles' liberty interests as inconsequential and the majority's trivialization of the unfavorable circumstances in which
juveniles were detained.197 Empirical research supports the
that is, to identify persons potentially dangerous who, if subsequently

released, would engage in no further violent or even criminal behavior.
United States ex rel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403
(1984). One author noted that
[t]he conclusion to emerge most strikingly from these studies is the
great degree to which violence is overpredicted ....

Of those pre-

dicted to be dangerous, between 65 percent and 99 percent are false
positives-that is, people who will not, in fact, commit a dangerous act
. ...

Violence is vastly overpredicted whether simply behavioral in-

dicators are used or sophisticated multivariate analyses are employed
and whether psychological tests are administered or thorough psychiatric examinations are performed.
J. Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior in Juveniles 10-11 (paper
presented at National Symposium on the Serious Juvenile Offender in Minneapolis, Minnesota, Sept. 19-20, 1977) (emphasis deleted).
One commentator used statistical techniques to predict which offenders
who met the District of Columbia preventive detention statute would commit
future offenses. There was substantial overprediction regardless of the nature
of the indicators employed. Depending upon the particular criteria used, the
ratios of false positives (those who committed no further offenses) to true positives ranged from seven false positives for every three true positives detained
to eight nonrecidivists for every recidivist. Note, Preventive Detention: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 6 HARv. C-R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 310 (1971).
197. In determining that pretrial detention of juveniles was not violative of
due process, the majority in Schall found that detention was not imposed for
the purpose of punishment. The majority noted that the statute itself did not
indicate "that preventive detention is used or intended as a punishment."
Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2413. Citing the time limits on such detention and the usual
separation of juveniles from adults, the majority concluded that "[s]ecure detention is more restrictive, but it is still consistent with the regulatory and
parens patriae objectives relied upon by the State." Id. By contrast, the dissent quoted from testimony and studies revealing that the juvenile detention
facility "is not the most pleasant place in the world." Id. at 2423 (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). The institution at issue in
Schall was the Spofford Detention Facility. Id. at 2424 n.13 (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). That facility had been the subject of
extensive litigation, judicial scrutiny, and critical reports. See, e.g., Martarella
v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), enforced, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). The Martarellacourt described Spofford as follows:
The building is surrounded by a high wall. Although individual sleeping rooms are left open at night unless the particular child poses a risk
to himself or others, the children (boys) are otherwise locked in their
dormitories, recreation rooms or classrooms ....

Each corridor of the

building that leads to the dormitories, classrooms, dining halls or offices has metal doors at each end that are locked at all times. An electronically locked metal door controls movement in and out of the
buildings. The windows are secured from inside by a screen made of
institutional netting....
When boys arrive at Spofford their personal clothing is taken from
them and they are issued uniforms of blue jeans and T-shirts on whose
fronts is an institutional legend ....

[[T]he facility is "fraught with problems related both to archi-
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dissent's view. For example, the vast majority of juveniles' institutional contacts occur in pretrial detention centers rather
than in postadjudication commitments to training schools or
other correctional facilities.198 Moreover, many juvenile court
jurisdictions do not have juvenile detention institutions and
juveniles routinely endure preventive detention in adult
jails.199 Juveniles confined in such adult jails have a suicide
rate nearly five times that of youths in the general population. 20 0 Judge Patricia Wald has summarized the realities of jutectural layout and to maintenance." For example, it is 1/7 of a mile
from one end of the structure to the other, the building is "poorly
designed for its functional purpose"; space for receiving children is inadequate so that searching is often conducted in the toilet facilites;
there is lack of sufficient area for visitation; the school is divided
among three separate floors, creating "traffic problems"; lighting is
"generally inadequate," the rooms are often cold in winter ....
In addition to being locked institutions (internally and externally)
whose male "inmates" must wear uniform clothing, there are other
characteristics which the centers share with penal institutions....
[C]hildren are required to walk in line from place to place without
talking, and are "hit" or have a smoking break taken away if they get
out of line. Knives are not generally furnished at meals. Homosexuality, both forced and consensual, exists in both boys' and girls' centers
as what all parties appear to agree is an inevitable concomitant of
incarceration.
349 F. Supp. at 580-83 (citations omitted). The conditions described at Spofford
are endemic to juvenile detention facilities around the nation. See, e.g, R.
SARuu, supra note 166; Wald, supra note 166, at 119, 127-30.
198. One author reports that "[a]nalysis of population distribution in juvenile justice indicates that on a given day, 9 out of 10 youths in residential facilities in the juvenile justice system will be found in detention units or adult
jails." Sarri, Service Technologies: Diversion, Probation, and Detention, in
BROUGHT TO JUSTICE? JUVENILES, THE CouRTs AND THE LAw 166 (IR Sarri & Y.

Hasenfeld eds. 1976); see also R. SARRI, supra note 166, at 5 (estimating that up
to 500,000 juveniles are processed through local adult jail systems each year).
199. See, e.g., D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F. Supp. 896 (D. Or. 1983). Tewksbury
provides a particularly graphic description of the conditions under which
juveniles are confined in adult jails. The Tewksbury court found that
"[n]othing... is responsive to the emotional and physical needs of children
. . .", id. at 903, the institutional policies generally "result in harsher treatment
for pre-trial detainee children than for adult prisoners, many of whom have
been convicted and sentenced," id. at 904, and there are no educational programs, no treatment programs, no recreational programs, and no access to
books, radios, television, or the like, id. at 900-01. The court concluded that
"[w]hen children who are found guilty of committing criminal acts cannot be
placed in adult jails, it is fundamentally unfair to lodge children accused of
committing criminal acts in adult jails." Id. at 907; see also MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 641.14 (West 1983) ("No person awaiting trial shall be kept in the same room
with a person convicted of a crime."); R. GoLnFARi,
JAILS, THE ULTIMATE
GHETrO 286-344 (1975).
200. See AL FLAHERTY, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL INCMENCE OF JUVENILE SUICIDE IN ADULT JAILS, LOCKUPS, AND JUVENILE DETENTION CENTERS 10
(1980). These statistics may seriously underestimate the significance of juvenile suicide rates in confinement for at least three reasons. First, institutional
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venile confinement thus:
Over half a million juveniles annually detained in "junior jails," another several hundred thousand held in adult jails, penned like cattle,
demoralized by lack of activities and trained staff. Often brutalized.
Over half the facilities in which juveniles are held have no psychiatric
or social work staff. A fourth have no school program. The median age
of detainees is fourteen; the novice may be sodomized within a matter
20 1
of hours. Many have not been charged with a crime at all.

It is this institutional reality that Justice Rehnquist has charac2
terized as the equivalent of parental supervision.2O

The dissent in Schall was also concerned with the injurious
consequences of imprisonment, such as deprivation of liberty,
stigmatization, negative self-labeling, and prisonization,03 and
with the impairment of juveniles' ability to prepare legal defenses. 204 Detention may be even more inimical than the disembarrassment concerning suicides may cause underreporting. Second, suicide rates in confinement are calculated on the basis of average length of stay
(seven days for children in adult jails and 17 days for children in juvenile detention facilities), whereas suicide rates for the general population are calculated on the basis of a 365 day calendar year. "[C ]hildren in adult jails ... kill
themselves more frequently than do children in juvenile detention facilities
and children in the general population despite the fact that children in jails...
have less time in which to commit suicide." Id. at 12. Third, it is more difficult
to commit suicide in confinement because the "techniques at one's disposal are
much more limited." Id. The lower suicide rate in juvenile detention centers
as opposed to adult jails may be attributable to greater supervision, less isolation, and greater participation in ongoing youth activies. Id.
201. Wald, supra note 166, at 119; see also Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260
(5th Cir. 1976) ("Pretrial detention is an onerous experience, especially for
juveniles."); D.B. v. Tewksbury, 545 F. Supp. 896, 903 (D. Or. 1982) (pretrial dention is "confinement without regard for human dignity or need"); R. SA=U,
supra note 166, at 35-63.
202. Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
203. Id. at 2424 n.14 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). In In re M., 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970), the court
noted thatIt is difficult for an adult who has not been through the experience to
realize the terror that engulfs a youngster the first time he loses his liberty and has to spend the night or several days or weeks in a cold, impersonal cell or room away from home or family ....
The experience
tells the youngster that he is "no good" and that society has rejected
him. So he responds to society's expectation, sees himself as a delinquent, and acts like one.
Id. at 31 n.25, 437 P.2d at 747 n.25, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 43 n.25 (citation omitted).
204. Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2421 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens,
JJ., dissenting). This impairment has been documented by other commentators:
[A] number of studies indicate that "the defendant at liberty pending
trial stands a better chance of not being convicted or, if convicted, of
not receiving a prison sentence." . . . This disparity may be attributable to "[cjonditions of confinement that impeded a defendant's preparation of his defense (apart, of course from the fact of confinement
itself), or that are so harsh or intolerable as to induce him to plead
guilty, or that damage his appearance or mental alertness at trial."
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sent suggested. Although the initial decision is not based on
offense criteria or other rational factors, detention itself increases both a juvenile's probability of conviction and the like20 5
lihood of institutional confinement following adjudication.

For example, one study reports that "[c]hildren detained were
much more likely to be found delinquent than those not detained ...
and to be committed when they had been found
20 6
delinquent."
The Schall dissenters also believed the procedural safeguards of the preventive detention statute were inadequate because eligibility for detention was not limited to juveniles
whose present offenses or past conduct indicated a substantial
likelihood of immediate future criminality and because trivial
offenders and those with no prior juvenile court contacts could

be and were routinely detained.207 Moreover, the statute specified neither the nature of the future crimes being predicted nor
the burden of proof needed to sustain the prediction, other
than requiring that there be a "serious risk" that the juvenile
would commit an offense.20 8 The lack of statutory standards or
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1355 (D.C. 1981) (Ferren, J., concurring
and dissenting) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
205. See, e.g., R. COATES, A. MILLER & L. OHLIN, supra note 194, at 101-04;
Clarke & Koch, supra note 156, at 293-94.
206. Clarke & Koch, supra note 156, at 293.
[After controlling for the effects of present offense and prior record],
the commitment rate remained much greater for children held in detention, except at the highest level of record and offense seriousness
We conclude that being detained before adjudication had an independent effect on the likelihood of commitment, entirely apart from
the fact that both detention and commitment had some common causal
antecedents.
Id. at 294. Professors Clarke and Koch suggest that the independent effects of
detention on rates of adjudication and commitment stem from the fact that
"[t]he child's ability to defend himself may have been impaired by detention,
either because he was prejudged by the same court that later decided his case,
or because it was harder for him to talk to his lawyer and otherwise prepare his
defense." Id at 295. These findings are similar to studies reporting the impact
of pretrial confinement on adults. See, e.g., Ares, Ranlin & Sturtz, The Manhattan Bail Project" An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-trialParole,38 N.Y.U. L.
RFv. 67,86 (1963). But see Goldkarnp, The Effects of Detention on JudicialDecisions: A CloserLook; 5 JusT. Sys. J. 234, 234 (1980); Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 333 (1974).
The Schall dissenters also concluded that pretrial detention was unlikely to
prevent the commission of serious crimes in any significant way and was more
likely to injure juveniles than to protect them from their own folly. See SchaI,
104 S. Ct. at 2425-28 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
207. See Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2422, 2426 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
208. Id at 2430 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ, dissenting); see also Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 1982) (' The statute
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criteria about ultimately speculative future behavior remits the
detention decision to the individual discretion of each judge.
As the dissent noted, unstructured discretion both creates the
danger that many juveniles will be detained "erroneously" and
fosters arbitrariness, inequality, and discrimination in a pro209
cess that impinges on fundamental liberty interests.
Despite the concerns of the dissenters and other critics of
Schall, states continue to subscribe to the Schall majority's position. For example, Minnesota's new Rule 18 authorizes the
preventive detention of juveniles at several different stages in
the juvenile justice process whenever an official predicts that
"others would be endangered" if the child were released, 210 although there is no comparable provision for the preventive detention of adults in Minnesota. 21 1 The New York and
Minnesota preventive detention statutes for the pretrial incarceration of juveniles are not unique: such statutes are found in
2 12
all states.
places no limits on the crimes for which the person subject to detention has
been arrested . . .. the judge ordering detention is not required to make any
evaluation of the degree of likelihood that the person committed the crime of
which he is accused[,] . . . [and] the statute places no limits on the type of
crimes that the judge believes the detained juvenile might commit if released."), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
209. Schall 104 S. Ct. at 2431-33 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
A principle underlying many of our prior decisions in various doctrinal
settings is that government officials may not be accorded unfettered
discretion in making decisions that impinge upon fundamental rights.
Two concerns underlie this principle: excessive discretion fosters inequality in the distribution of entitlements and harms, inequality which
is especially troublesome when those benefits and burdens are great;
and discretion can mask the use by officials of illegitimate criteria in
allocating important goods and rights.
Id. at 2432 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). For a
general discussion of the problems of discretion, vagueness, and discrimination
in the context of juvenile court decisions to transfer juvenile offenders to the
adult criminal process, see Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 77,
at 546-56; see also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 80 (1960) ("Prejudiced discriminatory, or overreaching exercises of state authority may remain concealed beneath findings of facts impossible for the Court to redetermine when such sweeping statutes have been
applied to the complex, contested fact constellations of particular cases.").
210. MINN. RP. JUv. CT. 18.02(2) (A) (i); 18.06(5)(b)(i); 18.09(2)(D)(i).
211. Minnesota encourages releasing an adult defendant with a citation on
personal recognizance or other nonmonetary conditions of release whenever
possible. See MiNN.R. Cumi. P. 6; 6.01; 6.02.
212. See Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2411 & n.16 (1984) (collecting statutes). Rule 18,02(2) (C) (2) (a) also authorizes the court to release a child upon
the posting of bail, although many states do not provide for a child's release on
bail. See, e.g., Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Doe v. State,
487 P.2d 47, 52 (Alaska 1971) (since minors cannot enter into binding contracts
with bail bondsmen, their freedom would be contingent on their parent's will-
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It is instructive to compare the procedural strategy used for
the preventive detention of adults in the District of Columbia2l3
with the New York statute upheld in Schall and with Minnesota's Rule 18 for juveniles. Although the D.C. statute shares
with the New York and Minnesota provisions the vice of preventive detention based on a prediction of future criminality, it
imposes detention under far more restricted circumstances and
with respect to a far narrower category of potential offenders.214
The D.C. statute allows preventive detention only when the
court finds by "clear and convincing evidence" that the defendant falls within one of the statutorily defined categories of per-

sons eligible for detention because they are charged with
"dangerous crimes" and "crimes of violence." 21 5 Moreover, the
court must also find that, on the basis of the defendant's past
and present pattern of behavior, there is "no condition or combinations of conditions of release which will reasonably assure
the safety of any other person or the community" and that
there is a "substantial probability" that the person committed
the offense charged. 21 6
ingness or ability to do so). See generally Guggenheim, supra note 166, at 108185; Note, The Right to Bail and the Pre-"Trial"Detentionof Juveniles Accused of
"Crime",18 VAND. L REV. 2096 (1965); Comment, Juvenile Right to Bail, 11 J.
FA. L. 81 (1971). The focus of this analysis is on preventive detention and not
the appropriateness of bail as an alternative basis for release for either adults
or juveniles. The manifold discriminatory deficiencies of the bail system have
been analyzed extensively. See, e.g., D. FREED & P. WALD, BAr UNTHE UNrTED
STATES (1964); Foote, The Coming ConstitutionalCrisis in Bail 113 U. PA. I
REv. 959, 1125 (1965).
213. The District of Columbia authorizes detention only of persons charged
with one of a prescribed set of "dangerous crime[s] of violence." D.C. CODE
ANN. § 23-1322(a) (1) (2) (1981).
214. Id. The pitfalls of predicting dangerousness are discussed supra note
189 and accompanying text, see also United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321,
1369 (D.C. 1981) (Mack, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
215. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b) (2) (A). Eligibility for detention is narrowly restricted to those accused of a statutorily defined "dangerous crime," a
"crime of violence," or an "obstruction of justice." D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 231331(3), (4) ("dangerous crime" includes robbery, burglary, arson, rape, sale of
narcotics; "crime of violence" includes murder, rape, statutory rape, robbery,
kidnapping, assault).
216. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 (b); 23-1322 (b) (2) (B) (i); 23-1322(b) (2) (C).
The "substantial probability" standard was discussed in United States v. Edwards, 430 A. 2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert denied; 455 U.S. 1022 (1982). The Edwards court noted that the higher standard of "a substantial probability,"
rather than simply probable cause, that the accused committed a designated
crime, was intended to "be equivalent to the standard required 'to secure a civil
injunction-likelihood of success on the merits."' Id. at 1339 (citation omitted).
Judge Ferren, concurring in part and dissenting in part, rejected any implication that a "probable cause" standard would be constitutionally adequate
and concluded that "due process mandates the much stricter requirement, con-
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The D.C. Court of Appeals examined the procedural safeguards of this statute in United States v. Edward.217 The Edwards majority rejected the defendant's contention that he was
entitled to an adversarial predetention proceeding including
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Instead, the
Edwards court relied on the rigorous procedural safeguards
and enumerated offense criteria of the D.C. statute 218 and held
that the type of pretrial hearing envisioned by the Supreme
220
Court in Gerstein v. Pugh2 19 was sufficient.
Neither the New York statute approved in Schall nor Minnesota Rule 18 provide comparable provisions for protection
against erroneous and excessive detention of juveniles. The
shortcomings of the Schall statute have already been discussed, and the Minnesota detention provision is even less adequate. In Minnesota, the detaining court need only find
"probable cause that . . . others would be endangered if [the
defendant were] released,"22 ' and eligibility for detention is
neither limited to the type of crime charged nor based on an
tained in the statute, that the finding be premised on clear and convincing evidence." Id. at 1351 (Ferren, J., concurring and dissenting).
Ferren added that the "substantial probability" standard is at least as high
as the "clear and convincing" standard of proof which is required for involuntary civil commitment. Id. at 1360 (Ferren, J., concurring and dissenting). Even
though an involuntary civil commitment is "nonpunitive," it entails a loss of liberty that requires a greater justification than the simple "more likely than not"
of probable cause. Compare Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (clear
and convincing evidence standard in "civil commitment proceeding as opposed
to criminal prosecutions") with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) ("judicial determination of probable cause [held] to be a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest").
217. 430 A. 2d 1321 (D.C. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1322 (1982). The defendant in Edwards was charged with armed rape, and at the time of his arrest
confessed to the rape, another forcible sodomy, two burglaries, and an additional seventeen robberies within the previous four months. He also had an extensive juvenile record. Id. at 1324. Thus, the court had little difficulty
concluding either that he fit the category of persons eligible for detention or
that based on his "pattern of behavior consisting of his past and present conduct... [that] no condition or combination of conditions of release [would]
reasonably assure the safety of any other person or the community.'" Id. at
1334 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b) (2) (B) (i) (1973)) (citation omitted).
218. See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
220. Edwards,430 A.2d at 1335-39. But see id. at 1353-65 (Ferren, J., concurring and dissenting) ("[Piretrial detention without bail is premised not only on
a showing that the accused may have committed a particular crime, but also on
a far more complex, inherently speculative prediction that the accused is likely
to be dangerous in the future, based on past and present conduct. This kind of
evaluation was not before the Court in Gersteinand, given its predictive nature,
requires a more carefully focused, Fifth Amendment [due process] analysis.").
221. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 18.09(2) (D) (i) (emphasis added).
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examination of the accused's individual circumstances.22 2 Although continued detention is authorized based on an individual judge's conclusion that the community would be
"endangered" by a youth's release, "endangerment" is not statutorily defined or circumscribed. The Minnesota rule lacks
even the New York statutory requirement that the risk be that
of "an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a
crime."
Furthermore, as distinguished from the "substantial
probability" of "dangerous crimes" requirement in Edwards,
Minnesota requires only a finding of probable cause that a
youth committed a delinquent act, which can include a violation of "any state or local law" as well as of many ordinances. 4 Presumably, every juvenile court judge in the state
may apply this same lower standard of proof on any individual,
idiosyncratic basis with virtually no means of effective appellate supervision
222.

See MniN.

R.P. Juv. Cr. 18.06(5).

223. Schlal 104 S. Ct. at 2405 & n.1 (quoting N.Y. F i. CT. ACT § 320.5 (Consol 1983)). Rule 18 provides no criteria, guidelines, or standards to structure
the detention decision. To what extent must a court speculate that others
would be endangered-violent felonies against the person, repeated property
offenses, disorderly conduct? Judge Mack, dissenting in Edward., addressed
this question:
The court could say that a petty larceny or a petty offense was dangerous to the community, the guy was a drunk driver for example, and
this was dangerous to the community. Such a conclusion, however,
would be simply unreasonable. I think the conclusion that marijuana
smoking is dangerous is unreasonable. But I don't know of any way to
prevent courts from being unreasonable.
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d at 1371 (Mack, J, dissenting).

224. See MINN. STAT. § 260.015(5) (a) (1982). The available data indicate that
less than one-third of the juveniles detained in Hennepin County, Minnesota,
in 1982 were detained for major offenses against persons or property, and if
burglary of an unoccupied building were removed from these totals, less than
one-fifth of those detentions would be major offenders. See HENNEPIN CoUNTY
COURT SERVICES, JUVENILE CENTER 9-10 (1982) (7.6% major person, 23.7% major
property). One-quarter of those detained in 1982 were status offenders. Id. at
11. Similarly, the Minnesota Supreme Court's own Juvenile Justice Study
Commission Report, issued in 1976, found that only about 10% of the juveniles
held in detention for longer than two days were charged with felonies. AL at 39.
225. Although the majority in Schall v. Martin, 104 S. CL 2403 (1984). conceded that "in some circumstances detention of a juvenile would not pass constitutional muster," the Court required the validity of those detentions to be
"determined on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 2415. As the dissent points out,
however, the reality of case-by-case adjudication, particularly of juveniles, and
the time-frame within which cases are decided make this an illusory safeguard.
"[I]t would be impracticable for a particular detainee to secure his freedom by
challenging the constitutional basis of his detention; by the time the suit could
be considered, it would have been rendered moot by the juvenile's release or
long-term detention pursuant to a delinquency adjudication." Id4 at 2428 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
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There are, of course, several obvious ways to prevent
courts from being unreasonable: prohibit them entirely from
incarcerating people on speculative predictive grounds; specify
more explicitly what categories of alleged present offenses,
prior records, or anticipated future offenses constitute minimum requirements for "dangerousness"; or constrain the entire
determination with more elaborate procedural safeguards and
standards of proof, comparable to those upheld in Edwards. In
adopting Rule 18, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court
shunned all of these methods. Instead, a judge must decide
whether or not to detain a youth within 36 hours after the child
is taken into custody. If the youth is in court for the first time,
the court will have, within 36 hours, only the petition stating
probable cause and perhaps a summary of a relatively brief interview conducted by the probation officer recommending detention. 226 There will be no clinical evaluations, psychiatric or
psychological examinations, or other verified information regarding school performance, family functioning, and the like.
Even for youths with prior juvenile court contacts, there is no
mechanism for obtaining and verifying current information
within the limited time envisioned by the rule. Defense counsel typically will be appointed only shortly before the detention
hearing, if at all, and thus will have little opportunity to gather
or verify background information on the child or determine the
availability of other nonsecure placement alternatives. 227 In
short, even if accurate predictions were possible, Minnesota's
Rule 18 does not provide juvenile court judges in detention
hearings with the information necessary to make such predictions. Although the Supreme Court in Schall alluded to its own
limited function in formulating public policy or drafting a
model rule in the context of constitutional adjudication, 228 the
Minnesota Supreme Court has no similar excuse when promul226. Cf United States ex reL Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 701-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (procedures under comparable New York provision), affd, 689
F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
227. Cf id. at 708 (comparable New York law). The Martin district court
was concerned that
[i]f counsel is court appointed ....
he takes on responsibility for the
proceedings only moments before convincing reasons must be
presented to the court for not ordering pretrial detention. The judge
has roughly 5 to 15 minutes to determine whether there is the likelihood that the juvenile would commit another crime before the return
date if released.
Id. at 708.

228. SchalI 104 S. Ct. at 2419 ("[Ilt is worth recalling that we are neither a
legislature charged with formulating public policy nor an ABA committee
charged with drafting a model statute.").
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gating rules of procedure for Minnesota's juvenile courts.M
State promulgation of such juvenile preventive detention procedures represents the state's choice to use less adequate procedures in juvenile courts than in adult courts. 230

B. IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES
The Supreme Court established that a defendant has a
sixth amendment right to counsel when placed in a postindictment lineup in United States v. Wade.231 The Court reasoned
that such a confrontation between the accused and the victim
or witness constitutes a "critical stage" in the proceedings that
requires the assistance of counsel in order to meaningfully
cross-examine witnesses and make possible effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself.232 The Wade Court believed
that the unreliability of eyewitness identification, the possibil229. There are a number of recommended standards for detention that the
Minnesota Supreme Court might have considered in limiting the scope of detention. For example, under the American Bar Association's Standards, a juvenile could not be detained unless: (1) the crime the youth is charged with is
one of violence and which if proven would likely result in commitment to a secure institution; and (2) the offense is one which if committed by an adult
would be punishable by twenty years or more (which in Minnesota would include only murder, aggravated robbery, first degree criminal sexual conduct,
kidnapping, and a limited number of similar offenses); or (3) the juvenile is an
escapee from an institution to which the juvenile has been previously committed as an adjudicated delinquent- or (4) no measure short of detention will ensure his appearance at subsequent proceedings in light of a demonstrated
history of failing to appear at proceedings in the past. JuVENL. JusTIcE STANSTATUS, Standard 6.6;
DARDs, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO INTEmiU
see also NATIONAL ADVISORY COhnMrTTEE, TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, Standard 12.7, at 390 (1976) (A juvenile may be detained prior to a delinquency adjudication "[tio prevent the juvenile from inflicting bodily harm on others."); id., commentary at 391 ("A court may not,
however, detain a youth simply to prevent the predicted commission of property offenses."); IL SARRu, supra note 166, at 68 ("Criteria for detention should
be explicit and limited solely to acts that would be felonies requiring detention
if committed by adults").
The Minnesota legislature shares the fault with the court by authorizing
preventive detention of juveniles. See MINN. STAT. § 260.171(1), which provides
for release "[uinless there is reason to believe that the child would endanger
himself or others, not return for a court hearing, not remain in the care or control of the person to whose lawful custody he is released, or that the child's
health or welfare would be immediately endangered." The criteria enumerated
in Rule 18 take into account these alternative grounds for release. Juveniles,
like adults, must "appear for a court hearing." MINN. STAT. § 260.171(2) (a) (ii)
(1982). Unlike adults, however, they require greater protection of their "health
and welfare." MINN. STAT. § 260.171 (2) (A) (i), (iv).
230. The critical focus of this section of the Article is only on the authorization of preventive detention of juveniles, for which there is no adult
counterpart.

231.
232.

388 U.S. 218, 228-39 (1967).
See id. at 236-37.
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ity of mistaken identification and erroneous convictions, the
danger of suggestibility, and the difficulty of reconstructing at
trial the manner and mode of identification create substantial
dangers to defendant's rights to a fair trial and thus require the
33
assistance of counsel to lessen those dangers.
Nevertheless, in

Kirby v. Illinois,234 a

plurality of the

United States Supreme Court declined to extend the right to
counsel to identification lineups that take place before a defendant is indicted or formally charged with a crime. The plurality's rationale was that a person's sixth amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the initiation of adversarial
proceedings. 235 This position drew both a strong dissent and
extensive scholarly criticism. The Kirby dissenters noted that
the presence of counsel at identification proceedings was required in Wade because of the inherent dangers identification
procedures present to a fair trial, not because of any "abstract
consideration of the words 'criminal prosecutions' in the Sixth
Amendment." 23 6 Thus, in the dissenters' view, the initiation of
adversary judicial criminal proceedings was completely irrelevant to the need for counsel.
The Kirby decision creates an additional danger to defendants by providing police with an incentive to conduct identification prior to the formal accusation. 237 Indeed, the vast majority
233. See id at 228-32. For an examination of the dangers and unreliability of
eyewitness identification, see, e.g., Goldstein, The Fallibilityof the Eyewitness:
Psychological Evidence, in PSYCHOLOGY IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 223, 225-28 (B.

Sales ed. 1977); Levine & Tapp, The Psychology of CriminalIdentification: The
Gapfrom Wade to Kirby, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1079, 1081-87 (1973); Note, Did Your
Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliabilityof Eyewitness Identification,29 STAN. L. REV. 969, 969-71 (1977). The sources of unreliability in eyewitness identifications include initial perceptual errors, memory
failure, and the problems of suggestibility, social cues, and the expectations of
police in the recognition process. See, e.g., Levine &Tapp, supra, at 1095-1118;
Note, supra at 976-89.
234. 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972).
235. The plurality explained:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed
itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds
himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and
immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law.
It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the "criminal prosecutions" to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90.
236. Id. at 696 (Brennan, J., joined by Douglas and Marshall, JJ.,
dissenting).
237. In People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576
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of identifications occur before the formal initiation of the adversarial process, in part because the pretrial identification by the
witness or victim provides an essential link between the accused and the crime that often leads to the decision to
charge.23 8 Thus, Kirby's decision not to extend the right to
counsel to these earlier confrontations provides uncharged "defendants" with only the less adequate safeguards afforded by
due process.2 3 9
Commentators 240 have also lamented the Kirby Court's
less than faithful adherence to the Wade rationale, noting that
nothing in the Wade analysis confined it exclusively to postindictment proceedings. 24 ' They also argue that, even accepting Kirby's formalistic reasoning, adverse positions
between the State and the defendant may arise at least as early
as the suspect's arrest, as evidenced in Mirandav. Arizona,242
and that the Kirby Court's treatment of inconvenient precedents was, at the least, disingenuous. 24 3 Commentators have
(1981), the court noted that "to limit the right to counsel at a lineup to postindictment lineups would as a practical matter nullify that right. ...
[TIhe
crucial confrontation necessarily will be held before the initiation of formal judicial proceedings when the defendant can be deprived of counseL" Id. at 101,
634 P.2d at 935, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584; accordBlue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 642 nl10
(Alaska 1977) ("[E]stablishment of the date of formal accusation as the time
when the right to counsel attached, could only lead to situations where substantially all lineups were conducted before the indictment or information.").
238. See, e.g., People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 101, 634 P.2d 927, 934, 177
Cal. Rptr. 576, 584 (1981).
239. See, e.g, Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 (1977); Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 193 (1972); United States ex. rel Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 39899 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 1016 (1975). See generally Pulaski Neil v.
Biggers: The Supreme Court Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due ProcessProtection, 26 STAN. I. REV. 1097, 1116-19 (1974) (Neil v. Biggersadopts permissive interpretation of due process test).
240. See, e.g., Grano, Kirby, Biggers, and Ash. Do Any ConstitutionalSafe.
guards Remain Against the Danger of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MhcH. I.
REv. 717, 725 (1974); Quinn, In the Wake of Wade: The Dimensions of Eyewitness Identification Cases, 42 U. CoLO. L Rnv. 135, 143 (1970); Note, Pretrial
Right to Counse 26 STAN. L. REV. 399, 410 (1974); Comment, Right to Counsel at
Police IdentificationProceedings: A Problem in Effective Implementation of An
Expanding Constitution, 29 U. Prrr. L. REV. 65, 78 n.81 (1967).
241. See Grano, supra note 240, at 726; cf. Comment, supra note 240, at 75
n.81 ("Since the reason for the rule is to prevent unfairness and to protect the
right to meaningful confrontation at trial should the suspect be identified, the
right to counsel must be afforded at any police-sponsored identification proceeding not conducted persuant [sici to constitutionally sufficient regulations.
Any other conclusion would be absurd."); Quinn, supra note 240, at 143 ("Since
the purpose of the counsel's presence is to avert prejudice and assure meaningful cross-examination at trial on the issue of identification, it should make no
difference that the lineup occurs prior to the filing of criminal charges.").
242. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
243. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 240, at 730. The Kirby plurality insisted
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also characterized the Kirby decision as "wrong from every
perspective," 244 "perhaps the least defensible, from a technical
point of view, of the Court's criminal law holdings during the
term,"245 a case where "the Court exalts form over substance," 24 6 and one that "removes the protective effects of
counsel's presence precisely when the danger of convicting an
innocent defendant upon a mistaken identification is
greatest."

247

Several state supreme courts also have rejected the
Supreme Court's position in Kirby and extended the right to
counsel to preindictment identification proceedings. 248 Although most of these decisions draw on the language of Kirby,
that the sixth amendment right to counsel "attaches only at or after the time
that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688.
The Court went on to note that:
[t]he only seeming deviation from this long line of constitutional decisions was Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478. But Escobedo is not apposite here for two distinct reasons. First, the Court in retrospect
perceived that the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the
constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda,"to guarantee
full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination . ..."
.... Secondly, and perhaps even more important for purely practical
purposes, the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own
facts ....

Id. at 689 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966)) (citation
omitted). As Professor Grano points out, however,
In a remarkable and questionable reinterpretation, Mirandastated that
the denial of counsel in Escobedo made the defendant's subsequent
statements the product of compulsion. The reinterpretation of Escobedo, however, does not lend support to Justice Stewart's holding in
Kirby. Wade, like Escobedo in its new guise, did not vindicate the right
to counsel as such, but rather vindicated the rights of cross-examination, confrontation, and fair trial. Escobedo still suggests that counsel
must be provided at any pretrial stage when necessary to protect other
constitutional rights .... Furthermore, Wade, which postdated Johnson by a full year, specifically relied on Escobedo to support the proposition that counsel must be provided at pretrial stages when that is
necessary to protect the fairness of the subsequent trial. Therefore, if
Escobedo has been limited to its facts, Kirby, rather than some prior
case, has accomplished the deed.
Grano, supra note 240, at 728-29 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
244. Grano, supra note 240, at 730.
245. Young, Supreme Court Report, 58 A.B.A.J. 1092, 1092 (1972).
246. Case Note, Criminal Law-The Lineup's Lament, Kirby v. Illinois, 22
DE PAUL L. REv. 660, 675 (1973).
247. Note, supra note 233, at 996.
248. See, e.g., Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 641 (Alaska 1977); People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 98, 634 P.2d 927, 933, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582 (1981); People v.
Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 338, 217 N.W.2d 22, 27 (1974); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 171, 320 A.2d 351, 353 (1974); see also People v. Hawkins, 55
N.Y.2d 474, 488, 435 N.E.2d 376, 383-84, 450 N.Y.S.2d 159, 166 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing Kirby), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982); Chandler v. State, 501
P.2d 512, 520 (Okla. 1972) ("[Wle strongly feel that better procedures require
that before a line-up is conducted, the suspect be given the right to contact an
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which balanced protection of a suspect from prejudice with the
State's interest in prompt and purposeful investigation,249 they
conclude that "a suspect who is in custody is entitled to have
counsel present at a pre-indictment lineup unless exigent circumstances exist so that providing counsel would unduly interfere with a prompt and purposeful investigation."25 0 These
state courts reason that once the investigation proceeds beyond
the immediate on-the-scene show-up, and especially once the
defendant is in custody at the station house, there is simply no
further compelling law enforcement exigency that offsets the
dangers of prejudice to the suspect.2 5 1 In determining what circumstances might excuse the lack of counsel, courts have
noted that, since defendants already have a Miranda right to
counsel, "[t]he delay involved in securing counsel will generally be a matter of hours at most" and that "[i]f conditions require immediate identification without even minimal delay, or
if counsel cannot be present within a reasonable time, such exigent circumstances will justify proceeding without counsel."25 2
attorney of his choice, or be informed that one will be called if he is unable to
hire one....!).
249. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 691.
250. Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 642 (Alaska 1977) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The Blue court, unlike the Kirby Court, acknowledged
that extending counsel to preindictment lineups involved a balancing process
between the state's concern for prompt investigation of unsolved crimes and
the suspect's legitimate right to be protected from prejudicial procedures. See
id. at 641.
251. Defendants already have a right to counsel when they are in custody
and being interrogated. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). If a
defendant requests consultation with counsel, further interrogation must cease.
See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2834 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 487 (1981). The state courts rejecting Kirby did so, in part, because
the procedural mechanisms for providing counsel to protect the Miranda fifth
amendment rights were equally necessary to protect the Wade sixth amendment rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and a fair trial. The court in
Blue noted that the defendant
was given his Mirandawarnings which advised him of his rights to
have counsel present and further advised him that if he could not afford counsel, one could be provided for him... . Even when a lineup is
conducted within a few hours after the commission of a crime, if the
suspect in custody requests an attorney at the lineup, he should be
provided an opportunity to call one. If the attorney can arrive within a
reasonably short time so as not to interfere with a prompt and purposeful investigation, then no evidence will be lost.
Blue v. State, 558 P.2d at 643 n.12.
252. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal. 3d 88, 102-03, 634 P.2d 927, 935, 177 Cal.
Rptr. 576, 584 (1981). In Bustamante, the California Supreme Court described
the Kirby decision as a "wholly unrealistic" formalism that would "as a practical matter nullify" the right to counsel at lineups and concluded that all of the
policies of Wade that made the identification process a "critical stage" were applicable regardless of when the confrontation occurred. Id. at 100-01, 634 P.2d at
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Whatever the Kirby Court's reservations about preindictment
guarantee of counsel, the state court decisions253 demonstrate
that any problems raised are not procedurally insuperable.
From the point of view of a misidentified suspect, the decision to deny counsel is an exaltation of form over substance.
Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court endorses this formalism in Rule 18 by denying the right to counsel at lineups to
juveniles who are already in custody but against whom a petition has not yet been filed, giving a right to counsel only when
a delinquency petition has been filed.254 Conducting a lineup
without a lawyer, however consistent with the minimum constitutional standards of Kirby,255 treats juveniles with no greater
934-35, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 584. In People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22
(1974), the Michigan Supreme Court also held that, independent of any federal
constitutional requirements, "a suspect is entitled to be represented by counsel
at a corporeal identification ... unless the circumstances justify the conduct of
an identification procedure before the suspect can be given an opportunity to
request and obtain counsel ...." Id. at 338, 217 N.W.2d at 27 (footnote omitted). The court's rationale was that "the best evidence of whether an eyewitness can identify a suspect is his response at a fairly conducted lineup....
and to preserve best evidence eyewitness testimony from unnecessary alteration by unfair identification procedures, the principles developed in and following the announcement of Wade ... shall govern .... " Id. at 338-39, 217
N.W.2d at 27-28. In Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, rather than rejecting Kirby outright, analyzed its own criminal process and concluded that the "line for determining the
initiation of judicial proceedings in Pennsylvania [begins] at the arrest." Id. at
171, 320 A.2d at 353. The Richman court concluded that all of the policies of
Wade apply to identification confrontation at any stage in the proceeding and
that to postpone the "formal initiation" of the process beyond arrest simply
would encourage uncounseled lineups after the suspect was in custody but not
yet arraigned. Id. In Commonwealth v. Scott, 246 Pa. Super. 58, 369 A.2d 809
(1976), Pennsylvania applied this "arrest" standard to identification procedures
in juvenile delinquency prosecutions. In In re Holley, 107 R.I. 615, 268 A.2d 723
(1970), decided between the Wade and Kirby decisions, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court applied the Wade right to counsel to preindictment juvenile defendants. Id. at 619, 268 A.2d at 725-26. The court noted that in a case in which
there is an identification issue, "[tjhe trial which might determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation" and that to deny the juvenile the right to counsel at that stage
would make the right to counsel at trial granted by Gault a meaningless one.
Id. at 623, 268 A.2d at 728 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235
(1967)).
253. See Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1977); People v. Bustamante, 30
Cal. 3d 88, 634 P.2d 927, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1981); People v. Jackson, 391 Mich.
373, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974); Commonwealth v. Richman, 238 Pa. Super. 413, 357
A.2d 585 (1976).
254. See MmN R.P. Juv. CT. 18.04(2) (C) ("A child has the right to have counsel present when placed in a line-up related to an act for which a petition has
been filed alleging the child to be delinquent.").
255. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (right to counsel attaches prior to arraignment and exists at time of preliminary hearing); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223-27 (1967) (accused has right to counsel at any
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solicitude or concern than adult criminal defendants.256 Indeed, given the greater likelihood that juveniles will waive their
right to counsel,25 7 juveniles may in fact be more disadvantaged
than their adult counterparts.
In addition, Minnesota's Rule 18.04 authorizes police to
photograph the lineup for evidentiary purposes or for other in253
vestigative purposes provided that a court order is obtained.
Rule 18.04 also authorizes police to routinely fingerprint any juvenile charged with a felony, provided that the court is informed that the child was fingerprinted. 25 9 Moreover, there are
no provisions in the Rules or their underlying legislation 26 0 for
the destruction of these photographic and fingerprint identifica-

tion records if no charges are filed or if the youth is acquitted.
The underlying legislation simply requires the police to sequester the records, not seal or destroy them.261 The Juvenile Juscritical pretrial confrontation where absence of counsel may derogate right to
fair trial).
256.

Cf. State v. Miles, 296 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Minn. 1980) (adult suspect has

no right to counsel at preaccusation lineup); State v. Oksanen, 311 Minn. 553,
553, 249 N.W.2d 464, 465 (1977) (adult suspect has no right to effective assistance
of counsel at preprosecution lineup); State v. Carey, 296 Ainn. 214, 219-20, 207
N.W.2d 529, 532 (1973) (presence of counsel not constitutionally required as
precondition of on-the-scene identification of adult suspect).
257. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
258. The Rule provides:
A detained child may be photographed only upon order of the court
under such terms as the court shall order. An order permitting the
child to be photographed shall only be issued(i) when necessary for the welfare of the child, or
(ii) when necessary for the public safety, or

(iii) when necessary for the investigation of a delinquent act, or
(iv) as evidence of a line-up.
Minu. RP. Juv. CT. 18.04(1) (A).
259. See MmN. R.P. Juv. CT. 18.04. Subdivision 3(A) provides that "[ajll
children in custody alleged to have committed an act which would be a felony if
it had been committed by an adult may be fingerprinted without court order."
MWIN. R P. Juv. CT. 18.04(3) (A); see also MUNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 18.04(1) (B) ("A report stating the name of the child photographed and the date the photograph
was taken shall be filed with the court."); 18.04(2)(D) ("A report stating the
name of the child who participated in the line-up and the date of the line-up
shall be filed with the court."); 18.04(3) (B) ("A report stating the name of the
child fingerprinted and the date of the fingerprinting shall be filed with the
court.").
260. The legislation provides that "[p]eace officers' records of children shall
be kept separate from records of persons eighteen years of age or older and
shall not be open to public inspection or their contents disclosed to the public
except by order of the juvenile court." MINN. STAT. § 260.161(3) (1982).
261. Compare MwN. STAT. § 260.161(3) (1982), supra note 260, with Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.313 (Page 1976) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the court,
originals and all copies of such fingerprints or photographs shall be delivered to
the juvenile court after use for their original purpose for such further use and
disposition as the court directs. Fingerprints and photographs of a child shall
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tice Standards, although recognizing that law enforcement
needs for identification evidence is the same whether an offender is a juvenile or adult, recommend that, "[i]f the court
does not adjudicate the juvenile delinquent for the alleged felony, the fingerprint card and all copies of the fingerprints
should be destroyed." 262 Similarly, the Standards recommend
that photographs retained by law enforcement agencies for
identification purposes should be destroyed if the agency or a
juvenile court concludes that the youth did not commit the offense or if a juvenile court concludes that the juvenile is not delinquent.263 To allow the continued existence of identification
records after legitimate law enforcement needs have been satisfied creates a continual danger of subsequent disclosure and
stigmatization.
The problem raised by these identification procedures
reaches beyond the simple creation .of records that may subsequently redound to the disadvantage of the juvenile. More significantly, the procedures subject juveniles, like adult criminal
defendants, to routine booking procedures. A major rationale
for a separate juvenile court was the elimination of the trappings of the criminal process and the creation of criminal
records. 26 4 As the juvenile process becomes increasingly
criminalized, many of the routine features of the handling of
adult criminal defendants become ordinary components of the
juvenile process as well. The state obviously requires identification evidence and should not be barred from obtaining it, but
provisions like the Minnesota Supreme Court's rule authorizing
its routine collection simply erode further any distinctions between the juvenile and adult systems.
be removed from the fie and destroyed if a complaint is not filed or is dismissed after having been filed.").
262. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, JUVENILE RECORDS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS, Standard 19.6(A).
263. See id. at Standard 19.6(E).
264. See Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909); see also
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, JUVENILE RECORDS AND INFORMA-

TION SYSTEMS, Standard 19.6 commentary at 144-45. The commentary questions
the role of confidentiality in juvenile proceedings because confidentiality is
premised
on the theory that the process of fingerprinting (in particular) may be
more traumatic for a juvenile than for an adult and that the retention
of fingerprints may stigmatize a juvenile and interfere with the historical rehabilitative purposes of juvenile court intervention. Whether
these theories are correct is unclear; and, in any case, it is doubtful
that the taking of a juvenile's fingerprints is any more traumatic than
arresting him or her or that the retention of a juvenile's fingerprints involves any greater risks than the retention of his or her arrest record.
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V. PETIONS AND PROBABLE CAUSE

A determination of probable cause is the fourth amendment touchstone of the initiation of formal criminal proceedings, as well as its necessary prelude. 265 Probable cause is the
constitutional prerequisite for an arrest with 266 or without a
warrant, 26 7 the basis for the continued detention of a person arrested without a warrant, 268 and a necessity for a grand jury indictment 26 9 or a preliminary hearing to hold a defendant for
further criminal proceedings. 270 The finding of probable cause
in all of these instances provides the evidentiary weight required to disturb the social equilibrium between the individual
and the state. It establishes the factual bases leading to the
conclusions that a crime was committed, that the defendant
committed it, and that the state is justified in requiring the defendant to answer for it.
Fourth amendment protection from intrusions on liberty
and privacy also requires a review of the probable cause determination by a "neutral and detached magistrate." 27 1 Review of
a probable cause statement to ensure actual probable cause
265. See Y. KAimSAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRMINAL PROCEDURE
963-1069 (5th ed. 1980); Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendmen 58
MwN. TL REV. 349 (1974); Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights, and the
FourthAmendment, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 46; Weinreb, Generalitiesof the Fourth
Amendmen4 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 47 (1974); Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warant 42 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 1119 (1967)1
Note, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court Shadows on the Fourth
Amendmen4 28 U. Cm. L REV. 664 (1961); Note, Protecting Privacy Under the
FourthAmendment, 91 YALE UJ. 313 (1981).
266. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-90 (1980) (arrest in the home
requires warrant founded on probable cause).
267. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-24 (1976) (arrest without
a warrant in public place requires probable cause).
268. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111-19 (1975) (fourth amendment requires judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended
restraint on liberty following arrest). For a discussion of Gerstein, see supra
notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
269. See Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968);
United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935

(1965).
270. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8 (1969).
271. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1970). The United
States Supreme Court has emphasized on numerous occasions that determinations of probable cause must be justified before an independent judicial official
rather than being remitted to law enforcement personnel See, e.g., Shadwick v.
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 348 (1972); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 453
(1970); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-15 (1964); Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480, 483-84 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
Although the Supreme Court has addressed the importance of probable cause
determinations by neutral detached magistrates primarily in the context of
fourth amendment arrests and searches, it also has acknowledged their impor-
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serves a variety of salutary functions in the charging process.
It strengthens the initial prosecutorial screening function by requiring a prompt evidentiary review of the underlying factual
bases of an action to eliminate those cases that lack prosecutive merit, that may have insuperable evidentiary difficulties, or
that may be motivated by malice or negligence. 272 As the Min273
nesota Supreme Court noted in State v. Florence,
The primary function is that of screening out cases which, for one rea-

son or another, ought not to be prosecuted.. . . ' The object or purpose of the preliminary investigation is to prevent the hasty, malicious,
improvident and oppressive prosecutions, to protect the person
charged from open and public accusations of crime, to avoid both for
the defendant and the public the expense of a public trial, and to save
the defendant from the humiliation and anxiety involved in a public
prosecution, and to discover whether or not there are substantial
2 74
grounds upon which a prosecution may be based."

A probable cause statement also supplies the notice required by Gault in juvenile cases 2 75 by providing the fullest factual and legal notice of charges. A full notice requirement
assists the state in framing the issues and aids the defense in
preparing to respond to them. The factual information contained in the probable cause statement furnishes avenues for
investigation and discovery that assure the fairest determination of ultimate questions of guilt or innocence. 276 Finally, a
probable cause requirement in the petition forces prosecutors
tance to the charging functions. See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112
(1975); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1969).
272. See, e.g., State v. Florence, 306 Minn. 442, 446-47, 239 N.W.2d 892, 896
(1976) (probable cause hearing serves to secure release of illegally detained
person, to relieve defendant from meritless prosecution, and to allow defendant
to know in advance of trial the evidentiary basis of state's claims); Thies v.
State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922) (purpose of preliminary examination is to prevent hasty, malicious, improvident, and oppressive prosecutions
and to discover whether there are sufficient grounds on which to base prosecution); Davis, The Efficacy of a ProbableCause Requirement in Juvenile Proceed.
ings, 59 N.C.L. REV. 723, 729-33 (1981) (probable cause requirement is an
essential element of preliminary hearing, establishing basis for arrest and
detention).
273. 306 Minn. 442, 239 N.W.2d 892 (1976).
274. Id. at 447 n.4, 239 N.W.2d at 896-97 n.4 (quoting Thies v. State, 178 Wis.
98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922)).
275. 387 U.S. at 34 (1967); see supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text.
276. In approving the elimination of the preliminary hearing in Minnesota
criminal procedure and its replacement by the trial judge's assessment "of
probable cause ...
based upon the entire record including reliable hearsay in
whole or in part," MmN. R. CmRm. P. 11.03, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
in Florence that the collateral discovery functions previously served by preliminary hearings now were more adequately afforded by explicit provisions for
discovery. 306 Minn. at 450, 239 N.W.2d at 898. The court pointed out that its
adoption of Rule 11.03 had demonstrated its "conviction that the probable cause
hearing should not be used as a substitute for disclosure and discovery and
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to charge juveniles more realistically, in light of what the prosecutor can reasonably expect to prove, and provides a partial
check on prosecutorial practices of overcharging as a prelude to

plea bargaining.27 7

Despite the benefits of a judicially reviewed probable cause
statement as a threshold charging requirement, the United
States Supreme Court has not recently addressed the question
of the right of all defendants to a probable cause statement at
an early stage in the criminal process, 278 and the earlier cases
found no such constitutional right for nondetained defendants.2 7 9 In Gerstein v. Pugh,280 however, a case that examined
fourth amendment probable cause requirements for arrested
defendants who remain in custody, 28 1 the Court noted that
"6even pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome
conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty."2 =2 The
Court did not consider, however, what burdens on released defendants might entitle them to a judicial probable cause determination. It focused only on detained defendants, holding that
they were entitled to a nonadversarial probable cause determination because of the serious impact of prolonged pretrial dethat the legitimate concern of the defendant to know the case against him
before trial should be dealt with by other means." Id.
The United States Supreme Court in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1
(1969), also observed the collateral discovery functions served by preliminary
hearings: 'Trained counsel can more effectively discover the case the State has
against his client and make possible the preparation of a proper defense to
meet that case at the trial" Id. at 9. The adoption of liberal rules of discovery
in criminal cases, however, obviates the need to resort to discovery indirectly
via the preliminary hearing. See, e.g., FED. R. CRmi. P. 16 MIN. R.Cai P.9.
The discovery provisions included in the Minnesota Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court likewise contain liberal provisions for reciprocal pretrial discovery. See MNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 24.
277. See, e.g., Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supranote 77, at 6071 Davis, supra note 272, at 744.
278. This issue has not come before the courts at least in part because such
a right routinely is afforded to all criminal defendants. See FED.R.Caro. P. 5;
Mn'N. R. Cum. P. 2.01; see also Brown v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838, 839 n.2 (1971)
(noting fundamental nature of right to a probable cause statement at an early
stage in the criminal process).
279. See, e.g., Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (neither presentment nor indictment by grand jury are required under the Philippine Bill
of Rights or the fourteenth amendment due process guarantee); Lem Woon v.
Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590 (1913) (direct filing of information by prosecutor without judicial review does not violate fourteenth amendment due process clause);
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538 (1884) (federal constitution does not incorporate fifth amendment requirement that state felony prosecutions be initiated by grand jury indictment).
280. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
281. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
282. 420 U.S. at 114.
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tention on their lives.283
State juvenile court procedures generally reflect only this
limited constitutional protection, even when adult court procedures go further. For example, Minnesota Juvenile Court Rule
19.03 requires that a delinquency petition state that the child is
delinquent, explain concisely and directly the alleged delinquent act, and cite the criminal statute or ordinance allegedly
violated. 284 The petition need state probable cause to believe
that the child committed a crime only if the child is held in detention. 285 In contrast, Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure
2.01 requires the prosecuting authority to allege "the facts establishing probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant committed it" in all adult
criminal complaints. 286 This difference is another instance in
which juveniles receive neither the procedural protections
given adult criminal defendants nor special consideration for
their youth.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's adoption of Rule 19 reaffirms a position, set forth sixteen years earlier in In re Hitzeman,287 that a juvenile petition need only state "the facts which
bring the child within the jurisdiction of the court." The juvenile in Hitzeman challenged the sufficiency of a petition that alleged only that he and a companion were delinquent because
"They did on October 3, 1966, at 8:46 p.m., at Montgomery Ward
and Company in Sun Ray Shopping Center, steal two tires val283.

The Court explained:

Because the probable cause determination is not a constitutional
prerequisite to the charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty other than the condition that they
appear for trial. There are many kinds of pretrial release and many degrees of conditional liberty.... We cannot define specifically those
that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key
factor is significant restraint on liberty.
Id. at 125 n.26.
284. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.03(a), (g). The rest of Rule 19.03 requires additional information prescribed by statute. See MINN. STAT. § 260.131(3) (1982).

The statute requires that the county attorney draft the petition "upon the
showing of reasonable grounds." Mim. STAT. § 260.131(2); see also MINN. R.P.
Juv. CT. 17 (providing that the discretionary charging decision is the function of
the county attorney); Mmsi. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.02(2) (requiring the county attorney to approve the petition as to form and content). Consolidating the charging responsibilities in the county attorney's office is one aspect of the
increasing prosecutorial domination of the juvenile justice process. See Rubin,
supra note 87, at 307-10.
285. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.04(1)(b).
286. MiNN. R. CRiM. P. 2.01; cf. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.03(a) (requiring the delinquency petition to contain "a simple, concise and direct statement of the alleged delinquent act").
287.

281 Minn. 275, 277, 161 N.W.2d 542, 543 (1968).
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ued at approximately $50.00."288 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, without any citation to In re Gault2 8 9 or any analysis of
the functions of notice and probable cause, held that the conclusory allegation was sufficient as a matter of law.290 The
court acknowledged that, although a juvenile court proceeding
is not a criminal proceeding, "[a] delinquency petition is similar to an indictment or information with respect to the issue of
sufficiency and certainty of the charges made."29 1 Nevertheless, the court held that the statute prescribing the contents of
petitions simply requires petitions to set forth the facts
"plainly," insisted that "plainly" could not be construed to
mean "in detail," and rejected the contention that the petition
should state probable cause.292 Several subsequent challenges
to the sufficiency of conclusory allegations in petitions and several requests that petitions state probable cause were similarly
rejected by the court, even though the petitions lacked information such as names of witnesses or victims, facts showing that
the youth committed a crime, details of physical identification,
and even citations to the criminal statutes allegedly violated. 293
Thus, despite the court's insistence that the petition be "sufficiently definite and certain to apprise the juvenile of the alleged violation," 29 4 it is questionable whether in application the
conclusory allegations consistently approved by the court in
case and rule provide a juvenile with enough information to
discover prosecution witnesses, prepare a defense, or even determine the nature of the offense alleged.295
288. Id.at 276, 161 N.W.2d at 543.
289. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault the United States Supreme Court required
that
the child and his parents or guardian be notified, in writing, of the spe-

cific charge or factual allegations to be considered at the hearing, and
that such written notice be given at the earliest practicable time, and in
any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit preparation.
Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described-that
is, notice which would be deemed constitutionallyadequatein a civil or
criminalproceeding.
Id.at 33 (emphasis added). The Court insisted that when a youth's liberty and
the parents' right to custody are at stake, timely notice "of the specific issues
that they must meet" is a constitutional prerequisite. Id. at 34.
290. Hitzeman, 281 Minn. at 279, 161 N.W.2d at 544.
291. Id. at 279, 161 N.W.2d at 545.
292. Id.
293. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.B.M, 263 N.W.2d 74 (1978); In re Welfare of
T.DF., 258 N.W.2d 774 (Minn. 1977). In T.D.F. the court upheld the sufficiency of
a petition that in substance alleged only that "[appellant) did enter premises

...without permission of person in lawful possession therein... with intent
to commit a crime therein." 258 N.W.2d at 776 nl.
294. J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d at 75.
295. Conclusory allegations foster other procedural abuses as well. In In re
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Minnesota's decision not to require a probable cause statement in the juvenile petition for nondetained youths 296 is typical of state juvenile procedures. 2 97 Most states require simply
that the juvenile court charging document allege the basis of
the court's jurisdiction over the youth, typically by a perfunctory allegation that the child has committed an act that would
give the court jurisdiction over the child.298 This approach

stems from a narrow reading of Gault's constitutional notice requirement and a desire to maintain a degree of flexibility and
informality or to perpetuate civil/criminal distinctions in juve2 99
nile proceedings.
A few states require that the petitioner set forth the factual
basis of the allegations against the child and that the intake
probation officer screen the case or the prosecutor verify the allegations. 300 These jurisdictions, however, require neither that
the factual allegations be set forth with the same probable
cause particularity required in a criminal complaint or indictment 30 1 nor that their sufficiency be reviewed by a court. 302 Al-

though requiring greater factual specificity approaches the
Welfare of Raino, 255 N.W.2d 398 (Minn. 1977), the petition alleged: "On or
about 2-11-76 [the defendant] did attempt to take one woman's white jacket...
and one multi-colored blouse,. . . property of Donaldsons [Department Store],
Minneapolis, Minn. without consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of said property." Id. at 399. In a trial before a referee, the youth was
convicted of attempted theft. On appeal the juvenile court judge substituted a
finding of disorderly conduct for attempted theft, stating that "disturbing the
peace is a concomitant to theft in a public place during business hours and is a
frequent result of a thwarted theft to the extent that it may be deemed a lesser
included offense." Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the adjudication of delinquency on the grounds that disorderly conduct is not a lesser included offense of attempted theft and that amending the petition after the trial
violated constitutional notice requirements. Id. at 400.
296. MiNN. STAT. § 260.131(3) (1982).
297. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 47.10.020(a) (1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.070(1)
(1982); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 712A.11 (West 1968). See generally Davis,
supra note 272, at 726-28 (describing the typical state requirements for juvenile
proceedings).
298. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 260.131(3) (a) (1982) (requiring that petition "set
forth plainly... [t]he facts which bring the child within the jurisdiction of the
court"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-19(A) (1978) (requiring that petition "set forth
with specificity. . . the facts necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the court").
299. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J.81405-S, 122 Ariz.
252, 255, 594 P.2d 506, 509 (1979); In re V.R.S., 512 S.W.2d 350, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974).
300. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-423 (1977); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.36
(West Supp. 1984-1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1622 (Supp. 1983); TEx. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 53.04 (Vernon 1975).
301. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-501 (1983); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.27
(1976); statutes cited supra note 300.
302. See statutes cited supra note 300. Some statutes require that the factual allegations in the petition be stated with the same particularity required in
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requirements of probable cause, these statutes fail to take into
account the separate role played by the neutral and detached
magistrate in evaluating such factual allegations. 303 The intake
probation officer and prosecutor hardly provide the neutrality
and detachment envisioned by the fourth amendment in the
determination of probable cause.304
A limited number of states, through either legislation or judicial construction, require a statement of probable cause reviewed by a court as an integral part of a delinquency petition
and thereby afford juveniles the same probable cause protections granted to adults. 305 For example, Indiana's preliminary

screening procedure provides that "[tihe juvenile court shall
consider the preliminary inquiry and the evidence of probable
cause. The court shall approve the filing of the petition if there
is probable cause to believe that the child is a delinquent
child ... .306 The Indiana Court of Appeals examined this
probable cause requirement in Davies v. State.30 7 The juvenile
in Davies, charged with being "delinquent in that he [was] involved in first degree burglary," moved to dismiss for lack of

specificity in the charge.3 08 The state argued that, because juvenile proceedings were not criminal, the allegations of juvenile wrongdoing need not provide the particularity required in
criminal complaints and that necessary facts could be obtained
through discovery.3 O9 The court rejected both rationales and
held that delinquent conduct must be specifically described. 310
a criminal complaint or indictment See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-455
(1972); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-274 (Supp. 1981).
303. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
304. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-531 (Supp. 1983) (stating that "the intake counselor shall make a preliminary determination as to whether the juvenile is within the jurisdiction of the court") with Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971) (holding warrant invalid because not issued by a
"neutral and detached magistrate").
305. See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. § 31-6-4-9 (Burns 1980 & Supp. 1984); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3302 (1964); N.Y. FA. CT. ACT § 311.1 (West 1983); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.070 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.255 (West 1979).
306. IND.CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-9(b) (Burns Supp. 1984).
307. 171 Ind. App. 487, 357 N.E.2d 914 (1976).
308. Id. at 488, 357 N.E.2d at 915.
309. Id at 488, 357 N.E.2d at 915-16.
310. The Indiana Court of Appeals explained:
It may be thought that the juxtaposition of an informal atmosphere
with a strict procedure creates practical difficulties for the litigation
process. However we note that the informal aspects of the hearing relate primarily to a relaxing of evidentiary rules .... [Clonstitutional
rights should not be grudgingly extended in the disposition of juvenile
matters under the rubric of informality.
Id at 491, 357 N.E.2d at 917.
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Similarly, Wisconsin requires that a juvenile petition state
"facts sufficient to establish probable cause that an offense has
been committed and that the child named in the petition com1
mitted the offense." 3
Other jurisdictions also impose the procedural safeguards
of criminal hearings on juvenile proceedings, including the requirement of a complaint containing a statement of probable
cause.3 12 For example, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Dis311. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.255 (West 1979). The requirement of probable
cause in the juvenile petition reflects a recent legislative amendment. Previously, Wisconsin's charging practices reflected "jurisdictional" pleading, requiring no probable cause allegation. See D.M.D. v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 313, 318-19, 195
N.W.2d 594, 597 (1972). Wisconsin now apparently uses the term "probable
cause" in two different ways, depending upon the "degree" of probable cause
required:
This court has distinguished between these two degrees of probable cause on the basis of the differences between the functions of the
probable cause determinations at the complaint and preliminary examination stages. While a probable cause determination at the complaint
stage determines whether the state may conduct further inquiry into
the alleged crime, . . . a probable cause determination at the preliminary examination stage is a finding by the court that sufficient evidence
exists so that the state may compel the defendant to be bound over for
criminal trial.... The purpose of determining probable cause in the
complaint is to ensure that the document provides a reasonable basis
for inferring that "a crime has probably been committed and that the
defendant named in the complaint was probably the culpable
party.... The test under Wisconsin law of the sufficiency of the complaint is one of 'minimal adequacy, not in a hypertechnical but in a
common sense evaluation, in setting forth the essential facts establishing probable cause."'
T.R.B. v. State, 109 Wis. 2d 179, 188-89, 325 N.W.2d 329, 333-34 (1982) (quoting
State v. Olson, 75 Wis. 2d 575, 581, 250 N.W.2d 12, 15 (1977)). Presumably, juvenile petitions are judged by the same probable cause complaint standard to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to establish that "the charges
against the juvenile are not merely capricious and that, assuming the juvenile
were an adult, further criminal proceedings would be justified." Id. at 189-90,
325 N.W.2d at 334 (1982) (quoting T.R.B. v. State, 105 Wis. 2d 405, 409, 313 N.W.2d
850, 852 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) (quoting D.E.D. v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 193, 205, 304
N.W.2d 133, 139 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981))).
312. See, e.g., Driskill v. State, 376 So. 2d 678, 679 (Ala. 1979) (noting that
"the allegations of a delinquency petition must be tested by the same standards of sufficiency as a criminal complaint for [sicI indictment"); In re Dennis,
291 So. 2d 731, 733 (Miss. 1974) (holding that "in those cases where a charge of
delinquency is based upon the violation of a criminal law, the petition must
charge the offense with the same particularity required in a criminal indictment"); In re Jose D., 102 Misc. 2d 907, 909, 424 N.Y.S.2d 674, 675 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1980) (holding that "a juvenile respondent is entitled, as a matter of law, to be
charged upon a petition that satisfies the sufficiency standards of the Criminal
Procedure Law"); N.Y. FAm. CT. AcT § 311.1 (McKinney 1983) (requiring the
complaint to contain "a plain and concise factual statement ... which . . . asserts facts supporting every element of the crime charged and the respondent's
commission thereof with sufficient precision to clearly apprise the respondent
of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 13.40.040 (Supp. 1984) (requiring a court's finding of probable cause).
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trict of Columbia, in Brown v. Fauntleroy,313 required a probable cause determination for a youth even though he was not
being held in detention because he had "remained in the status
of a person arrested for conduct defined as a crime and [was]
3 14
subject to trial for that conduct as a juvenile delinquent."
The Brown court reasoned that the initial arrest of the person
implicated the fourth amendment, requiring the state to justify
the arrest with a showing of probable cause regardless of any
additional incidents of detention or custody.3 15 In the same
year, following the reorganization of the court system in the
District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
overturned the Brown decision in M.A.P. v. Ryan. 316 M.A.P.
held that, because there was no constitutional right to a judicial
probable cause determination, the prosecutor's decision to fie
a petition constituted an adequate preliminary screening of
3 17
charges prior to the trial itself.
The court in M.A.P. is clearly correct in its conclusion that
the Supreme Court has not found a constitutional right to a
probable cause statement in a petition for a nondetained youth.
There remains, however, the more basic policy question of
whether judicial review of a probable cause statement should
be required as a matter of court rule. The Juvenile Justice
Standards recommend that every juvenile, whether detained or
released pending trial, should receive a prompt judicial determination of probable cause. 18 The Standards propose that the
313.

442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

314. Id. at 839.
315. 1& at 841-42. The court of appeals held that "the right to be free of a
seizure made without probable cause does not depend upon the character of
the subsequent custody. Appellant accordingly has the right to have the validity of the seizure determined since he will be called to trial for conduct which
led to the seizure." Id at 842. The court also observed the detrimental consequences of the juvenile's status even if released:
A juvenile in appellant's situation, released to his mother pending
trial, will nevertheless suffer disadvantages from his newly acquired
status. There is undoubtedly a certain stigma attached to being accused of a crime. Both school authorities and potential employers will
probably have him under close surveillance. Furthermore, neither the

United States Army nor the Job Corps ordinarily will accept him while
the charge is pending against him.

Id. at 842 n.7. The Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974),

noted that the burdens imposed on released defendants might entitle them to a
judicial determination of probable cause, although it emphasized the importance of a loss of liberty to this requirement. Id.at 114.
316. 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1971).

317. IL at 313-15. The court simply concluded that since "there is no constitutional right to a probable cause hearing," the contrary holding in Brown "was

erroneously decided and should not be followed." Id. at 313.
318.

See, e.g., JuvENmE JUSTICE STANDARDs, supra note 73, STANDARs Rz-
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legal sufficiency of a complaint or petition should be determined in the first instance by an intake officer, whose judgment
is then reviewed by the prosecutor with the ultimate authority
to determine whether to file a petition. 319 If the prosecutor decides to file a petition, the Standards call for a judicial determination of probable cause at the child's first appearance in
court. 320 One commentator, summarizing the probable cause
requirements of the Juvenile Justice Standards, concludes that
These requirements assure that only those cases with prosecutive
merit reach the formal adjudicative stage of the proceedings. If an intake officer were allowed to make the final determination to file a petition, such a determination might be nothing more than a therapeutic
decision that the child is in need of services, without regard to whether
the child committed the alleged act. A prosecutor is more likely to be
concerned with the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause; therefore the prosecutor is authorized to make the final determination of whether or not to fie a petition.
... [T]he Standards clearly provide for a final determination of
32 1
probable cause by the court.

The Standards conclude that the type of administrative screening provided by intake officers or prosecutors is simply inade322
quate to determine the merit of charges.
Ironically, because Minnesota's new juveniles rules have
statewide applicability, the state supreme court's decision not
to require a factually detailed probable cause statement in the
petition represents a retrenchment from the safeguards afforded nonurban juveniles under the prior juvenile court rules.
Under the previous rules of procedure applicable in the
nonurban counties of the state, a delinquency petition was reLATING TO ADJUDICATION, Standard 1.1(B); id., STANDARDS RELATING TO THIE JUVENILE

PROBATION

FUNCTION,

Standard 2.7; id.,

STANDARDS

RELATING

TO

PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, Standard 4.1(A); id., STANDARDS RELATING TO

PROSECUTION, Standard 4.2, 4.6; see also Davis, supra note 272, at 727 (summarizing the requirements of the various volumes of the Juvenile Justice Standards regarding the legal sufficiency of a petition).
319. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION, Standard 2.16.
320. See id., STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, Standard 1.1(B); id.,
STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION, Standard 4.6.

321. Davis, supra note 272, at 728. In addition to requiring probable cause
determinations in connection with the sufficiency of a petition, the Standards
also require an initial determination of probable cause in connection with a decision to detain a youth, JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS, Standard 7.6(F); id., STANDARDS RELATING
TO PRE-TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, Standard 4.1 (B), or to transfer a juvenile for
prosecution as an adult, id., STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN

COURTS, Standard 2.2(A) (1).
322.

Id., STANDARDS RELATING TO PRE-TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, Standard

4.1(A) commentary at 86-87.
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quired to include "a clear and particularized statement of the
facts on which the petitioner relies for the assertion that the
child has violated the law or ordinance."3 2 3 The new Rules
used the approach of the urban counties because the urban
prosecutors asserted that it was administratively burdensome
for them to conform with a practice that was routine in eighty24
four of the eighty-seven counties in the state.3
However administratively inconvenient thorough prepetition screening may be to the state, the juvenile faces a more
onerous imposition. Without such screening, a juvenile must
participate in the entire juvenile justice process, all the way
through to a trial, without the state ever being required to justify in writing and submit to judicial scrutiny the underlying
factual bases for that imposition. -As the Minnesota Supreme
Court has itself noted with respect to the analogous context of
the sufficiency of an adult criminal complaint,
We are and should be concerned if innocent persons can be forced to
undergo expensive and demeaning trials only to be found not guilty, or
if trial on the merits can be delayed or aborted by excessive formalism... [I]n striking the balance, care should be exercised to avoid
overemphasis on judicial efficiency or convenience 3 25

Apparently the court does not consider such an emphasis on
efficiency and administrative convenience offensive in juvenile
proceedings, even though many petitions containing conclusory
allegations are currently dismissed prior to or following trial
when prosecutorial investigation finally reveals that the facts
alleged do not correspond to the actual event.3

26

A rule that re-

323. Minn. Juv. CL R. 3-2(1) (a) (iii) (1982). In contrast, the Hennepin
County Juvenile Court Rules, which also were superseded by the new rules, allowed petition statements to be based merely on information and belief. Hennepin I. Juv. CL 3.1 (1982).
324. See Letter from Thomas L Johnson, Hennepin County Attorney, to
Barry Feld (Nov. 8,1984); Letter from Allen Oleisky, Hennepin County Juvenile
Court Judge and Member of Rules Drafting Task Force, to Barry Feld (Nov. 16,
1984) [hereinafter cited as Oleisky letter]; Letter from John 0. Sonsteng, Reporter of Rules Drafting Task Force, to Barry Feld (Nov. 6, 1984) Ihereinafter
cited as Sonsteng letter] (copies of above correspondence on fie with the
author).
325. State v. Florence, 306 Min. 442, 458, 239 N.W.2d 892, 902-03 (1976).
326. Accurate statistics on dismissal rates prior to or following trial and the
reasons for dismissal are unavailable. Moreover, the national statistics available on rates of dismissal do not distinguish among jurisdictions with different
types of pretrial screening processes or petition procedures. On a national basis, however, it appears that over 40% of those cases referred by intake officers
to prosecutors are dismissed, primarily due to lack of sufficient evidence. See
T. BLACK & C. SMri,

REPORTS OF THE NATIONAL JuvEmu

JUSTICE ASSEssMENT

CENTERS: A PRELuINARY NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF JUVENILES PROCESSED IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

As this report notes,

53 (1981).
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quires the county attorney to draft a full probable cause statement for every petition filed would insure more conscientious
preliminary screening of cases. Many insubstantial cases
would never be fied and scarce prosecutorial resources would
be reserved for meritorious and contested cases.
Another important problem created by Minnesota's failure
to require probable cause statements in all delinquency petitions is that discovery provisions 32 7 allow a court to force
nondetained juveniles to participate in pretrial evidence-gathering procedures such as lineups, fingerprinting, photographing, and various physical or medical inspections. 328 If this
evidence were obtained from a person in custody, the fourth
amendment would require probable cause for arrest or search
in order for the evidence to be admissible at trial.3 29 Although
the acquisition of evidence from people who are not in custody
must still be reasonable, 330 there is no juvenile court mechathe largest number of offenders referred to juvenile court are dismissed. Some are dismissed summarily . . while others are dismissed due to insufficient evidence to sustain the allegation that a
crime had been committed or to indicate that the child's situation warranted system intervention ....
Together, these two dismissal categories account for 46.2 percent of all disposition decisions.
Id. at 68-70. Thus, it appears that a large number of juvenile cases penetrate
deeply into the juvenile justice process without effective screening. There is no
reason to believe that the juvenile process in Minnesota differs in any significant way from the national experience in this regard.
327. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 24. The broad discovery provisions afforded under
Rule 24 reflect the expansion of criminal discovery practices in the past decade.
See, e.g., United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1975) (prosecution as well
as defense can invoke inherent power of federal judiciary to require production
of previously recorded witness statements that facilitate discovery); Wardius v.
Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 473-79 (1973) (Oregon rule requiring disclosure of defendant's alibi witnesses invalid because not reciprocal); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 80-86 (1970) (Florida notice-of-alibi rule upheld); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16
(discovery and inspection); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 9 (discovery in felony and gross
misdemeanor cases).
328. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 24.02(2) (A). The rule requires the county attorney
to advise the child's counsel of the time and place that the identification procedure will be conducted. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 24.02(2) (B).
329. See, e.g., United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 472 (1980) (use of photographic and lineup identification unconstitutional because arrest made without
probable cause); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 724 (1969) (fingerprint evidence obtained without probable cause inadmissible); Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 766-70 (1966) (outlining constitutional requirements for blood tests
of persons accused of driving under the influence of alcohol).
330. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969) (suggesting that
fingerprint evidence obtained without probable cause might be admissible if
there were "narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the
course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom
there is no probable cause to arrest"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-27 (1968)
("stop and frisk" allowable with lower standard of probable cause than that required for arrest); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967) (health
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nism that compels a judicial probable cause determination
prior to subjecting nondetained youths to the various identification procedures. Perhaps Rule 19, which gives juveniles the
right to request a petition stating probable cause by filing a motion that "states sufficient reasons that a probable cause showing is necessary,"331 can be read to require a probable cause
statement as a prerequisite to discovery from the child, but the
requirement remains discretionary with the court.
A rule requiring a probable cause statement in every petition would have readily solved such problems and placed
juveniles on a more equal footing with adult criminal defendants. The current rule permitting conclusory allegations allows
unscreened or cursorily reviewed cases to penetrate much further into the process. This, coupled with the reality that a substantial majority of juveniles waive their rights to the
assistance of counsel 332 and plead guilty, greatly increases the
likelihood of juvenile courts obtaining jurisdiction over youths
when a factual basis for such intervention may be lacking.
VI. EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
The United States Supreme Court established the constitutional procedures for determining the admissibility of a confession at trial in Jackson v. Denno.333 Jackson rejected the New
York practice of admitting a confession into evidence without
any preliminary judicial determination of its voluntariness.
The Court reasoned that the procedure, which allowed the jury
to decide whether the confession was voluntary and instructed
it to disregard an involuntary confession in deciding guilt or innocence, was fraught with too many dangers. - 4 It declared the
procedure unconstitutional because the procedure failed to
provide a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the
inspection allowable without meeting traditional probable cause requirements

for a search of private property), In contrast, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973), held that a suspect may be compelled to
give a voice examplar to a grand jury without a preliminary probable cause determination. The Court asserted that "a subpoena to appear before a grand
jury is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that summons may be inconvenient or burdensome." I&L at 9. The Court distinguished
Davison the grounds that in Davis "it was the initial seizure-the lawless dragnet detention-that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, not the
taking of the fingerprints." Id.at 11. Critical to the Dionisio decision was the
investigative function of the grand jury. See id.at 17.
331. MmAN. R.P. Juv. CT. 19.04(1) (c) (ii).
332. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
333. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
334. Id.at 381-82.
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confession and because there was no way of adequately determining from a general verdict of guilt whether the jury had
properly disregarded a confession that it had found involuntary.335 The Court feared that a jury could not adequately compartmentalize the issue of the voluntariness and admissibility
of the confession from the issue of the defendant's guilt. As a
result, other evidence of guilt might influence the jury's voluntariness determination, or a reliable but involuntary confession
might be depended on to convict. 336 The Court concluded that
state procedures must provide a
reliable and clear-cut determination of the voluntariness of the confession... . Whether the trial judge, another judge or another jury, but
not the convicting jury, fully resolves the issue of voluntariness is not a
matter of concern here ....
[T]he states
are free to allocate functions
337
between judge and jury as they see fit.

The Minnesota Supreme Court described the procedures
necessary to meet the federal constitutional standards of Jackson in State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash.338 Rasmussen requires the prosecution to advise the court at the time of
defendant's arraignment if evidence whose admissibility raises
constitutional issues will be offered at trial.3 39 The court then
advises the defendant's counsel, who may contest the admissibility of the evidence on federal constitutional grounds in a pretrial hearing.3 40 Three years later, however, the court limited
the Rasmussen pretrial hearing requirement to jury trials in
City of St. Paul v. Page3 4 l and exempted the juvenile court
335. The Court in Jackson noted that
the New York jury returns only a general verdict upon the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence. It is impossible to discover whether the
jury found the confession voluntary and relied upon it, or involuntary
and supposedly ignored it. Nor is there any indication of how the jury
resolved disputes in the evidence concerning the critical facts underlying the coercion issue. Indeed, there is nothing to show that these matters were resolved at all, one way or the other.
Id. at 379-80.
336. Id. at 383. As the Court pointed out,
It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession which a jury
has found to be involuntary has nevertheless influenced the verdict or
that its finding of voluntariness, if this is the course that it took, was
affected by the other evidence showing the confession was true. But
the New York procedure poses substantial threats to a defendant's
constitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded and to have the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined.
These hazards we cannot ignore.
Id. at 389.
337. Id. at 391 & n.19.
338. 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966).
339. Id. at 553, 141 N.W.2d at 13.
340. Id. at 554, 141 N.W.2d at 13.
341. 285 Minn. 374, 376, 173 N.W.2d 460, 462 (1969).
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from the requirement in In re Welfare of Spencer. 4 - The Spencer court reasoned that, because the purpose of a separate pre-

trial hearing was to isolate the jury from preliminary
constitutional evidentiary questions, juvenile court proceedings
do not require such separate pretrial hearings because they do
not involve juries. 43

Minnesota codified this approach in Rule 26, which provides that an evidentiary hearing may be held to determine the
admissibility at trial of evidence obtained from search and
seizure, admissions, confessions, or identification procedures,

as well as evidence of other crimes.&3

This evidentiary hearing

"may be held by the court at any time before the trial" and

"[a]ny issue not determined prior to trial shall be determined
as part of the trial."345 In most juvenile delinquency trials,
however, administrative convenience leads to the litigation of
suppression issues in the course of the trial itself rather than in
a pretrial evidentiary hearing.u6 The practice under Rule 26 allows the same judge to determine the admissibility of evidence

or the voluntariness of a confession and, in the same proceed-

ing, the ultimate guilt or innocence of the juvenile defendant.3 47
This is similar to the practice in adult misdemeanor prosecutions in bench trialsm but differs from the practice in adult felony and gross misdemeanor prosecutions, in which the
evidentiary issues must be determined prior to trial, bench trial
or not.w9
342. 288 Minn. 119, 179 N.W.2d 95 (1970).
343. Id. at 123, 179 N.W.2d at 97-98.
344. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 26.01. Rule 23 requires the county attorney to advise the child's counsel of any evidence that the state intends to introduce that
may raise constitutional issues, as well as proof of other crimes. MWm. R.P.
Juv. CT. 23. The notice requirements correspond to those of the state rules of
criminal procedure. MnN. R. CumL P. 7; see also State v. Billstrom, 276 Minn.
174, 178-79, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (1967) (requiring notice of evidence of additional offenses); State ex reL Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539. 552-56, 141
N.W.2d 3, 12-15 (1965) (requiring notice of evidence obtained from defendant
that may raise constitutional issues); State v. Spreigl, 272 Minn. 488, 496-97, 139
N.W.2d 167, 172-73 (1965) (requiring notice of evidence of repeated offenses).
345. MImN. R.P. Juv. CT. 26.01. If an adverse judicial determination is anticipated, the county attorney may obtain a pretrial evidentiary hearing in order to
preserve a right to appeal the ruling without having double jeopardy attach.
MmN. R.P. Juv. CT. 26.01(b).
346. See Letter from Thomas H. Frost, Assistant Hennepin County Attorney, Juvenile Division, to Barry Feld (Nov. 1, 1984); Oleisky letter, supra note
324; Sonsteng letter, supra note 324 (copies of above correspondence on file
with the author).
347. See MmN. R.P. Juv. CT. 26.
348.
mmi. . Crn. P. 12.04(3).
349. MIN. R. CRi. P. 11.07 ("All issues presented at the Omnibus Hearing
shall be determined before trial.").
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The current practice in juvenile court thus permits the
judge to decide both the admissibility of evidence and the ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendant in the same proceeding. 350 The rationale for allowing judges, but not juries, to
decide both voluntariness/admissibility and guilt in the course
of the same proceeding is that judges, unlike juries, are, by professional training, temperament, and experience, capable of
compartmentalizing inadmissible evidence from admissible evidence in deciding a case.351 That presumption also underlies a
host of interrelated evidentiary doctrines.352 For example, "ab350. Courts generally have held that adult criminal bench trials do not require separate pretrial hearings. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d
1269, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298,
1304 (1976); United States v. Greathouse, 484 F.2d 805, 807 (7th Cir. 1973); City of
St. Paul v. Page, 285 Minn. 374, 376, 173 N.W.2d 460, 462 (1969); Pinczkowski v.
State, 51 Wis. 2d 249, 255, 186 N.W.2d 203, 205 (1971). See generally C. McCotMICK, EVIDENCE § 60 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) (discussing admissibility of evidence
in adult bench trials).
The same rule also is followed in juvenile proceedings. See, e.g., In re Appeal of Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-84357, 118 Ariz. 284, 287, 576 P.2d
143, 146 (1978); In re Welfare of Spencer, 288 Minn. 119, 123, 179 N.W.2d 95, 97-98
(1970).
351. See United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1305 (7th Cir.
1976); People v. Fultz, 32 IlI. App. 3d 317, 333, 336 N.E.2d 288, 302 (1975). The
New York Court of Appeals has articulated this difference between judge and

jury:
While a jury may sometimes be confused by the legal intricacies of
deciding two questions together, a Judge will not be so disoriented. . . . "Errors which loom large to a judge, learned in law and
trained to administer justice in strict accordance with the law, may be
scarcely visible to the lay juror." . . .
In our own deliberations in this court, we are called upon to objectively consider questions of law and reverse convictions even though
upon reading the entire record we are convinced of the defendant's
guilt.
People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 247 N.E.2d 153, 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193
(1969) (quoting People v. Buchalter, 289 N.Y. 181, 224-25, 45 N.E.2d 225, 247
(1942)).
Although Brown was a criminal case, courts in civil cases also have presumed that the judge will disregard all incompetent evidence and base findings
solely on admissible evidence. As the Eighth Circuit has observed, "In the trial
of a nonjury case, it is virtually impossible for a trial judge to commit reversible
error by receiving incompetent evidence, whether objected to or not. An appellate court will not reverse... unless all of the competent evidence is insufficient to support the judgement ...
." Builder's Steel Co. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950). For a discussion of the impact of incompetent evidence, see Note, Incompetent Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Ought We Presume That It Has No Effect?, 29 IND. LJ. 446 (1954).
352. The Seventh Circuit, in United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d
1298 (7th Cir. 1976), noted that
much that comes to the attention of a judge in a bench trial would be
inadmissible in a jury trial. In a bench trial, we presume that evidence
admitted for a limited purpose is considered in its proper perspective
by the trial judge. Moreover, when evidence has been initially received
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sent a clear showing of substantial prejudice, a bench trial
judge is presumed to have considered only relevant and admissible evidence in reaching his findings."353 Appellate courts
thus regularly presume that inadmissible evidence that would
clearly prejudice a jury does not improperly influence a trial
judge exposed to the same evidence, even when the judge erroneously admitted it originally.35 4
There are also practical and administrative considerations
that lead courts to treat the impact of evidence differently
when the evidence is presented to a judge instead of a jury. It
may be administratively inconvenient to require one judge to
determine preliminary issues of evidence admissibility and an3 55
other to sit as the ultimate trier of fact at the adjudication.
and later excluded as inadmissible in a bench trial, we assume that the

trial judge was not improperly influenced thereby. Indeed, even when
we have held that evidence was improperly admitted in a bench trial,
we have refused to presume that the trial judge considered it in reaching his verdict ...
[A) trained, experienced ... judge, as distinguished from a jury, must be presumed to have exercised the proper
discretion in distinguishing between the improper and the proper evidence introduced at trial, and to have based his decision only on the
latter, in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary.
Id. at 1305.
353. Id. at 1304. For citations of additional authority on this point, see id. at
1304 n.3. The New York Court of Appeals has concluded that "there is a critical
difference between a jury and nonjury trial and, therefore.... the rationale of
Jackson is inapplicable in the latter situation." People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168,
173, 247 N.E.2d 153, 156, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190, 194 (1969).
354. Commentators have noted this tendency:
Presumptions of propriety govern, ascribing to the trial judge-so long
as he sits without a jury--the wisdom to have disregarded the inadmissible and to have relied solely on the evidence which he later adjudged
competent. At times the presumption may appear a bit tenuous, for
the very judge who has been found to have erred in favor of admissibility is presumed to have gained new wisdom, if not a measure of sheer
omniscience, by the end of the case when he is obliged to weigh and
assess the evidence and is presumed to have disregarded that which he
earlier erroneously admitted.
Levin & Cohen, The Exclusionary Rules in Nonjury Criminal Cases, 119 U. PA.
L. Rav. 905, 907 (1971). For opinions expressing similar views, see Commonwealth v. Green, 464 Pa. 557, 569, 347 A.2d 682, 688 (1975) (Manderino, J, dissenting); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 432 Pa. 76, 86, 247 A.2d 218, 223 (1968)
(O'Brien, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Goodman, 221 Pa. Super. 73, 76, 289
A.2d 186, 188 (1972) (Spaulding, J., dissenting), vacated 454 Pa. 358, 311 A.2d 652
(1973). But cf. Commonwealth v. Corbin, 447 Pa. 463, 468, 291 A.2d 307, 310
(1972) (finding that a trial judge's denial of defendant's motion to suppress was
harmless because the confession was found to be voluntary).
355. In Commonwealth v. Green, 464 Pa. 557, 347 A.2d 682 (1975), the trial
judge had found the defendant's confession to be involuntary and had stated
that it was not considered in determining the defendant's guilt. See id. at 558,
347 A.2d at 683. In response to the defendant's contention on appeal that exposure to the prejudicial evidence was sufficient to nullify the judge's verdict, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania responded that
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Moreover, the suggestion that judges might be adversely influenced by evidence that they have heard but suppressed could
jeopardize a number of other presumptions about the role of
judges in bench trials. 3 6 Indeed, some courts regard questioning the ability of trial judges to disregard the prejudicial impact
of inadmissible evidence as an attack on the very foundation of
the judicial trial process. 357
One need not attack the foundations of the entire judicial
function in bench trials, however, to question whether, as a
matter of policy, it might not be preferable to have a judge
other than the one who actually tries the case make preliminary determinations of admissibility.358 For example, the
Pennsylvania federal district court has applied the Jackson rationale to bench trials by requiring that a judge determine the
admissibility of evidence in a separate proceeding prior to
trial. 35 9 It did so because it believed that the finder of fact,
it is of the essence of the judicial function to hear or view proffered evidence.., and to decide whether or not it should be admitted .... For

us to accept appellant's contention would be, in effect, to find disqualification of a judge to be a judge; it would go against the time honored

practice in our courts ... .and would add immeasurably to the workload of the trial courts.
Id. at 561, 347 A.2d at 683-84.
356. A Florida appeals court has recognized this danger. '"To reverse this
trial on the basis that the trial judge, in his capacity as trier of fact, was so prejudicially influenced by his encounter with the incriminating portions of [codefendants' confessions], would be to cast aspersions on the entire foundation
of the judge's role in any court proceeding." Brown v. State, 223 So. 2d 337, 339
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
357. See People v. Fultz, 32 Ill. App. 3d 317, 333, 336 N.E.2d 288, 302 ('There is
no valid analogy between the jury and the trial judge .... There can be no
assumption that the trial judge cannot make a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the confession ...and there can be no assumption of his inevitable prejudice in making that determination .... "); State v. Hutchinson, 260

Md. 227, 231, 271 A.2d 641, 643 (1970) (observing that "the issue before us goes to
the very marrow of the role, function, and capacity of the judge in our legal system"); see also C. MCCORMICK, supra note 350, § 60, at 138 n.87 (suggesting that
those who take the position that judges cannot purge inadmissible evidence
from their minds do so "misguidedly").
358. See United States ex rel. Placek v. Illinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1306 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1976) ("Holding a pretrial hearing, or a separate hearing when the voluntariness issue is first raised at trial, seems preferable in order to minimize the
possibility that such improper influence might arise."); Commonwealth v.
Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 360, 311 A.2d 652, 653 (1973) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 258, 301 A.2d 837, 841 (1973)) (preferred practice is "to
have the trial conducted by someone other than the judge who presided over
the Suppression Proceedings particularly where there is a waiver of [a] jury").
359. United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 695 (E.D. Pa.
1967), affd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969); see also United States ex rel. Owens v.
Cavell, 254 F. Supp. 154, 155 (M.D. Pa. 1966) (questioning but not deciding
whether a judge sitting as fact finder would be able to pass on the question of
guilt or innocence without being influenced by the voluntariness issue); cf.
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whether judge or jury, must be absolutely unprejudiced when
it decides guilt and that simultaneously determining the voluntariness of a confession and guilt prejudices both decisions. 360
Although some other courts have recognized that "judges, being flesh and blood, are subject to the same emotions and
human frailties as affect other members of the specie," 36 ' remarkably few courts have considered testing the dimensions of
judicial frailty, and there are no empirical studies directly testing the ability of judges to compartmentalize as a result of their
professional training and expertise. Several commentators
have questioned this ability,362 but in most jurisdictions the fiction of judicial blindside precludes further analysis of the
issue. 363

There are several analogous instances of judicial decision
making that bear on the propriety of allowing the same judge to
determine both suppression issues and a defendant's guilt or
innocence. Many courts and commentators have concluded
that when a judge knows about a defendant's prior criminal
record, the judge may be unable to prevent such knowledge
from influencing the judge's determination of the defendant's

guilt.364 The problem of judicial awareness of a defendant's

Hutcherson v. United States, 351 F.2d 748, 751-55 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (setting aside
conviction because jury not properly instructed on its responsibility regarding
a confession admitted against a claim of involuntariness). For other cases discussing the admissibility of evidence in nonjury proceedings, see supra note
354.
360. United States ex rel Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 695-96 (ED. Pa.
1967), affid, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969).
361. State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 233, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (1970); see also
Kovacs v. Szentes, 130 Conn. 229, 232, 33 A.2d 124, 125 (1943) ("A judge has not
such control over his mental faculties that he can definitely determine whether
or not inadmissible evidence he has heard will affect his mind in maling his
decision.").
362. For example, commentators have observed:
Nature does not furnish a jurist's brain with thought-tight compartments to suit the convenience of legal theory, and convincing evidence
once heard does leave its mark...
* . * If after an evidential objection and argument thereupon, he
definitely admits the improper evidence, it requires an appellate Pollyanna with fingers crossed and tongue in cheek, to presume that the
trial judge discovered and removed his error before judgment.
Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversiesas to Admissibility,36 YALE L.J. 1101, 1115-16 (1927); see, e.g., Levin & Cohen, supra note
354; Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basisfor Reversal, 79 HARv.
L REV. 407 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Note, Improper Evidence]; Note, supra
note 351.
363. See, e.g., State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 233, 271 A.2d 641, 644 (1970).
364. See Commonwealth v. Oglesby, 438 Pa. 91, 93-94, 263 A.2d 419, 420-21
(1970); Commonwealth v. Jones, 259 Pa. Super. 103, ., 393 A.2d 737, 738-40
(1978); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRWhIliAL JUS-
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criminal past is akin to information obtained in suppression
hearings, 365 because in both instances the judges have information that is both inadmissible and prejudicial to the defendant.
Kalven and Zeisel's classic study of American juries 366 noted
that when judges have facts that are kept from the jury,
whether obtained from suppression hearings, withdrawn guilty
pleas, or knowledge of the defendant's criminal record, the
judges are more likely to convict than are juries because the
judges use that additional (albeit inadmissible) evidence in
making their decisions. 367 The availability of such evidence to
TICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE, Standard 1.7

(1972) (trial judges should excuse themselves whenever they doubt their ability to preside impartially in a criminal case or when their impartiality reasonably could be questioned); Levin & Cohen, supra note 354, at 911-17; Note,
Improper Evidence, supra note 362, at 413-14; see also Amsterdam, The Supreme
Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases,45 N.Y.U. L REV. 785, 792
(1970) (judges and magistrates who are functionally and psychologically allied
with the police determine the fate of a suspect, who usually is a "bad type" and
has a criminal record). Professor Wigmore described the problems posed when
the judge knows about the defendant's prior criminal record:
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal-whether judge or
jury-is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present
charge, or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the present charge. Moreover, the use of alleged particular acts ranging over the entire period of the defendant's life makes it'
impossible for him to be prepared to refute the charge, any or all of
which may be mere fabrications.
1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 194, at 646 (3d ed. 1940).
Compare Commonwealth v. Rivers, 218 Pa. Super. 184, 187, 279 A.2d 766, 768
(1971) (trial judge's knowledge of defendant's prior crimes and pending murder
charge "was so prejudicial that the trier of facts, even though he was an able
and experienced trial judge, could have come to no other conclusion than that
the appellant had a predilection for crime") with People v. Robillard, 55 Cal. 2d
88, 99, 358 P.2d 295, 301, 10 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (1960) ("A trial judge is much less
likely than a jury to be prejudiced by allegedly inflammatory or improper evidence, since his well-trained legal mind will reject such evidence if it is improper and view it in its proper light and for the limited purpose for which it
was introduced."), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 886 (1961), overruled on other grounds,
People v. Morse, 60 Cal. 2d 631, 648-49, 388 P.2d 33, 44, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 212
(1964).
365. See United States ex rel. DiGiangiemo v. Regan, 528 F.2d 1262, 1265-70
(2d Cir. 1975) (due process mandates that the granting of a motion to suppress
evidence constitutes collateral estoppel barring introduction of that evidence in
a subsequent criminal trial), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976); cf. Simmons v.
United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968) (defendant's testimony in support of a
fourth amendment suppression motion may not thereafter be admitted against
him at trial on the issue of guilt).
366. H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
367. Id. at 105-17, 133. In the 962 sample cases in which the judge and jury
disagreed on guilt, the existence of facts that only the judge knew was given as
one of the reasons for disagreement seven percent of the time. Id. Table 26, at
111. The study concludes that "judges will decide cases differently because
they are privy to additional, albeit inadmissible, evidence." Id. at 133.
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trial judges thus constitutes a significant risk of prejudice to
defendants.
A similar problem occurs when a judge trying a criminal
case is aware that the defendant pled guilty and later withdrew
the plea or that the court rejected a guilty plea. 36 8 The danger

is that the judge "will infact have negated in his mind the presumption of innocence with which each criminal trial is supposed to begin."369 Indeed, some courts have recognized that
withdrawn guilty pleas may so prejudice the tribunal that a fair
bench trial thereafter is impossible.3 70 Most courts, however,
have left it to the trial judge's discretion to withdraw from a
case in which the judge has previously participated in plea negotiations or received a plea that was later rejected or
withdrawn.371
368. See Commonwealth v. Conti, 236 Pa. Super. 488, 495-503, 345 A.2d 238,
241-46 (1975) (new trial required when judge learned through testimony that
defendant had pleaded guilty at preliminary hearing since evidence of guilt not
otherwise overwhelming and prior plea highly prejudicial).
369. Note, Judicial Plea Bargaining,19 STAn. L. Rsv. 1082, 1089-90 (1967);
see also Alschuler, The TrialJudge's Role in Plea Bargaining,76 CoLu. L. Rnv.
1059, 1108-16 (1976) (discussing danger that bargaining judge could not conduct
a fair trial after breakdown of plea negotiations); Gallagher, JudicialParticipation in Plea Bargaining: A Searchfor Standards,9 HARv. C.R.-C.L L. Rlv. 29,
44 (1974) (noting that a trial judge's impartiality, or at least "the judge's image
as an impartial arbiter of justice," may be jeopardized by involvement in pretrial negotiations).
370. See, e.g., Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352, 1359 (4th Cir. 1970) (Winter, J,
dissenting) (pointing out that "if a plea bargain is rejected, it should be a simple matter for the judge to disqualify himself and send the parties to another
judge for consideration of their revised agreement"), cert denied, 406 U.S. 931
(1972); State v. Joyner, 228 La. 927, 930-31, 84 So. 2d 462, 463-64 (1955) (withdrawn guilty plea inadmissible and prejudicial); State v. Reardon, 245 Minn.
509, 511-12, 73 N.W.2d 192, 193-94 (1955) (same); People v. Selikoff, 35 N.Y.2d 227,
239, 318 N.E.2d 784, 792, 360 N.Y.S.2d 623, 634 (1974) (defendant who had withdrawn guilty plea had a right to request that another judge preside over the
trial), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); Commonwealth v. Rothman, 222 Pa.
Super. 385, 386-87, 294 A.2d 783, 784 (1972) (judicial participation in plea bargaining allowed when judge advised defendant that another judge would try the
case if plea withdrawn); cf. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269-74 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (trial judge should neither participate in plea bargaining nor create incentives for guilty pleas by using a policy of differential sentencing).
371. See, e.g., People v. Irwin, 47 Mich. App. 608, 609.10, 209 N.W.2d 718, 719
(1973). The Minnesota Supreme Court has stated
We do not conceive that the rule ... should have unvarying application in cases where defendant waives a jury and his guilt or innocence
is passed upon by the court. It would not be unusual for a court to be
aware of proceedings had in another courtroom in connection with the
same prosecution, and it could not be fairly said that in every case the
court's knowledge of the prior plea of guilty, either withdrawn or vacated, would prevent him from fairly passing upon the issue of guilt or
innocence.
State v. Hayes, 285 Minn. 199, 201, 172 N.W.2d 324, 326 (1969).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has observed: "After rejecting a plea [be-
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Another analogue to the problem of a judge simultaneously
deciding issues of admissibility and guilt arises when a trial
court erroneously considers a codefendant's confessions. As
with other types of '"prejudicial knowledge," the Supreme
Court forbids juries to possess such information and still decide guilt but allows judges to have that knowledge and make
372
the same decision. For example, in Bruton v. United States,
a codefendant's confession implicating defendant Bruton was
admitted into evidence, but the trial judge instructed the jury
to consider it only against its maker and to disregard its incriminating character in determining Bruton's guilt. 373 The
Supreme Court held that Bruton was entitled to a new trial
"because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial
statements in determining [Bruton's] guilt." 374 The Court
cause the presentence report did not support the bargained-for plea], a judge
may excuse himself from further involvement in the case and should give serious consideration to doing so.... But ultimately, absent a showing of actual
prejudice, the choice lies within the discretion of the trial judge." United States
v. Gallington, 488 F.2d 637, 639-40 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 907
(1974). The Gallington court recognized the dangers inherent in allowing the
same judge to decide the case on the merits after exposure to evidence probative of guilt, id. at 639, but it followed the majority practice and allowed the
same judge to try the case, id. at 640; see United States v. Clark, 605 F.2d 939, 942
(1979) (not improper for judge who had read the presentence report after defendant's initial guilty plea to preside over defendant's jury trial). As one commentator summarized the issue,
Whatever the professionalism and objectivity of most judges, a particular judge may view a defendant's participation in plea discussions as
an indication of guilt; he may resent a defendant's refusal of an offer
that the judge considered generous; and he may be exposed to evidence and allegations during a bargaining session that make it difficult
for him to remain impartial. Moreover, defendants and other observers
of the criminal courts may have less confidence in a judge's "trained
and disciplined judicial intellect" than the judge does himself. To dissipate the doubt about a judge's objectivity that would inevitably arise
from his participation in pretrial bargaining, it seems desirable to assign a case to another judge for trial whenever a defendant rejects a
judicial offer and enters a plea of not guilty.
Alschuler, supra note 369, at 1111.
372. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
373. Id. at 125 n.2.
374. Id. at 126. The Court, applying its reasoning in Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964), regarding the inability of juries to compartmentalize evidence,
stated:
"The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition [to the jury]
against misuse of the confessor's inculpation of the nonconfessor is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declara.
tion cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors." 352 U.S., at
247... . "The Government should not have the windfall of having the
jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter
of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their
minds." Id., at 248. To the same effect, and also quoted in the Jackson
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noted that Bruton had been denied the right to confront and
cross-examine his codefendant, who did not testify regarding
his own confession. 375 Similar concern about a judge's ability
to compartmentalize such knowledge, however, is generally
lacking for either adult defendants in bench trials or juvenile
3 76
defendants in juvenile proceedings.
Whenever a judge knows information that is not admissible
at trial but is prejudicial to a defendant, the impartiality of the
note.... : "The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury... all practicing lawyers know to be
unmitigated fiction."
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 129 (quoting Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 247,
248 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S.
440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The Court also noted that "there are
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that
the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Id.
at 135. The Court recognized the inadequacy of cautionary instructions: "'A
jury cannot "segregate evidence into separate intellectual boxes." . . . It cannot determine that a confession is true insofar as it admits that A has committed criminal acts with B and at the same time effectively ignore the inevitable
conclusion that B has committed those same criminal acts with A.'" Id. at 131
(quoting People v. Aranda, 63 Cal. 2d 518, 529, 407 P.2d 265, 272, 47 Cal. Rptr. 353,
360 (1965)).
375. Id. at 126.
376. Some state courts have applied the Bruton reasoning to juvenile proceedings held before a judge. The California Court of Appeals, for example,
ruled that "out-of-court statements made by one juvenile implicating another
cannot be admitted in a joint jurisdictional hearing unless the references implicating the nondeclarant have been effectively deleted; if the inculpatory references cannot be effectively deleted, the hearing must be severed if the
statement is to be admitted against the declarant." In re D.L, 46 Cal. App. 3d
65, 70-71, 120 Cal. Rptr. 276, 279 (1975).
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals also applied Bruton in a juvenile
court bench trial in which the trial judge not only erroneously admitted the codefendant's confession against the defendant, but also demonstrated on the
record his failure to "compartmentalize" the evidence in his findings of guilt.
See In re Appeal No. 977 from Circuit Court of Baltimore City, 22 Md. App. 511,
515-18, 323 A.2d 663, 666-68 (1974). Although adhering to the general rule that
Bruton violations are inapposite in a nonjury trial because of the presumption
of judicial compartmentalization, the court stated, 'The presumption is rebutted, however (or, more properly, it does not even arise), where the judge's instructions to himself are discernibly erroneous." Id. at 518, 323 A.2d at 667.
In Mackey v. State, 234 So. 2d 418 (Fla.Dist. Ct. App. 1970), the Florida District Court of Appeals ruled that Bruton applied to adult criminal bench trials
since "there is a reasonable probability that the trial judge could not evaluate
the evidence, as it bore on the guilt or innocence of [one defendant], after hearing the [codefendant's] statement, ,ithout to some material extent being influenced thereby." Id. at 420. The following year, however, the court reversed its
decision in Mackey to apply Bruton to bench trials. Brown v. State, 252 So. 2d
842, 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971). The confrontation problem in Bruton, incidentally, is similar to the voluntariness problem in Jackson in that both indicate the danger inherent in exposing the fact finder to certain additional,
prejudicial information.
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tribunal is open to question. 37 7 The presumption that judges
can successfully compartmentalize admissibility and guilt is a
frail reed on which to build an adjudicative apparatus. The presumption against evidentiary "seepage" is particularly troublesome in juvenile court proceedings because the same judge
typically handles the same case at different stages. 378 For example, at a detention hearing, a judge may be exposed to a
youth's "social history" file and the youth's prior record of police contacts and delinquency adjudications, all of which bear
on the issue of the appropriate pretrial placement of the
youth.379 When that same judge is subsequently called on to
determine the admissibility of evidence in a suppression hearing and the guilt of the juvenile in the same proceeding, the
risks of prejudice become almost insuperable. To whatever degree a judge is unable to compartmentalize, a juvenile is denied
the basic right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal with a determination of guilt based on admissible evidence. 380 The risk
377. See authorities cited supra note 362.
378. As pointed out in the Juvenile Justice Standards, a juvenile court judge
is more likely than his or her counterpart in the criminal justice process to have had contact with a case prior to an adjudication hearing, in
a detention hearing or perhaps even a hearing to consider transfer for
prosecution in criminal court, in which background information that
would be unfairly prejudicial to the respondent at adjudication was
properly presented.
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION,

Standard 4.1 commentary at 54.

379. A number of courts have condemned juvenile court examination of social reports prior to an adjudication of delinquency. See, e.g., In re H., 41 A.D.2d
667, 667, 341 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (1973) (directing that "the probation service should
not communicate reports to the court concerning the alleged delinquent until
the fact-finding hearing is completed"); cf.In re R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 859-62, 464 P.2d
127, 130-32, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671, 674-76 (1970) (reversible error for court to review
social study report before jurisdictional hearing); In re Lee, 126 Vt. 156, 158, 224
A.2d 917, 919 (1966) (court should not consider the social welfare worker's report in making commitment order).
380. The right to a fair trial before an impartial tribunal is a fundamental
due process requirement. See, e.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965). The
Supreme Court in In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), explained the importance of an impartial tribunal:
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness .... But to perform its high function in
the best way "justice must satisfy the appearance of justice."
Id. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 398 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)). Moreover, the
fact finder must make a determination based only on the evidence in the record
in order to ensure effective appellate review. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (noting that "conclusions to be reached in a case will be
induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence").
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of prejudice is even more significant in juvenile court proceedings than in adult bench trials because adult defendants can at
least avoid the risk by choosing a jury trial.381 Since juveniles
have no right to a jury trial, their risks of prejudice are aggravated by their inability to avoid those risks.
States can avoid this risk for juveniles either by providing
for jury trials or by requiring that admissibility determinations
be made prior to trial, as is already done in some jurisdictions.382 In addition to carrying out the policy of "minimiz[ing]

the possibility that... improper influence might arise,"3 =3 pretrial suppression hearings provide other advantages. Conducting suppression hearings prior to the trial also protects the
state's right to an interlocutory appeal. Once jeopardy has attached, a ruling that evidence is inadmissible may preclude
either appellate review 384 or retrial of the defendant.38 5 In ad-

dition, a pretrial suppression hearing assures that a juvenile
381. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (trial by jury is a fundamental right available to all who, had they been tried in federal court, would
have come within sixth amendment jury trial guarantee). Compare RLR v.
State, 487 P.2d 27, 33 (Alaska 1971) (juvenile jury trial required) with McKeiver
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (juvenile jury trial not required) and In
re McCloud, 110 R. 431, 436, 293 A.2d 512, 516 (1972) (same). For a discussion
of the jury trial issue in juvenile proceedings, see infra notes 389-496 and accompanying text.
R. Juv. P. 8.130(b)(3) (iii); Omo R. Juv. P. 22(D)(3).
382. See, e.g., F"
383. United States ex reL Placek v. fllinois, 546 F.2d 1298, 1306 n.8 (7th Cir.
1976). Pennsylvania supports pretrial suppression hearings, preferably before
a judge other than the trial judge. See, e.g., United States ex reL Spears v. Rundle, 268 F. Supp. 691, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (voluntariness of confession must be
determined prior to admission of evidence by judge other than the trier of
fact), affd, 405 F.2d 1037 (3d Cir. 1969). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has indicated, 'The better practice in a multi-judge county would be to have
the trial conducted by someone other than the judge who presided over the
Suppression Proceedings particulary where there is a waiver of jury accepted."
Commonwealth v. Paquette, 451 Pa. 250, 258, 301 A.2d 837, 841 (1973). Commentators have reached the same conclusion
The importance of the underlying policies together with the risks of
prejudice are, in our view, sufficient reason for imposing some measure
of added administrative burdens, even to the point of requiring, where
feasible, that one judge rule on admissibility of confession at preliminary hearings and a different judge sit to determine guilt or innocence.
Levin & Cohen, supranote 354, at 910.
384. The Minnesota juvenile rules allow the county attorney to request a
pretrial evidentiary hearing in order to preserve the right to appeal MINN. R.P.
Juv. CT. 26.01(b). If the prosecutor does not anticipate the court's ruling, however, this right may be lost or proceedings substantially delayed pending
review.
385. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528-33 (1975) (because juvenile put in
jeopardy when trier of fact in juvenile proceeding hears evidence on whether
juvenile had violated criminal law, subsequent criminal prosecution violates
double jeopardy clause).
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defendant who wants to testify only on issues concerning the
voluntariness of the confession or the admissibility of other evidence will be able to do so without prejudice. 38 6 Finally, conducting the suppression hearing prior to the trial or before a
different judge can minimize the possible confusion of the fact
finder by separating the defendant's testimony on the preliminary questions of admissibility from any subsequent testimony
387
on the ultimate questions of guilt or innocence.
Minnesota's endorsement of a contemporaneous suppression hearing and trial on the merits is one that places juveniles
at a substantial procedural disadvantage compared with adult
criminal defendants. The belief that juvenile court judges can
successfully compartmentalize prejudicial and inadmissible evidence when deciding questions of guilt or innocence requires a
leap of faith. All of the deficiencies of the "totality of the circumstances" as a criterion for determining issues of constitu386. Although the Supreme Court in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377,
389-94 (1968), gave defendants the right to testify at a suppression hearing without that testimony being admissible in their subsequent trial, when the suppression proceeding occurs in the midst of the trial, preservation of the
Simmons right becomes more difficult. A Michigan appeals court has recognized that
a defendant who testifies at the trial in chief concerning the voluntariness of his confession does so at the peril of waiving constitutional
safeguards. This result is avoided only when he enjoys the special protection expressly afforded at a [pretrial suppression] hearing, i.e., the
right to testify for a limited purpose without waiving any rights.
People v. Garza, 13 Mich. App. 189, 192, 163 N.W.2d 813, 814 (1968). A Florida
appeals court also has noted this problem: "Holding a separate hearing, even if
just prior to trial has several advantages ....
[A] separate hearing will assure
that when the defendant wishes to testify only concerning voluntariness of his
confession, there will be less confusion over whether he is submitting his testimony on the merits or simply giving evidence on voluntariness .
M.A. v.
State, 384 So. 2d 740, 741-42 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
In State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d 3 (1966),
the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the importance of allowing the defendant to testify at suppression hearings without waiving the privilege against
self-incrimination:
"At this hearing the defendant may take the stand and testify for the
limited purpose of making a record of his version of the facts ....
By
so doing, the defendant does not waive his right to decline to take the
stand in his own defense on the trial in chief."
Id. at 554 n.43, 141 N.W.2d at 14 n.43 (quoting State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke,
27 Wis. 244, 265, 133 N.W.2d 753, 764 (1965)).
387. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant may
take the stand to contest the admissibility of an in-court identification "without
waiving his right to silence as to matters beyond the scope of that isolated issue." In re Welfare of Spencer, 288 Minn. 119, 123, 179 N.W.2d 95, 98 (1970). Despite that possibility, however, the danger of a judge confusing testimony
offered in one stage of the proceedings with that offered in another persists.
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tional admissibility3 8 8 are further aggravated when these
factors are lumped together in one undifferentiated proceeding.
To whatever degree the "theory" of compartmentalization is
factually invalid-and the various analogies at least raise troubling questions-juveniles are exposed to a serious risk of
prejudice. Moreover, the risks that juveniles incur are substantially greater than those incurred by their adult counterparts,
both because the same juvenile court judge will likely have had
far more contact with the juvenile's case as it wends its way
through the process and because the juvenile has no right to a
jury trial that would alleviate those risks. The practice approved in Minnesota's Rule 26 unnecessarily raises a host of
procedural problems that could readily have been avoided simply by requiring suppression hearings to be conducted prior to
trial and with a different judge or by providing for a jury trial.
VII. TRIALS
As noted earlier,3 89 the Supreme Court held in McKeiver
that juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial because the
only requirement for "fundamental fairness" in juvenile proceedings is "accurate factfinding," a requirement as well satisfied by a judge as by a jury.3 90 Because of Minnesota's
legislative and judicial reluctance to go beyond the minimum
constitutional requirement established by McKeiver, Minnesota's Rule 27, which governs the rights of a juvenile in a delinquency trial and the procedures to be followed there, gives no

right to a jury trial.39 1
Rule 27 provides that juvenile courts shall admit "only such
evidence as would be admissible in a criminal trial"3 92 and implements the Winship holding393 by requiring that allegations
388.
389.

See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.

390. 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971). In emphasizing only factual accuracy, however,
the Court departed from its prior analysis that also looked to protection against
governmental oppression. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
391.

MIN. R.P. Jtrv. CT.27; see also MINN. STAT. § 260.155 (1982) (providing

that "hearings on any matter shall be without a jury and may be conducted in
an informal manner").
392.

MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 27.04; accord JuvEmLE JUSriCE STANDARDS, SUpro

note 73, STANDARDs RELATING TO ADnmicAION, Standard 4.2 (applying evidentiary rules used in criminal trials to contested delinquency adjudication proceedings). The same evidentiary limitations also apply to the suppression

hearing, which typically is conducted during the adjudicatory hearing. See
MINN. R.P. Juv. CT.26.02.
393. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
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of delinquency "must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt."394
These procedural requirements, which are so similar to those
in adult criminal trials, starkly symbolize the juvenile justice
system's evolution from an inquiry focusing on the "real needs"
and "best interests" of the child into one initially emphasizing
the proof of the commission of a specific crime subject to many
395
of the strictures of adult criminal procedure.
Minnesota's uncritical reliance on McKeiver in denying
juveniles jury trials is unfortunate because it ignores the possibilities that juvenile court judges may not satisfy the "accurate factfinding" standard as well as juries and that juveniles
may need as much protection as adults against governmental
oppression. As a result, Minnesota again provides juveniles
with fewer safeguards than adults while subjecting them to increasingly criminalized proceedings and punitive dispositions.
A.

ACCURATE FACT

FINDING

The Supreme Court's assertion in McKeiver that accurate
fact finding does not require juries in juvenile proceedings, like
Minnesota's decision in Rule 27, follows neither logic nor the

approach of the Court in

Winship,396

because it does not take

into account the real differences in perception of fact between
juries and judges. Winship required "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" to convict juveniles alleged delinquent as well as
adults charged with criminal offenses. 397 The Court's rationale
was that the seriousness of the proceedings and the potential
consequences for a defendant, whether juvenile or adult, required the highest standard of proof in order to avoid convicting innocent people. 398 Minnesota necessarily adheres to the
394.

MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 27.05; accord JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra

note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, Standard 4.3 (government
should be required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in contested
juvenile trials).
395. As one empirical study of the operation of juvenile courts observed,
The adjudicatory hearing or trial of a juvenile in Denver so closely
resembles an adult criminal trial that, except for the age and size of the
"defendant," the legal terminology used, and the numbers of jurors,
most lay people and a subtantial number of attorneys would find the
two types of proceedings impossible to differentiate.
Hufnagel & Davidson, Children in Need: Observationsof Practicesof the Denver
Juvenile Court, 51 DEN. L.J. 337, 387-88 (1974).
396. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
397. See Winship, 397 U.S. at 368.
398. Id. at 363-64; cf.Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428-29 (1979) (Court's
adoption of "clear and convincing" standard of proof in civil commitment proceedings not inconsistent with Winship because state power not being used pu-
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constitutional standard of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt"
in juvenile proceedings in Rule 27.399 Having the same rigorous
proof standard for both adults and juveniles assures the highest possible accuracy, public confidence in decisions, and a similarity of outcomes in juvenile and criminal proceedings.
Minnesota's refusal to require jury trials for juveniles, however, undermines that accuracy and creates the possibility of
differing results. Juries serve special protective functions in assuring the accuracy of factual determinations, and studies show
that juries are more likely to acquit than are judges.400 Substantive criminal guilt is not just "factual guilt" but a complex
assessment of moral culpability.40 1 The power of jury nullification provides a nexus between the legislature's original
criminalization decision and the community's felt sense of justice in the application of laws to a particular case. 4o 2 These tendencies are attributable to various factors, including differences
in jury-judge evaluations of evidence, jury sentiments about
the "law" (jury equity), and jury sympathy for the defendant.40 3 Kalven and Zeisel attribute the substantial differences

between judge and jury verdicts to the jury's use of a higher evidentiary threshold standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."4o4 They conclude, "If a society wishes to be serious
about convicting only when the state has been put to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, it would be well advised to have a
jury system."405 Given the importance of juries in this regard,
the Supreme Court's decision in McKeiver to dispense with juries in juvenile court can be seen as rendering conviction of a
youth appearing before a judge in juvenile court somewhat easier than conviction on the basis of the same evidence before a
jury of detached citizens in an adult proceeding.
nitively in commitment proceedings and mentally ill person not "better ofr*
free than committed).
399. MMN. R.P. Juv. CT. 27.05.
400. See, e.g., H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 366, at 58-59 Simon & Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof A View from the Bench, the Jury, and the
Classroom, 5 LAw &Soc'y REv. 319, 329 (1971). Contra Nagel, Lamm & NefL Decision Theory and JurorDecision-Making,in THE TRIAL PROCESS 353, 375-76 (B.
Sales ed. 1981).
401. See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. LJ. 185, 214 (1983).
402. Id at 215; see Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of
a Controversy,LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1980, at 51.
403. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 366, at 182, 185-90; Comment,
Juveniles and their Right to a Jury Tial, 15 VILL. L.REV. 972, 992-95 (1970).
404. H. KALVEN &H. ZEISEL, supra note 366, at 182, 185-90.
405. Id,at 189-90.
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The jury-judge "reasonable doubt" distinction is further
amplified for juveniles because the youthfulness of the defendant is one characteristic that studies indicate elicits substantial
jury sympathy,40 6 again suggesting that obtaining convictions
in juvenile court trials without a jury may be easier than in
adult proceedings with one. Indeed, juvenile court judges may
be more predisposed to find jurisdiction than criminal court
judges or juries in order to "help" an errant youth. One study
of juvenile justice in California compared, among other things,
the attrition rates of similar types of cases in juvenile and adult
courts and suggests that "it is easier to win a conviction in the
juvenile court than in the criminal court, with comparable
40 7
types of cases."
When the differences between "judge reasonable doubt"
and "jury reasonable doubt" and sympathy are coupled with
the greater flexibility and informality of nonjury, closed proceedings in juvenile court, the disadvantages to juveniles are
further compounded. Juvenile court judges are exposed to far
more prejudicial information about a youth in detention proceedings and this influences the likelihood of both conviction
and institutional confinement.4 0 8 The absence of a jury also
permits suppression hearings to be conducted during the trial,
which allows the introduction of additional information with
prejudicial consequences for a youth. 40 9 Finally, in the majority of cases, juveniles are adjudicated delinquent without the
presence or assistance of an attorney, which further prejudices
the accuracy of the fact-finding process. 4 10 Thus, it appears
that McKeivers rejection of a jury trial requirement in juvenile
cases and Minnesota Rule 27's silence on the issue is inconsistent with Winship's and Minnesota Rule 27.05's affirmative requirement of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" and with
"fundamental fairness."
B.

PREVENTING GOVERNMENT OPPRESSION

The jury's special role in preventing government oppres406. Id. at 209-13. Although their research was confined to adult proceedings, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that in that context the youthfulness of a defendant was the personal characteristic that engendered the greatest sympathy
from jurors. Id. at 210.
407. See W. GREENWOOD, A. LIPSON, A. ABRAHAMSE & F. ZIMRING, YourrH
CRIME AND JUVENILE JusTICE IN CALIFORNIA 30-31 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
YOUTH CRIME IN CALIFORNIA].
408. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
409. See supra notes 344-88 and accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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sion also suggests that the rationale of McKeiver is untenable.
The McKeiver Court uncritically accepted the assertion that juvenile courts are "rehabilitative" rather than punitive and
made no further inquiry about the need for procedural protections against governmental oppression. 411 Justice White's concurrence in McKeiver emphasizes the perceived distinctions
between juvenile and criminal proceedings. Whereas the criminal law punishes morally responsible actors for making blameworthy choices, the deterministic assumptions of the juvenile
justice system regard juveniles as less culpable. 412 Justice

White observed that the indeterminate length of juvenile dispositions and the "eschewing [of] blameworthiness and punishment for evil choices" 4 13 satisfied him that "there remained
differences of substance between criminal and juvenile

courts."414 This stance assumes that juveniles receive only pos411. Rather, the Court noted that concern over the applicability of various
procedural safeguards to jury trials ignores "every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates." McKeive7, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971). In contrast, the Court in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), held that fundamental fairness in
adult criminal proceedings requires both factual accuracy and protection
against governmental oppression:
Those who wrote our constitutions knew from history and experience
that it was necessary to protect against unfounded criminal charges
brought to eliminate enemies and against judges too responsive to the
voice of higher authority ... Providing an accused with the right to
be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant preferrred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less
sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Beyond
this, the jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the
citizen to one judge or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power,
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in other respects,
found expression in the criminal law in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt or innocence.
Id. at 156.
In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court held that no offense
that is punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is petty. Id at 7374. Baldwin has important implications for juveniles because juvenile court
dispositional authority may continue for more than six months, even beyond
the age of majority, see MnN. STAT. § 260.181(4) (Supp. 1983) (jurisdictional authority of juvenile court may last until juvenile reaches age of 19), and thus no
juvenile proceeding could be deemed "petty."
412. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 551-52 (White, J., concurring).
413. Id.at 552 (White, J., concurring).
414. Id. at 553 (White, J., concurring). Justice Stewart's dissent in In re
Gault articulated a similar distinction between the juvenile and adult criminal
justice systems, observing that "a juvenile proceeding's whole purpose and
mission is the very opposite of the mission and purpose of a prosecution in a
criminal court. The object of the one is correction of a condition. The object of
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itive rehabilitative treatment that requires no further special
safeguards against governmental intervention. Retributive
criminal punishment, in contrast, requires additional proce415
dural guarantees to prevent governmental oppression.
It is highly questionable, however, whether the contemporary juvenile justice system, either in theory or practice, eschews punishment in favor of rehabilitation. Although the
Supreme Court in McKeiver did not analyze the distinction between treatment in juvenile courts and punishment in criminal
courts, 416 it has in other decisions examined the issue of what
the other is conviction and punishment for a criminal act." 387 U.S. 1, 79 (1967)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
415. The fundamental justification in juvenile jurisprudence for denying
jury trials and, more basically, for maintaining a juvenile justice system separate from the adult one is based on the difference between punishment and
treatment. Punishment, according to Professor Hart's conventionally accepted
definition, is the imposition by the state, for the purpose of retribution or deterrence, of burdens on an individual who has violated legal prohibitions. H.
HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND RsSPONSIILrTY 4-5 (1968); see G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRiMINAL LAw 408-20
(1978). Treatment, however, focuses on the mental health, status, or welfare of
the individual rather than on the commission of prohibited acts. Hence, it gives
rise to open-ended, indeterminate intervention rather than determinate sanctions proportional to the offense.
As one author points out, punishment and therapy often seem to be mutually exclusive goals because of the backward-looking nature of punishment, as
opposed to the forward-looking emphasis of therapy. Punishment imposes unpleasant restraints on offenders because of their past offenses, but therapy
seeks to alleviate undesirable conditions and thereby improve the patient's life.
Gardner, supranote 69, at 793 n.18, 815-16. For more on the distinction between
punishment and treatment, see F. ALLEN, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative
Ideal in BORDERLAND, supra note 14, at 25; H. PACKER, supra note 88, at 23-28,
54; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (although state
may require attendance at compulsory drug treatment programs, it cannot punish people for being addicted to narcotics). Treatment also assumes that certain antecedent facts are responsible for the individual's undesirable condition
and that steps can be taken to alter those conditions. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 14, at 2-3; D. GIBBONS, CHANGING THE LAWBREAKER 130 (1965).
The difficulty in distinguishing punishment from treatment in the juvenile justice system stems from both a lack of analytical clarity about the conceptual
differences between the two justifications for intervention and a deliberate
obfuscation of those differences in the redefining of punishment by the
Progressives to include reform of the offender. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
416. The Court in McKeiver noted only that the ideal of the juvenile court
system is "an intimate, informal protective proceeding." 403 U.S. 528, 545
(1970). The juvenile court has been described as a peculiar hybrid institution
intermingling both punitive and therapeutic characteristics. See Gardner,
supra note 69, at 793; Schulz & Cohen, supra note 42, at 20, 21; see also Simpson,
Rehabilitationas a Justificationof a Separate Juvenile Justice System, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 984 (1976) (criticizing rehabilitation as a justification for the juvenile justice process and proposing a juvenile system similar to the adult one);
Walkover, The Infancy Defense in the New Juvenile Court, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
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constitutes punishment.4 1 7 For example, Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez4 18 identified the factors that determine whether a particular state sanction is punitive:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it
comes into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation Will
promote the traditional aims of punishment--retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purposes assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may
often point in different directions. 4 1 9

The inquiry into the punishment/treatment distinction
may be advanced by applying the Mendoza-Martinezcriteria to
a juvenile offender adjudicated delinquent for burglary, conduct that would be a felony if committed by an adult, who is incarcerated in a state training school. Institutional confinement
is a restraint that has historically been regarded as punishment, furthers the traditional goals of punishment, and is invoked upon proof of mens rea and criminal behavior.42 0
Despite these seemingly penal characteristics, however, incarceration is not punitive if it is done for the "alternative purpose' of treatment and if it is not excessive in relation to that
therapeutic purpose.4 2 1
The sole question, then, in deciding whether McKeiver and
503 (1984) (urging a central role for the infancy defense in light of courts' recent switch from treatment to blameworthiness as a basis for sentencing).
417. See generally Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A
Frameworkfor ConstitutionalAnalysis, 60 Mimi. L. REv. 379 (1976) (comprehensive critique of the Court's handling of punishment in various substantive
contexts).
418. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
419. Id. at 168-69.
420. See Clark,supra note 417, at 401-03, 455-56; see also Gardner, supra note
69, at 809-15 (discussing, in the context of preventive detention, the requirement that confinement have a punitive purpose before being termed punishment); Shepherd, Challengingthe RehabilitativeJustificationfor Indeterminate
Sentencing in the Juvenile Justice System: The Right to Punishment 21 ST.
Louis U.LJ. 12, 35-40 (1977) (criticizing indeterminate sentencing scheme of juvenile system in light of its frequent failure to provide adequate treatment and
exploring a juvenile's right to punishment that is not disproportionate to the
offense).
421. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 673 (1962) (involuntary confinement of narcotics addicts is valid, but imprisonment for the status of being an
addict is cruel and unusual punishment); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
560-61 (1979) ("double-bunking" of pretrial detainees is not punishment because it is done to ensure their presence at trial and to facilitate effective management of detention facility). For a discussion of cases involving alternative
nonpunitive purposes for challenged government actions, see supra note 176
and accompanying text.
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Minnesota's Rule 27 should have provided for jury trials as a
protection against governmental oppression is whether a juvenile court's disposition is for purposes of punishment or treatment. One obvious way to determine the purpose of juvenile
court intervention is to examine the statute's purpose clause
for its stated goal. In 1980, the Minnesota legislature redefined
the purpose of the juvenile court, basing its new statement on
the Juvenile Justice Standards. 422 The current statute states:
"The purpose of the laws relating to children alleged or adjudicated to be delinquent is to promote the public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency by maintaining the integrity of the
substantive law prohibiting certain behavior and by developing
42
individual responsibility for lawful behavior." 3
The Juvenile Justice Standards, from which this purpose
clause is derived, also recommend that delinquency sanctions
should be determinate and proportional in accordance with the
seriousness of the offense 424 and, because such sanctions are at
least impliedly punitive, that juveniles should have jury trials. 42 5 Minnesota did not follow these recommendations. In422. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING
TO DISPOSITIONS, Standard 1.1.
423. Act of Apr. 15, 1980, ch. 580, § 3, 1980 Minn. Laws 962, 966 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 260.011(2) (1982)). The statute continues: "This purpose should
be pursued through means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique
characteristics and needs of children, and that give children access to opportunities for personal and social growth." Id.
424. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, s"upra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO
DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS, Standard 5.2.
425. Specifically, the Standards provide: "Each jurisdiction should provide
by law that the respondent may demand trial by jury in adjudication proceedings when respondent has denied the allegations of the petition." JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION,
Standard 4.1(A). Although recognizing that making jury trials available in juvenile court would effect a substantial change in many jurisdictions, the commentary accompanying this Standard suggests that such a reform "would
materially enhance the fairness of the adjudication proceeding." Id. Standard
4.1(A) commentary at 52. It notes that the policy arguments supporting jury
trials in juvenile proceedings are the same as those "that underlie constitutional provisions authorizing jury trials in criminal cases," id., namely, requiring "the trial court judge to articulate his or her views of the applicable law in
the case through jury instructions, thereby facilitating appellate court review of
the legal issues involved," id. at 53, and reducing the danger that preliminary
rulings on admissibility will contaminate the fact-finding processes:
[M]any significant evidentiary protections in the adjudicative process
are based on the assumption that preliminary rulings on admissibility
will be made by the trial judge and that a jury will receive the evidence
only if it has been ruled admissible. When a jury is not present, the
evidentiary questions tend to become blurred and appellate review of
evidentiary questions is made extremely difficult by the universal presumption that the trial judge disregarded inadmissible evidence and
relied only upon competent evidence in arriving at his or her decision.
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stead, it adopted a new purpose that marks a fundamental
philosophical departure from the previous rehabilitative purposes of the juvenile justice system in favor of much more ex-

plicitly punitive and social control purposes without providing

42 6
the accompanying safeguard of a jury trial.
Other states have also amended their juvenile code purpose clauses to deemphasize rehabilitation in favor of public
safety and punishment, 42 7 changes which raise the issue of a
juvenile's right to trial by jury. The state of Washington has
undertaken the most extensive revision of its juvenile court of
any jurisdiction in the nation, restructuring it along the lines of
the 'Justice" model, which emphasizes retributive punishment
and 'Just deserts" rather than individualized treatment.
The
new statute's purpose clause, which was amended to reflect
these new goals,42 9 was involved in State v. Lawley,4 3 0 in which

Id.; see also supra notes 344-88 and accompanying text (procedure for evidentiary hearing).
426. The previous purpose of the law was "to secure for each minor... the
care and guidance, preferably in his own home, as will serve the... welfare of
the minor and the best interests of the state." Juvenile Court Act, ch. 685, § 1,
1959 Minn. Laws 1275, 1275 (amended 1980). Under the new legislation, this exclusively benevolent and rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court applies
only to children "alleged or adjudicated neglected or dependent." MINN. STAT.
§ 260.011(2) (1982); see Feld, supra note 35, at 197-203; Note, A Recommendation
for Juvenile Jury Trials in Minnesota, 10 Wz. MrrcHuEu L Rv. 587, 602 (1984).
See generally Clark, supra note 417, at 435-90 (exhaustive analysis of the issue
of discerning a "punitive" legislative intent).
427. One author notes that one of the characteristics of the "new" juvenile
law is that "in many jurisdictions accountability and punishment have emerged
among the express purposes of juvenile justice statutes." Walkover, supra note
416, at 523; see, e.g, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1984) ("protect the
public from criminal conduct by minors") (enacted 1977); IND. CODE ANN. § 316-1-1 (Burns 1980) ("protect the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society") (enacted 1979); VA. CODE § 16.1-227 (1982) ("protect the
community against those acts of its citizens which are harmful to others and to
reduce the incidence of delinquent behavior") (enacted 1977). For additional
citations to state "purpose" clauses, see Walkover, supra note 416, at 523 n.82.
428. Juvenile Justice Act of 1977, ch. 291, § 55, 1977 Wash. Laws 1023. For
discussions of this legislative revision of Washington's juvenile justice system,
see A. SCHNEIDER, A COMPARISON OF INTAKE AND SENTENCING DECISION-MLAI-UNG
UNDER REHABILITATION AND JUSTICE MODELS OF THE JUVENILE SYSTEM (1983); A.
SCHNEIDER & D. SCHRAM, A JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY FOR THE JUVENILE COURT
(1983); Krajick, A Step Toward Determinacyfor Juveniles, CoRREcTIoNs, Sept.
1977, at 37; Walkover, supra note 416, at 528-33; Juvenile Law, 14 GoNz. L REv.
285 (1979) (symposium). For an elaboration of "just deserts" sentencing, see
infra notes 438-53 and accompanying text.
429. The present purpose clause provides:
It is the intent of the legislature that a system capable of having
primary responsibility for, being accountable for, and responding to the
needs of youthful offenders, as defined by this chapter, be established.
It is the further intent of the legislature that youth, in turn, be held accountable for their offenses and that both communities and the juve-
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a juvenile argued that the changes had made the proceedings
essentially criminal in nature and thus entitled him to a jury
trial.43 1 The Washington Supreme Court acknowledged that
the legislature's new emphasis on accountability for criminal
behavior and punishment based on the juvenile's present and
past offenses might seem to convert juvenile court proceedings
into criminal proceedings but found that the statutory provisions did not treat and sentence juveniles as if they were adult
offenders. 432 The court reasoned that "sometimes punishment
is treatment" and held that the legislature could permissibly
conclude that "accountability for criminal behavior, the prior
criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age,
crime, and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate, correct and direct an errant youth as does the prior philosophy of
focusing upon the particular characteristics of the individual juvenile." 433 The court concluded that a jury trial was not constitutionally mandated because the legislature authorized
treatment as well as punishment and because juveniles were
incarcerated in facilities separate from adult penal
4 34
institutions.
nile courts carry out their functions consistent with this intent. To
effectuate these policies, it shall be the purpose of this chapter to:
(a) Protect the citizenry from criminal behavior;
(b) Provide for determining whether accused juveniles have committed offenses as defined by this chapter;
(c) Make the juvenile offender accountable for his or her criminal
behavior;
(d) Provide for punishment commensurate with the age, crime, and
criminal history of the juvenile offender;
(e) Provide due process for juveniles alleged to have committed an
offense;
(f) Provide necessary treatment, supervision, and custody for juvenile
offenders;
(g) Provide for the handling of juvenile offenders by communities
whenever consistent with public safety;
(h) Provide for restitution to victims of crime;
(i) Develop effective standards and goals for the operation, funding,
and evaluation of all components of the juvenile justice system and related services at the state and local levels; and
(j) Provide for a clear policy to determine what types of offenders shall
receive punishment, treatment, or both, and to determine the jurisdictional limitations of the courts, institutions and community services.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.40.010(2) (Supp. 1984). The revised code, however,
denies the right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. Id. § 13.40.020.
430. 91 Wash. 2d 654, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
431. Id. at 656, 591 P.2d at 772.
432. Id. at 656-58, 591 P.2d at 773-74.
433. Id. at 656-57, 591 P.2d at 773.
434. Id. A strong dissent in Lawley argued that a jury trial is required because juvenile court proceedings first adjudicate the alleged offense and then
punish the offender in proportion to the offense adjudicated. Id. at 662-64, 591
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The courts in Lawley and similar cases 43 failed to consider
adequately whether a juvenile justice system could punish explicitly without providing criminal procedural safeguards. Although a legislature certainly may conclude that punishment is
an appropriate goal and legitimate strategy for controlling
young offenders, when it chooses to shape behavior by punishment, it should provide the procedural safeguards of the crimi-

nal law. Any ancillary social benefit or individual reformation
resulting from such punishment is irrelevant to the need for

procedural protection. Confinement of juveniles for determinate sentences based on the nature of the offense still entails a
loss of liberty imposed to punish violations of the criminal law,
even though the length of confinement may be shorter than an
43 6
adult's and the place of incarceration is not called a prison.
P.2d at 775-76 (Rosellini, J., dissenting). The dissent's analysis of the Washington purpose clause differed from that of the majority:.
In these provisions the legislature has made it clear that it is no
longer the primary aim of the juvenile justice system to attend to the
welfare of the offending child, but rather to render him accountable for
his acts, to punish him, and to serve society's demand for retribution.
While the punishment prescribed may well be less than that imposed
upon offending adults for the same offense, it nevertheless involves...
a loss of liberty ....
No longer is the punishment geared to fit the needs of the child,
Thus, the sysrather it is related to the seriousness of the offense ....
tem has been converted from one which was or ostensibly was
designed to protect and rehabilitate the child to one which is designed
to protect society. The present act focuses upon the purposes which
are generally served by adult criminal law.
Id at 662, 591 P.2d at 775-76 (Rosellini, J. dissenting). The dissent reasoned that
although the Supreme Court in McKeiver was reluctant to impose the requirement of jury trials on states that were attempting to achieve some sort of rehabilitative ideal in their juvenile system, once the Washington legislature
reshaped the purpose and practices of the state's system so as to punish offenders, the judiciary had no choice but to recognize that jury trials were required. Id. at 663-64, 591 P.2d at 776 (Rossellini, J., dissenting).
435. Other courts also have subscribed to the notion that "punishment is
treatment" and an acceptable component of a juvenile court's therapeutic dispositions. For example, in In re Seven Minors, 99 Nev. 427, 664 P.2d 947 (1983),
the Nevada Supreme Court endorsed punishment as a legitimate purpose of its
juvenile courts: "By formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses juvenile courts will be properly and somewhat belatedly expressing society's firm disapproval of juvenile crime and will
be clearly issuing a threat of punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile population." Id at 432, 664 P.2d at 950. The court suggested that, in order to effect
this purpose, "[juvenile courts should be able to fashion reasonable punitive
sanctions as part of dispositional programs in delinquency cases." IdL at 436,
664 P.2d at 953. Such sanctions might include restitution, compensation for
crime victims, and punitive detention in detention facilities and jails. Id. at 436
n.8, 664 P.2d at 953 n.8.
436. Juvenile offenders in Washington receive determinate sentences proportional to their age, the seriousness of their offense, and their prior criminal
history. See WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 13.40.030 (Supp. 1984). A study of the
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Besides looking at the stated legislative purpose to determine the purpose of a juvenile's disposition, courts may look at
whether the sentence is based on considerations of the offense
or of the offender. When the sentence is based on the offense,
the sentence is usually determinate and proportional, with a
goal of retribution or deterrence. When the sentence is based
on the offender, however, it is typically indeterminate, with a
437
goal of rehabilitation or incapacitation.
In the adult dispositional framework, determinacy increasingly supersedes indeterminacy as "just deserts" replaces rehabilitation as the underlying sentencing rationale. 438 The
Progressives' optimistic assumptions about human malleability
are challenged daily by the observation that rehabilitation programs do not consistently rehabilitate and by the volumes of
empirical evaluations that question both the effectiveness of
treatment programs and the "scientific" underpinnings of those
who administer the enterprise. 43 9 The "just deserts" advocates
Washington code revision concludes that it had a positive impact on juvenile
sentencing practices: "Sentences in the post-reform era were considerably
more uniform, more consistent, and more proportionate to the seriousness of
the offense and the prior criminal record of the youth than were sentences in
the rehabilitation system which existed before 1978." A. SCHNEIDER, supra note
428, at 76.
437. As explained by a New York court, "The distinction between indeterminate and determinate sentencing is not semantic, but indicates fundamentally different public policies. Indeterminate sentencing is based upon notions
of rehabilitation, while determinate sentencing is based upon a desire for retribution or punishment." In re Felder, 93 Misc. 2d 369, 374, 402 N.Y.S.2d 528, 533
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1978). See generallyN. MORRIs, supra note 189, at 13-20 (discussing historical evolution from retributive to rehabilitative goal); H. PACKER,
supra note 88, at 149-248 (comparing sentencing under Due Process Model with
that under Crime Control Model); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE, FAIR
AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT 11-14 (1976) (noting that individualized sentencing
grants too much discretion to judiciary); A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 11-26
(1976) (comparing "rehabilitative disposition" and "predictive restraint"
models).
438. The movement in the adult criminal process away from rehabilitation
as a justification for intervention and toward dispositions based on "just
deserts" has had both academic support and legislative success. See AMERICAN
FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 45-53 (1971); D. FOGEL, WE
ARE THE LIVING PROOF. THE JUSTICE MODEL FOR CORRECTIONS 260-72 (2d ed.
1979); N. MORRIS, supra note 189, at 45-50, 73-77; R. SINGER, JUST DESERTS (1979);
A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 437, at 49-55; infra note 512 (describing "modified
just deserts" policy of Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines).
439. In the view of one commentator, "Either because of scientific ignorance
or institutional incapacities, a rehabilitative technique is lacking; we do not
know how to prevent criminal recidivism by changing the characters and behavior of offenders." F. ALLEN, DECLINE, supra note 14, at 34. For other studies
discussing the ineffectiveness of treatment, see D. GLASER, THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM (1964); D. MANN, INTERVENING wrH CONVICTED SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1976); L. SECHEREST, S. WHITE & E.
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reject rehabilitation as a justification for intervention because
of the discretionary power an indeterminate sentencing scheme
vests in presumed experts, the inability of such experts to justify their differential treatment of similarly situated offenders,
and the inequalities, disparities, and injustices that result from
individualized sentences. 440 "Just deserts" sentencing, with its
strong retributive foundation, punishes offenders according to
their past behavior rather than who they are or may be predicted to become. Similarly situated offenders are defined and
sanctioned equally on the basis of objective characteristics
such as seriousness of offense, culpability, or criminal
history. 4 1
As the same sentencing philosophy changes appear in the
juvenile process, the renewed interest in "just deserts" for
adults acquires important implications for the rationale of
McKeiver. The inability of proponents of juvenile rehabilitation
to demonstrate the effectiveness of parens patriae intervention
led the state of Washington to modify its juvenile justice system to incorporate 'just deserts" sentencing principles. Under
the statute and administratively developed sentencing guidelines, sentences for juveniles in Washington are determinate
and proportional, based on age, the seriousness of the present
offense, and the length of the prior record. 2 An evaluation of
the process that produced the legislation concluded that the
primary legislative goal was to emphasize uniformity, proportionality, equality, fairness, and accountability, rather than rehabilitationA43 These conclusions make the Lawley court's
BROWN, THE REHABILrATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (1979); D. WARD, D. WILNER & G. KASSENBAUM, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL (1971); L WuLKISS, EVALUATION OF PENAL MEASURES (1969); Gold, A Time for Skepticism, 20
CRIME & DELINQ. 20 (1974); Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional
Programs, 17 CreE & DEiNQ. 67 (1971). Compare Martinson, What Works?
Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PuB. INTEREST 22, 25 (1974)
("With few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivisim.")with Gendreau &
Ross, Effective Correctional Treatment Bibliotherapyfor Cynics, 25 Cum~I &

DELiNQ. 463, 469 (1979) (studies reported show indirect contribution of treatment to reduced criminality). See generally D. L'roN, R. MARTsoN & J.
Wmxs,THE EFFECTrVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT 25-298 (1975) (summarizing 18 studies on the effect of corrections on recidivism).
440. See, e.g., AMERiCAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMbrIrEE, supra note 438, at 3447; authorities cited supranote 438.
441. See, e.g., AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITrEE, supranote 438, at 14553; Shichor, Historicaland Current Trends in American Juvenile Justice,Juv. &
FAM. CT. J., Aug. 1983, at 61, 64.
442. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13.40.010(2)(c), (d) (Supp. 1984); see supra

.notes 429 &436.
443. A. SCHNEIDER & D. SCRAM,supra note 428, at 2.
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holding that juveniles are not entitled to a jury trial because
they are not being punished all the more perplexing, because
juvenile dispositions are determinate and proportioned according to the seriousness of the present offense and prior record
rather than based on "real needs." 444
Washington is not alone in repudiating the individualized,
offender-oriented dispositions of traditional parens patriae juvenile justice in favor of offense-based dispositions. The Minnesota Department of Corrections administratively
implemented a plan providing for determinate sentences in juvenile institutions based on a juvenile's present offense and
prior record to '"provide a more definite and distinct relationship between the offense and the amount of time required to
bring about positive behavior change."44 5 The Department of
Corrections calculates a juvenile's length of stay on the basis of
the severity of the most serious offense committed and the
weight of "risk of failure" factors that are "predictive to some
degree of future delinquent behavior."446 The recidivism risk
factors considered include prior felony adjudications and probation and parole failure.4 4 7 Minnesota's Sentencing Guidelines for adult offenders, which are explicitly punitive and
expressly designed to achieve "just deserts," rely on these
same factors.4 4 8 Several other states have altered their juvenile
444. The Washington courts have been treading a fine line in trying to uphold the traditional procedural aspects of the juvenile justice system while
staying within the bounds of the recent legislative changes. After the Washington Supreme Court's holding in Lawley differentiating the adult and juvenile
systems with respect to the right to a jury trial, see supra notes 428-34 and accompanying text, a Washington juvenile claimed that her disposition violated
the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude "except
as a punishment for crime." In re Erickson, 24 Wash. App. 808, 604 P.2d 513
(1979). After noting certain due process protections available to juvenile offenders and statutory references to the criminal nature of juvenile offenses, the
Washington Court of Appeals concluded that "the juvenile disposition order
did constitute 'punishment for crime' sufficient to fall within the constitutional
exception to involuntary servitude." Id. at 810, 604 P.2d at 514. Similarly, the
Washington Supreme Court in In re Trambitas, 96 Wash. 2d 329, 635 P.2d 122
(1981), held that the requirement that time spent in pretrial detention count toward the sentence received following conviction applied to juvenile as well as
adult detainees, reiterating that "[tihe restrictions on a person's liberties suffered by pretrial detention is [sic] no less 'punishment' than that imposed by
the disposition order." Id. at 333, 635 P.2d at 124 (citing Reanier v. Smith, 83
Wash. 2d 342, 351, 517 P.2d 949, 954 (1974)).
445.

MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, JUVENILE RELEASE GUIDE-

LINES 2-3 (1980).
446. Id. at 7.
447. Id. at 5.
448. The "purpose and principles" section of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines specifically mentions severity of the offense and past criminal his-
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sentencing practices to emphasize characteristics of the offense
rather than the offender as the determinant of dispositions.
This has been accomplished through the adoption of either offense-based determinate sentences or mandatory minimum
sentences for certain offenses, both of which preclude consideration of a juvenile's "real needs."44 9
Evaluations of juvenile sentencing practices also indicate
the extent to which 'Just deserts" principles influence dispository as factors in determining sentencing. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMSSION, MINNESOTA

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY

at L2

(1983) [hereinafter cited as MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUmELINES]. The Guidelines also add points to the sentencing scale whenever the defendant committed the offense while on probation or parole. Id. at ILB.2.
449. The New Jersey legislature instructed courts making dispositional decisions regarding juveniles to assign weight to the characteristics of the offense
and the criminal history of the offender and provided for enhanced sentences
for certain serious or repeat offenders. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2AAA-43(a), -44(a),
(d) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (enacted 1982); see also Walkover, supra note 416, at
524 n.86 (citing this New Jersey statute and others emphasizing the nature of
the crime in sentencing guidelines).
Ohio has adopted mandatory minimum terms of confinement based on the
seriousness of the offense for which a youth is committed. The mandatory minimum terms are six months, one year, or until age 21, depending on the serious-

ness of the crime. 01o CODE § 2151.355(A) (4), (5), (6) (Page Supp. 1983)
(enacted 1981). One commentator has noted that the legislation
tends to focus more on retribution for the offense committed as opposed to the needs of the juvenile offender. The minimum sentence requirements seem to focus on punishing rather than rehabilitating the
youth offender. This is contrary to the basic philosophy that the juvenile justice system ideally should emphasize rehabilitation over retribution or punishment.
Comment, H.B.440: Ohio RestructuresIts Juvenile Justice System, 8 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 237, 245 (1982).
Delaware has adopted legislation that provides that any youth who is adjudicated delinquent for conduct that would be a felony within one year of a prior
felony adjudication must serve a mandatory minimum term of confinement.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 937(c) (1) (Supp. 1982) (enacted 1976). One commentator has concluded that the mandatory confinement of juvenile offenders under
this statute constitutes punishment:
The determinate nature of the restraint-a mandatory term fixed for at
least six months-strongly suggests a legislative intent to punish while
belying a rehabilitative purpose. The statute did not provide an indeterminate disposition, which is characteristic of therapeutic attempts to
alter undesirable status conditions, but rather fixed a term of confinement based solely upon the offenses committed.
Gardner, supra note 69, at 835-36. But see State v. J.K., 383 A.2d 283, 289 (DeL
1977) (noting underlying rehabilitative purpose of juvenile sentencing requirements).
Finally, Colorado recently adopted determinate sentencing provisions for
"aggravated juvenile offenders"--youths with prior felony adjudications who
subsequently commit a crime of violence-whereby convicted juveniles may receive determinate sentences of five years. Act of Apr. 12, 1984, ch. 142, §§ 1, 3,
1984 Colo. Sess. Laws 566, 566, 568 (Hein microfiche) (to be codified at COLO.
REv.STAT. §§ 19-1-103(2.1) (b), 19-3-113.2(1)).
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tional decision making.450 These studies report that, to the extent that variations in dispositional patterns can be accounted
for, offense characteristics explain most of the variance. 451 A
survey of juvenile sentencing practices in California reported
that, despite claims of individualization, juvenile dispositions
appear to be based primarily on the youth's present offense
and prior record. 452 The study concludes that
these comparisons of juvenile and adult sentencing practices suggest
that juvenile and criminal courts in California are much more alike
than statutory language would suggest, in the degree to which they focus on aggravating circumstances of the charged offense and the defendant's prior record in determining the degree of confinement that
453
will be imposed.

Viewed as a whole, these legislative and administrative
changes and operational practices have eliminated virtually all
of the significant distinctions between sentencing practices in
the juvenile and adult criminal processes. The use of determinate sentences based on the present offense and prior record of
the juvenile, whether de jure or de facto, calls into question any
possible therapeutic "alternative purpose" for juvenile dispositions. The revisions in juvenile court purpose clauses, placing
greater emphasis on the integrity of the substantive criminal
law or the need to protect public safety, eliminate even rhetorical support for the traditional rehabilitative goals of juvenile
justice.
Looking to the reality of juvenile correctional dispositions
is also helpful in the quest to determine whether institutional
confinement constitutes punishment or a therapeutic "alterna450. See Clarke & Koch, supra note 156, at 276-88; Cohen & Kluegel, Determinants of Juvenile Court Dispositions: Ascriptive and Achieved Factors in Two
Metropolitan Courts, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 162, 166, 174-75 (1978); Cohen & Kluegel,
Selecting Delinquents for Adjudication, 16 J. RES. CRIME & DEINQ. 143, 159
(1979); Feld, Reference ofJuvenile Offenders, supra note 77, at 585-601; Marshall
& Thomas, Discretionary Decision-Making and the Juvenile Court, Juv. & FAM.
CT. J., Aug. 1983, at 47, 51.
451. See authorities cited supra note 450. Nonetheless, the research also indicates that present offense and prior record, although the best indicators, account for only about 25% of the variance in sentencing, leaving an enormous
amount of dispositional variation unexplained. See Feld, Reference of Juvenile
Offenders, supra note 77, at 598-99; Thomas & Cage, The Effects ofSocial Characteristics on Juvenile Court Dispositions,18 Soc. Q. 237, 244 (1977). Commentators have observed with respect to this unexplained variation that "the juvenile
justice process is so ungoverned by procedural rules and so haphazard in the
attribution of relevance to any particular variables or set of variables that judicial dispositions are very commonly the product of an arbitrary and capricious
decision-making process." Marshall & Thomas, supra note 450, at 57.
452. YOUTH CRIME IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 407, at 38-40, 51.
453. Id. at 51.
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tive purpose," since it was this reality that motivated the Court
54
to afford juveniles procedural safeguards in Gault4
In Gaul
the Court belatedly recognized conditions that had long persisted.4 55 One study of the early juvenile training schools describes institutions that not only failed to rehabilitate but were

scarcely distinguishable from their adult penal counterparts.

45 6

The criticism of the adequacy of juvenile correctional efforts in
Gault is not simply an analysis of the historical record, however; a number of evaluations of juvenile correctional facilities
in the years since Gaultreveal a continuing gap between rhetoric and reality.45 7 The author's study of juvenile institutions in
Massachusetts describes a number of facilities in which staff
physically abused inmates themselves and were frequently
powerless to prevent the worst aspects of inmate abuse by

other inmates. 458 A study in Ohio reveals a similarly violent

and oppressive institutional environment for the "rehabilita-

tion" of young delinquents.

4 9

Despite the rhetoric of rehabili-

tation, the daily reality of juvenile offenders confined in many
"treatment" facilities is one of staff and inmate violence, predatory behavior, and custodial incarceration with all of its attend454. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967); see supra note 41.
455. As the Court observed,
So wide a gulf between the State's treatment of the adult and of the
child requires a bridge sturdier than mere verbiage, and reasons more
persuasive than clichL can provide. ...
"The rhetoric of the juvenile
court movement has developed without any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of court and institutional routines."
Id. at 29-30 (quoting S. WHEELER & I- CoTrRELL, JuvEmm DELmQUENCy-ITs
PREVENTION AND CONTROL 35 (1966)).
456. D. ROTHMAN, supra note 2, at 261-89. For a similarly pessimistic account of the reality of juvenile correctional programs under the aegis of Progressivism, see S. SCHosSmAN, supra note 2.
457. See, e.g., C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. Dmrrz, JuvENruL Vic'rmuzmmoN
(1976); B. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE (1977); . GIALLOmBARDO, THE
SOCIAL WORLD OF IMpRiSONED GIRLS (1974); 11. POLSiCY, COTrAGE SIx (1962); D.
STREET, R. VINrER & C. PERROW, ORGANIZATION FOR TREATMENT (1966); K.
WOODEN, WEEPING IN THE PLAYTIME OF OTHERS (1976); Feld, A Comparative
Analysis of OrganizationalStructure and Inmate Subcultures in Institutionsfor
Juvenile Offenders, 27 CRIME & DELINQ. 336 (1981); Poole & Regoli Violence in
Juvenile Institutions: A Comparative Study, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 213 (1983); Rolde,
Mack, Scherl & Macht, The Maximum Security Institutionas a Treatment Facility for Juveniles, in JuvENILE DELINQUENCY 437 (J. Teele ed. 1970).
458. The study described the conditions as follows:
In sum the lives of the low-status inmates in the custody-oriented
cottages were miserable....

The direct physical assaults and abuse

were substantial and real. The attendant psychological trauma was
equally apparent. These victims of terrorization were afraid of other
inmates. Their fear emboldened others who, by their aggression, reinforced their fear.
B. FELD, supra note 457, at 160.
459. C. BARTOLLAS, S. MILLER & S. Dnmrz, supra note 457, at 153, 158.
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4 60
ant punitive consequences.
During the period of these evaluations, a number of lawsuits challenged the conditions of confinement in juvenile correctional facilities, alleging that the conditions violated the
committed inmates' "right to treatment."46 ' These "right to
treatment" and "cruel and unusual punishment" cases provide
another outside view of the reality of juvenile corrections. In

460. See authorities cited supra note 457.
461. The right to treatment follows from the state's invocation of its parens
patriae power to intervene for the benefit of the individual. In a variety of settings other than juvenile corrections, such as institutionalization of the mentally ill and mentally retarded, states confine individuals without affording
them the procedural safeguards associated with criminal incarceration for punishment. In all of these settings, it is the promise of benefit that justifies the
less stringent procedural safeguards. Thus, failure to deliver the promised
treatment is a denial of due process. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507,
513 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563, 577 (1975); Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487,
491 (D. Minn. 1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 786 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
affid in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1319 (5th
Cir. 1974). For commentary on these cases and the issue of treatment generally, see Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 (1960); The Right to
Treatment, 57 GEo. L.J. 673 (1969) (symposium); Developments in the LawCivil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 1316-57 (1974).
The constitutional rationale of the civil commitment cases also has been invoked to secure treatment for juveniles incarcerated in state training schools.
See, e.g., Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Robinson v. Leahy, 401 F. Supp. 1027, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1975); Long v. Powell,
388 F. Supp. 422, 432 (N.D. Ga. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Morales v.
Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 64 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 459 (N.D. Ind. 1972), ajd, 491
F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 602 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1363 (D.R.I.
1972); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345, 350-52 (W.D. Ky. 1972); Lollis v. New
York State Dep't of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp. 473, 482 (S.DN.Y. 1970); Neil M. v.
Gregory M., 71 Misc. 2d 396, 400-01, 336 N.Y.S.2d 304, 308-09 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1972).
The right to treatment has been invoked successfully against juvenile institutions in a number of cases in which rehabilitative services were not forthcoming and custodial warehousing or barbaric practices were shown. See, e.g.,
In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 112
(D.C. Cir. 1967). The First Circuit, however, rejected any "right to treatment,"
holding that "there is no legally cognizable quo to trigger a compensatory
quid.... [A]lthough rehabilitative training is no doubt desirable and sound
as a matter of policy and, perhaps, of state law, plaintiffs have no constitutional
right to that rehabilitative training." Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (lst
Cir. 1983). For commentary on these and other related cases, see Renn, The
Right to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CIME & DEULNQ. 477 (1973); Wald &
Schwartz, Trying a Juvenile Right to Treatment Suit: Pointers and Pitfallsfor
Plaintiffs, 12 AM. CRhi. L. REv. 125 (1974); Note, The Courts, The Constitution
and Juvenile InstitutionalReform, 52 B.U.L. REV. 33 (1972); Note, Judicial Recognition and Implementation of a Right to Treatment for Institutionalized
Juveniles, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1051 (1974); ConstitutionalRight to Treatment
for Juveniles Adjudicated to be Delinquent-Nelson v. Heyne, 12 Am. CalM. L.
REV. 209 (1974); Limits on Punishment and Entitlement to Rehabilitative Treatment of InstitutionalizedJuveniles: Nelson v. Heyne, 60 VA. L. REV. 864 (1974).
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Nelson v. Heyne,462 the court found that inmates were routinely
beaten with a "fraternity paddle," injected with psychotropic
drugs for social control purposes, and deprived of minimally
adequate care and individualized treatment.463 In Inmates of
Boys' Training School v. Affleck,46" the court found inmates
confined in dark and cold dungeonlike cells in their underwear,
routinely locked in solitary confinement, and subjected to a va4
riety of antirehabilitative practices. 465 In Morales v. Turman, 66
the court found numerous instances of physical brutality and
abuse, including hazing by staff and inmates, staff-administered
beatings and tear-gassings, homosexual assaults, extensive use
of solitary confinement, repetitive and degrading make-work,
and minimal clinical services.46 7 In Morgan v. Sproa 468 the
court found youths confined in padded cells with no windows
or furnishings and only flush holes for toilets, denied access to
all services or programs except a Bible.A9 In State v. Werner,470 the court found that inmates were locked in solitary confinement, beaten, slapped, kicked, and sprayed with mace by
staff, required to scrub floors with a toothbrush, and subjected
to punitive practices such as standing and sitting for prolonged
periods without changing position.4 71 Unfortunately, these
cases are not atypical, as the list of judicial opinions documenting institutional abuses demonstrates.4 72 Rehabilitative
euphemisms and a therapeutic "alternative purpose" cannot
disguise the reality of punitive confinement as a fundamental
characteristic of juvenile institutionalization. Although juvenile
correctional facilities are not as uniformly bad as adult prisons,
they are not so consistently good that they provide an unquestionably therapeutic "alternative purpose."
Against this background, it is hard to understand the decision in McKeiver to deny juveniles jury trials in order not to
impede further experiments "to seek in new and different ways
the elusive answers to the problems of the young."47 3 It is also
462.
463.
464.
465.

355 F.
Id. at
346 F.
Id. at

Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), affd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974).
454.
Supp. 1354 (DR.L 1972).
1357.

466. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864
(5th Cir. 1976).
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.

Id. at 77-78.
432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
Id. at 1138.
242 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978).
Id. at 909.
See authorities cited supra note 461.
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 528, 547 (1971); see also Gardner, supra note 69, at
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difficult to understand Minnesota's uncritical acceptance of the
Court's position. In contrast, the Alaska Supreme Court, in
RLR v. State,474 held that the Alaska state constitution requires
jury trials in juvenile court in order to provide a protective
buffer between the juvenile and the state.475 The court rejected
the notion that "the benevolent social theory supposedly underlying juvenile court acts justifies dispensing with constitutional safeguards" 476 and emphasized that the safeguards of a
jury are required when a juvenile is charged with criminal behavior and subjected to the possibility of incarceration. 4 77 Although the majority of states, like Minnesota, deny juveniles
the right to a trial by jury, the experiences of those jurisdictions that allow juveniles jury trials478 show that McKeiver's
fear of delay, formality, and the clamor of the adversary pro7
cess appears to be unfounded.4 9
Justice Brennan's concurring-dissenting opinion in
McKeiver was based upon his perception that a public trial provided a protection against governmental oppression functionally equivalent to a jury trial by assuring the visibility and
823-33 (noting failure of courts to use concept of punishment in analyzing juvenile cases).
474. 487 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1971).
475. Id. at 32. For cases denying juveniles the right to a jury trial, see In re
Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 598 (La. 1978); State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573, 585 (Me.
1979); In re McCloud, 110 R.I. 431, 436, 293 A.2d 512, 516 (1972).
476. RLR, 487 P.2d at 30.
477. Id. at 33.
478. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1979); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1106(1) (a) (Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(a) (1981) (restricted to certain
felonies); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 55A (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984);
MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 712A.17 (West Supp. 1984); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-23-15
(1972); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-522 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-31 (1981);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1110 (West Supp. 1984); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 54.03 (Vernon 1975).
479. Despite the fears of the majority in McKeiver that delays could result
from requiring juvenile jury trials, 403 U.S. 528, 550 (1971), Justice Douglas argued that "there is no meaningful evidence that granting the right to jury trials
will impair the function of the court." Id. at 564 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Similarly, commentators have noted that
where a jury trial is available by statute it is seldom used and creates
no burden on the juvenile court system, nor does it interfere with the
rehabilitative program for the juvenile. None of the data collected indicates that the extension of this right to the remaining states would significantly affect the efficiency of the operation of the juvenile courts.
Burch & Knaup, The Impact of Jury Trials upon the Administrationof Juvenile
Justice, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 345, 360 (1970); see also Comment, supra note
403, at 995 n.134 (observing that the right to a jury trial would not be used as
often in juvenile trials as it is in criminal trials, at least in part because attorneys concerned for the juveniles realize that its overuse would delay the rehabilitative process).
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accountability of the process. 4 o Although the possibility of

public trial was one of the factors that led the McKeiver plurality to deny juveniles the right to jury trials,481 several states
grant juveniles the right to a public trial as well. 482 The major-

ity of states, however, including Minnesota, exclude the general
public from delinquency hearings.4 83
Although the imposition of jury trials and public trials on
juvenile proceedings is inconsistent with traditional informality
and confidentiality, concepts of fairness require questioning the
extent to which "benevolent social theory" ought to be invoked
to deny fundamental constitutional rights. Minnesota's Rule 27
itself evidences that informality in the adjudicative process is
already a thing of the past. The Juvenile Justice Standards
commentary notes that "the adjudication hearings should be
conducted in a careful, formal manner to assure accurate findings of fact. Contested adjudication hearings should be formal
proceedings whether or not there is a jury present."484 The
Standards also recommend that juveniles should have a right
to public trial.48 5 The Standards emphasize that the current
practice of allowing attendance by students, social workers,
lawyers, social scientists, and other observers of the court without any specific "interest" in the particular child or case already vitiates the promise of confidentiality without affording
the benefits of a public hearing.0 6 They also question whether
the "benefits" of confidentiality have been elevated over those
of a public trial without adequate appraisal of what the benefits
480. McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528, 553-55 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
481. 403 U.S. at 550; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
482. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (1982); CAL. WELF. & INST. CoDE § 676
(West 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.498(1) (1983); S.D. CODIIED LAWS § 26432
(1976). Commentators recognize that many states do not provide public trials
for juveniles because of a fear that public trials threaten the informality, flexibility, and confidentiality of juvenile proceedings. See McLaughlin &Wisenand,
Jury Trial, Public Trial and Free Press In Juvenile Proceedings: An Analysis
and Comparisonof the IJA/ABA, Task Force, and NAC Standards,46 BROoKLYN L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1979); Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile Delinquency Hearings,81 MIc. L REv. 1540, 1540 n.3 (1983).
483. MIN. STAT. § 260.155(1) (1982) ('hne court shall exclude the general
public from these hearings and shall admit only those persons who, in the discretion of the court, have a direct interest in the case or in the work of the
court."); see also Mm. R.P. Juv. CT. 8.01 (specifying who is permitted to attend
the juvenile hearings).
484. JUVENUX JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 73, STANDARDS RELATING To
ADjuDICATON, Standard 4.1(A) commentary at 54.
485. Id. Standard 6.1.
486. Ild. Standard 6.1 commentary at 71.
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of a public trial are.4 7
Over three decades ago, the United States Supreme Court,
in In re Oliver,488 held that a defendant had a right to a public
trial and condemned secret criminal proceedings:
Whatever other benefits the guarantee to an accused that his trial be
conducted in public may confer upon our society, the guarantee has always been recognized as a safeguard against any attempt to employ
our courts as instruments of persecution. The knowledge that every
criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of
public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial
power.4 8 9

The Oliver Court also noted that public trials are needed because they may bring the matters at issue to the attention of an
unknown witness who can then voluntarily come forward to
provide testimony, they provide citizens with information about
the administration of justice, and they promote confidence in
the judiciary. 490 Public trials, like jury trials, provide a check
on potential abuses of judicial power. One commentator has
suggested that such uses of public trials are even more beneficial in juvenile than in adult criminal court proceedings, 491 and
another has emphasized that the public's need for information
about the administration of the juvenile justice system is at
least as acute as in the case of adult defendants. 492 Even some
courts acknowledge that juvenile cases exhibit far more procedural errors than comparable adult cases and suggest that secrecy may foster a judicial casualness toward the law that
487. Id. Standard 6.1 commentary at 71-72.
488. 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
489. Id. at 270.
490. Id. at 270 n.24.
491. McLaughlin & Wisenand, supra note 482, at 3.
492. Note, supra note 482, at 1549-53. Specifically, the commentator asserts:
[A] ccess to juvenile delinquency hearings would function as a check
on the abuse of power by judges, probation officers, and other public
officials. The nature of the juvenile justice system, even more than the
criminal system, suggests a compelling need to check the exercise of
government power. Juvenile court judges, for example, exercise more
discretion than their criminal trial counterparts.... Such a system
relies heavily on subjective judgments, making the "compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge" a particular hazard. Juvenile court judges, moreover, are often less qualified and less competent than other judges. As
a result, juvenile courts often commit "much more extensive and fundamental error than is generally found in adult criminal cases." Because juvenile cases are only rarely appealed, public scrutiny of the
juvenile justice system takes on added importance as a check against
official misconduct. Finally, judges, not juries, decide most delinquency cases. Thus, the juvenile is unable to appeal to the community
conscience, as embodied in the jury, to protect against abuse of government power.
Id. at 1550-51 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968); RLR v.
State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971)).
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visibility might constrain. 4 93 Thus, although public access
would marginally vitiate the confidentiality of the process, 494 it
could simultaneously assure that the daily administration of juvenile courts adheres more closely to the formal procedures
that are now required.
Again, procedures like Minnesota's Rule 27, which denies
juveniles in Minnesota both jury trials and public trials,495 meet

constitutional due process requirements. They do not, however, take into account the reality of contemporary juvenile justice, the extent to which invocations of "informality" are
contradicted by the close formal resemblance between juvenile
and adult criminal proceedings, or the need to protect juveniles
as well as adults from the coercive and punitive power of the
state.49 6 It is clear, however, that by adhering to the traditional
493. See, eg., RLR v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971); In re Dino, 359 So.
2d 586, 597 (La. 1978).
494. Although confidentiality in juvenile court proceedings has been justified by some courts and commentators "to hide youthful errors from the full
gaze of the public and bury them in the graveyard of the forgotten past," In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967), and to avoid labeling juveniles and thereby either
limiting their chances of success later in life or reinforcing their conception of
themselves as criminals, see, e.g., E. ScHUa,

LABELING DEVIANT BEHAVIOR

(1971); Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, in JuvENn.E DELiNQUENCY AND YOUTH CRnME, supranote 30, at 91, 92, it is not clear to what extent
eliminating confidentiality actually would aggravate these dangers. Commentators have questioned whether the absence of confidentiality would intensify the
dangers of labeling beyond those already inherent in the legal proceedings
themselves:
Similarly, it is unclear that access to juvenile hearings would decrease
the occupational and educational opportunities of the juvenile offender.
The FBI, the military, government agencies and private employers currently may obtain information about an individual's juvenile court contacts....

Publicity of juvenile court proceedings may also prove beneficial to
both the juvenile and society. First, the public has an interest in learning the identity of the juvenile offender .... Second, publicity of juvenile delinquency hearings may deter juvenile delinquency. Such
publicity may also alert the juvenile's parents, as well as others, to
their responsibilities toward their children.
Note, supra note 482, at 1558; see also Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon
Youths in the Juvenile Justice Systen: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 583, 589-90 (1974) (noting ways in which court experience may be
perceived positively by youths despite negative label).
495. See MmN. R.P. Juv. CT. 27.03(2) (A) (granting the child's counsel and
the county attorney the right to present evidence, present and cross-examine
witnesses, and present arguments supporting or attacking allegations in the
petition).
496. As one commentator has noted, it is
both inaccurate and deceptive to describe the operation of the juvenile
court in this area as the exercise of a rehabilitative or therapeutic function.... The primary function being served in these cases.., is the
temporary incapacitation of children found to constitute a threat to the
community's interest... In a great many cases the juvenile court
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procedures of the juvenile court, the Minnesota Supreme Court
chose to treat juveniles worse procedurally than adult criminal
defendants.
VIII. REFERENCE OF DELINQUENCY MATTERS
A final issue concerns the procedure by which a juvenile
court waives jurisdiction for a youth, allowing the prosecution
of the youth as an adult. The procedures and criteria used are
critical because such a waiver of jurisdiction subjects the youth
directly to all the consequences of adult criminal prosecution.
Two United States Supreme Court decisions, Kent v. United
States4 97 and Breed v. Jones,4

98

constrain this judicial waiver

process. Kent mandates that procedural due process must be
observed in judicial waiver determinations, 4 99 and Breed requires a state to make its dispositional determination-whether
to proceed against an offender as a juvenile or an adult-before
reaching the merits of the complaint.5 00 Dicta in Kent also note
some of the substantive criteria a juvenile court judge might
properly consider in deciding whether to waive jurisdiction.5 0 1
must perform functions essentially similar to those exercised by any
court adjudicating cases of persons charged with dangerous and disturbing behavior.
F. ALLEN, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice, in BORDERLAND, supra note 14, at 43, 53; see also The Administration of Juvenile JusticeThe Juvenile Court and Related Methods of Delinquency, in JUVENILE DEUNQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME, supra note 30, at 1, 8 (the policies supporting the
application of the criminal law to adult offenders, namely, retribution, condemnation, deterrence, and incapacitation, also support its application to juvenile
offenders).
497. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
498. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
499. Ken; 383 U.S. at 554-57.
500. Breed, 421 U.S. at 539-41.
501. The Court explained its criteria as follows:
An offense falling within the statutory limitations ... will be
waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is heinous or of an aggravated character, or-even though less serious-if it represents a pattern of repeated offenses which indicate that the juvenile may be
beyond rehabilitation under Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public
needs the protection afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses
will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is
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Minnesota's waiver procedures and criteria are typical of
the way that a large majority of states decide to prosecute a
chronological juvenile in an adult criminal court, subject to the
requirements of Kent and Breed5O2 Minnesota's Rule 32 governs the process for waiving juvenile court jurisdiction and

prosecuting a young offender as an adult if the court concludes
that the child is "not suitable for treatment" or that "public
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an indictment ....
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in
one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are
adults ....

6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation
to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to
have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services
and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court.
Kent 383 U.S. at 566-67 app. For a general review of the implications of Kent,
see Paulsen, ConstitutionalCont=ex supra note 35.
502. Forty-six states employ judicial waiver in making transfer decisions.
See Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 77, at 523 n.22. For an
overview of state statutes defining juvenile and criminal court jurisdiction, see
D. HA1PARIAN, L.EsTEP,S. MUNTEAN, I. PRIESINO, . SWISHER, P. VALLACE &
J. WHITE, YoUTH INADULT CouRTs: BETWEEN Two WoRDs 43-86 (1982) [hereinafter cited as D. HAMPAIuAN]; see also JuvENIx JusTicE STANDARDS,supra note
73, STANDARDS RELATING To TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS (proposed waiver

guidelines).
Until 1980, Minnesota provided only minimal substantive guidance to juvenile courts in making the critically important discretionary decision of whether
to waive jurisdiction. Waiver was authorized if the court concluded either that
the youth was "not suitable to treatment" or that a dispostion within the juvenile system would pose a threat to public safety. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d)
(1963) (amended 1980). Compare Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra
note 77, at 523-46 (describing Minnesota waiver requirements before 1980
amendment) with Feld, supra note 35, at 203-30 (describing postamendment
waiver provisions). The Minnesota Supreme Court found the problems of judicial discretion in waiver decisions substantial enough to call on the legislature
to review and revise the statute. See In re Welfare of Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 319
(Minn. 1979). It was in response to the court's request in Dahl for "a reevaluation of the existing certification process," id., that the Minnesota legislature
adopted offense criteria to help structure the waiver decision under the statute.
Judicial waiver decisions, products of the courts' unbridled discretion in
this area, have been criticized for their dissimilar treatment and occasional discrimination and abuse. See D. HA
A.IA,
supra,at 15-40 (review and digest of
the waiver literature); Youth in Adult Courts, in READINGS IN PuBc PoLIcY
169-377 (J. Hall, D. Hamparian, J. Pettibone &J. White eds. 1981) (compilation
of 10 articles considering policy implications and specific problems involved in
prosecuting juveniles in adult courts) [hereinafter cited as READINGS IN PuBuc
PoucY]; see also Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 77, at 522 n.
21 (listing citations to recent waiver literature).
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safety is not served" by retention in juvenile court. 50 3 Under
the rule, the county attorney initiates a reference proceeding
by filing a motion for adult prosecution. 50 4 Following a finding
of probable cause, the juvenile court may order a social study
of the child 505 and, within thirty days of the fling of the motion,
must conduct a hearing to determine whether the youth meets
the waiver criteria. 06 The prosecution may prove its case for
waiver either by direct proof of nonamenability to treatment or
dangerousness under subdivision 2 of the statute5O7 or by indi503. MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 32.05(2); see MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (Supp.
1983). For general discussions of the waiver procedure in Minnesota, see Feld,
supra note 35; Feld, Reference of Juvenile Offenders, supra note 77.
504. Rule 32 provides: "Proceedings to refer a delinquency matter ... may
be initiated only upon motion of the county attorney after a delinquency petition has been filed." MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 32.01; see In re Welfare of Sweats, 293
N.W.2d 67, 70 (Minn. 1980) (decision whether to prosecute as an adult is within
discretion of prosecutor).
505. The rule provides: "If probable cause has been shown, pursuant to
Rule 19.03 or Rule 32.05, Subd. 1, the court, on its own motion or on the motion
of the child's counsel or the county attorney, may order a social, psychiatric or
psychological study concerning the child who is the subject of the reference."
MIwN. R.P. Juv. CT. 32.03. The rule also provides that the social report is to be
paid for "at public expense," shall be filed 48 hours before the time scheduled
for the hearing, and must be made available to both parties. Id.
506. MiN. R.P. Juv. CT. 32.01.
507. MINN. STAT. § 260.125(2) (d) (2) (Supp. 1983). When proving amenability
to treatment or dangerousness directly, the State will introduce evidence pertaining to the nature of the juvenile's present offense and prior record as well
as evidence bearing on the treatment prognosis of the youth.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has emphasized that the facts of the crime
are relevant to the determination of whether prosecution as an adult is proper.
State v. Duncan, 312 Minn. 17, 32-33, 250 N.W.2d 189, 198-99 (1977). It has indicated that the following factors are relevant to the question of whether the
child is a threat to public safety:
1) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection; 2)
the circumstances surrounding the offense; 3) whether the offense was
committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner; 4)
whether the offense was directed against persons or property; 5) the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act; and 6) the absence of
adequate protective and security facilities available to the juvenile
treatment system.
State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 438, 212 N.W.2d 664, 669-70 (1973).
Also, in determining the amenability of a juvenile to treatment, the court
has emphasized the role of psychological and psychiatric evaluations and described the procedure by which those evaluations are to be prepared and submitted to the court. S.R.J. v. State, 293 N.W.2d 32, 36 (Minn. 1980). As a result,
the prosecution is encouraged
to introduce whatever social, psychological, or psychiatric evidence it
has available to bolster its case. Similarly, defense attorneys, obligated
to effectively assist their juvenile clients, are likely to introduce substantial evidence of their clients' redeeming social value. Following
this morass of evidence, juvenile court judges will continue to decide
on a discretionary basis ifa youth is amenable to treatment or dangerous despite the absence of clinical tests or objective validated indicators that accurately predict such traits.
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rect proof of offenses establishing a prima facie case under
subdivision 3508
It is important to note that such a waiver decision is also a
sentencing decision that represents a choice between the punitive disposition of adult criminal court and the "rehabilitative"
disposition of the juvenile court. 09 Consistent with the view of
waiver as a sentencing decision, Minnesota added offense criteria to guide the waiver decision when it revised its waiver statute in 1980.510 Under the new waiver statute, the prosecution
can establish a prima facie case for waiver by proving that the
juvenile is at least sixteen years of age, the present offense
charged is serious, and the combination of the present crime
charged and the prior record bring the case within one of the
clauses of the subdivisions.511 The use of such offense criteria
to create a presumption of adulthood reflects a legislative effort
to provide some objective guidance to juvenile court judges
making the waiver decision. It also reflects the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines' repudiation of traditional, individualized
discretionary sentencing practices in favor of 'Just deserts" deFeld, supra note 35, at 213-14.
508. Subdivision 3 provides: "A prima facie case that the public safety is
not served or that the child is not suitable for treatment shall have been established if the child was at least 16 years of age at the time of the alleged offense," is alleged to have committed one of various specified serious present
offenses, and, for all but the most serious offenses, has a record of prior offenses. MIN. STAT. § 260.125(3) (1982). The various combinations of present offense and prior record create a rebuttable presumption for waiver. Feld, supra
note 35, at 207-14. If the defendant does not introduce rebuttal evidence, establishment of the prima facie case alone will support a waiver decision. See, e.g,
In re Welfare of Givens, 307 N.W.2d 489, 490 (Minn. 1981) (reference based on
an unrebutted prima facie case).
509. See In re Welfare of Hartung, 304 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. 1981) ("A reference hearing is a dispositional type hearing which is forward looking ....")
In re Welfare of SRIJ., 293 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn. 1980) ("A reference hearing is a
dispositional hearing. . . ."); see also In re Welfare of T.D.S, 289 N.W.2d 137,

140 (Minn. 1980) (reference hearing is properly distinguished from adjudicative
hearing). For a discussion of the punitive aspects of a waiver decision, see
Whitebread & Batey, The Role of Waiver in the Juvenile Court: Questions of
Philosophy and Function, in READINGS IN PUBLIC Poucy, supra note 502, at 207.
510. Act of Apr. 15, 1980, ch. 580, § 7, 1980 Minn. Laws 962, 967-69 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1982)); see also Feld, supra note 35, at 192-97 (describing
1980 changes in the Minnesota juvenile code).
511. MINN.STAT. § 260.125(3) (1982). The legislative addition of offense criteria was responsive to the issues raised by the Minnesota Supreme Court in In
re Welfare of Dah4 278 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn. 1979), see supra note 502, and
other decisions. For example, the court in In re Welfare of J.B.M., 263 N.W.2d
74 (Minn. 1978), indicated that a waiver decision is based on more than just the
seriousness of the offense: "Although the nature of the offense is certainly a
factor to be considered in this determination and may serve as a basis for statutory reference .... this court has not held that reference is mandatory when
a serious crime is involved." Id at 76.
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cision making, in which the primary determinants of an offender's sentence are the severity of the present offense and
512
the length of the prior record.
The legislative goal of greater waiver uniformity has not
been achieved through the use of offense criteria, however, because youths may introduce evidence of amenability to treatment and lack of dangerousness to rebut the prima facie
case5 1 3 and thus may have the case decided under the general
waiver provisions. 5 14 A recent evaluation of the Minnesota
waiver process found that less than one-half of the youths for
whom prosecutors sought waiver met the prima facie offense
criteria and only about one-third of the youths actually referred
for adult prosecution met them.5 15 Furthermore, the adoption
of prima facie offense criteria for waiver seems to have had little impact on the numbers or kinds of youths criminally prosecuted in Minnesota. 16 Thus, notwithstanding the 1980
legislative amendments specifying offense criteria to structure
judicial discretion, certification for adult prosecution remains a
highly idiosyncratic procedure.
Rule 32 was promulgated against this background of persistent judicial discretion despite the legislature's predilection for
512. The "purpose and principles" section of the Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines reflects the "modified just deserts" sentencing philosophy of the
Sentencing Guidelines Commission: 'The purpose of the sentencing guidelines
is to establish rational and consistent sentencing standards which reduce sentencing disparity and ensure that sanctions following conviction of a felony are
proportional to the severity of the offense of conviction and the extent of the
offender's criminal history." MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note
448, at 1.2. Two articles from a recent symposium on determinate sentencing
explore the impact of the "just deserts" philosophy on the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. See Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on
Sentencing Practices,5 HAMLiNE L. REv. 237 (1982); Von Hirsch, Constructing
Guidelinesfor Sentencing: The Critical Choices for the Minnesota Sentencing
Commission, 5 HAmLINE L. REv. 164 (1982).
513. See MINN. R.P. Juv. CT. 32.04(2).
514. See Feld, supra note 35, at 213-14, 239-40.
515. Osbun & Rode, Prosecuting Juveniles As Adults: The Questfor "Objective" Decisions, 22 CRnmNoLoGY 187, 194-95 (1984). As the authors note, however, "Following enactment of the revised statute, there was a slight increase in
the proportion of transferred cases which did satisfy the [offense] criteriafrom 22.2% before enactment to 34.5% after enactment." Id. at 195.
516. Id. at 197-98. The ineffectiveness of the "objective guidelines" promulgated by the legislature is in part attributable to their failure to single out those
"serious" offenders who often are better identified on a discretionary basis. As
a result, as Osbun and Rode conclude, "Despite its defects and potential for
abuse, the traditional discretionary process used by prosecutors and juvenile
court judges to make waiver decisions appears to be more successful than the
objective criteria alone in identifying the more serious juvenile offenders." Id.
at 199-200.
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'Just deserts" sentencing and its adoption of offense criteria to
structure the waiver decision. Rule 32.05 elaborates a nonexclusive list of the "totality of the circumstances" that a juvenile court may consider in determining a youth's
dangerousness or amenability to treatment:
(a) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community protection.
(b) the circumstances surrounding the offense,
(c) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner,
(d) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the
greater weight being given to an offense against persons, especially if
personal injury resulted,
(e) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act,
(f) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available
to the juvenile treatment system,
(g) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of the child's home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living,
(h) the record and previous history of the child,
(i) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the
life or safety of another,
(j) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning by the child, and
(k) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches
5 17
age nineteen (19) to provide appropriate treatment and control

These factors are already part of the controlling case law5 18 and
statutory grounds519 for waiver, and their inclusion in the rules

without any attempt to rank, order, or weight them is, at best,
simply redundant. Indeed, this catalogue of factors allows juvenile court judges to retain their wide and virtually unreviewable discretion in evaluating the significance of the various
517. MiNN. R.P. Juv. CT. 32.05 (2).
518. These criteria largely are drawn from the eight factors announced by
the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67
.app. (1965), quoted supranote 501, and the six considerations listed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Hogan, 297 Minn. 430, 438, 212 N.W.2d 664, 670
(1973), quoted supra note 507. Subsequent Minnesota cases generally have
echoed these factors See, e.g., In re Welfare of S.R.J., 293 N.W.2d 32, 35 (Minn.
1980) (citing Hogan factors); In re Welfare of K.P.H., 289 N.W.2d 772, 725 (Minn.
1980) (same); In re Welfare of WJ.R., 264 N.W.2d 391, 393 (Minn. 1978) (extensive prior offenses relevant to public safety determination); In re Welfare of
JLB.M., 263 N.W.2d 74, 75 (Minn. 1978) (considering extensive record of assaultive and violent behavior); State v. Duncan, 312 Minn. 17, 22-25, 250 N.W.2d 189,
194-96 (1977) (reference based on aggravated robbery); In re Welfare of LQ.S.,
309 Minn. 78, 91-92, 244 N.W.2d 30, 40 (1976) (juvenile's rejection of treatment
justifies reference); cf. In re Welfare of Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 321 (Minn. 1979)
(Hoganfactors, although relevant, are not conclusive); In re Welfare of J.E.C,
302 Minn. 387, 394-98, 225 N.W.2d 245, 251-52 (1975) (unavailability of adequate
treatment does not per se justify reference).
519. See MfNN. STAT. § 260.125 (3) (1) (1982) (factors determining suitability
for reference include age, seriousness of offense, manner of offense, and history
of repeated offenses).
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criteria and making the ultimate dispositional decision. As a
study of such catalogues has noted, "Collectively, 'lists' of this
length rarely serve to limit discretion or regularize procedure.
By giving emphasis to one or two of the guidelines, a judge can
usually justify a decision either way."5 20
Commentators concerned about excessive judicial discretion have emphasized that "waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
requires a central guiding principle." 2 1 The catalogue of miscellaneous factors promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme
Court provides neither a "central guiding principle" nor much
practical guidance to juvenile court judges struggling with this
difficult sentencing decision. Instead, Rule 32's emphasis on
vague, discretionary, and ultimately unquantifiable factors simply compounds all the preexisting problems of the process and
submits the most important dispositional decision in the juvenile court to the subjective reaction of each individual juvenile
court judge. Rather than maximizing discretion, the Minnesota
Supreme Court would have been much better advised to reinforce the legislature's own "just deserts" philosophical sentencing preferences through greater emphasis on offense criteria.
By failing to do so, the court endorses a sentencing philosophy
that has been legislatively repudiated for adult offenders and
subjects juvenile offenders to a much less "just" dispositional
process.5 22
IX.

CONCLUSION

The decades since Gault have witnessed a substantial procedural convergence between juvenile courts and adult criminal courts. The recent Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court
promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court reflect the ex520.

TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, TASK FORCE ON SENTENCING POUCY To-

WARDS YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 56 (1978).

521.

Id. at 57; see also Whitebread & Batey, The Role of Waiver in the Juve-

nile Court; in READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 502, at 207, 211 (waiver

decisions historically have been made in atmosphere of informal procedure and
unfettered discretion); Zimring, Notes Toward a Jurisprudence of Waiver, in
READINGS IN PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 502, at 193, 194-95 (discretion in waiver

decision inevitable absent legislative and judicial agreement on substantive
standards).
522. See, e.g., SUPREME COURT JUVENILE JUSTICE STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT
TO THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT 71-73 (1976) (documenting enormous urban/rural disparities in the seriousness of the present offenses and prior
records of youths waived in different counties in the state); see also D.
HAMPARIAN, supra note 502, at 205 (reporting that county-by-county variations
in waiver decisions throughout the country cannot be accounted for by any objective or offense criteria).

1984]

JUVENILE JUSTICE

tent to which many of the procedural attributes of criminal
courts are now routine aspects of the administration of juvenile
justice as well. The greater procedural formality and adversary
nature of the juvenile court also reflect the attenuation between the court's therapeutic mission and its social control
functions, which has increased as the relative emphases on rehabilitating offenders and protecting the public have shifted523
The many instances in which the Minnesota Supreme Court
chose to treat juvenile offenders procedurally like adult criminal defendants is one aspect of this process.
Despite the criminalization of the juvenile court, it remains
nearly as true today as two decades ago that "the child receives
the worst of both worlds: that [the child] gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." 5 24 This Article has
identified a number of instances in which the procedural safeguards afforded to juvenile offenders are not comparable either
formally or functionally to those provided to adult criminal defendants. Juveniles are found to waive their Miranda rights
and their right to counsel under a standard that, in practice, is
unlikely to discern whether they adequately understand the
rights they relinquish. The high rate of waiver of counsel, in
particular, is an indictment of the entire juvenile adjudicative
apparatus because the effective assistance of counsel is the
necessary prerequisite to the invocation of every other procedural safeguard. Similarly, preventive detention, deplorable in
its own right, further disadvantages a youth at adjudication and
disposition. The inadequate screening and charging practices
in juvenile court result in more youths being drawn more
deeply into the process. The absence of counsel to challenge
deficient petitions leads many youths to admit allegations that
could not be proved. Combining the suppression hearing with
the trial on the merits is also a highly prejudicial practice that
increases the likelihood of erroneous determinations of guilt.
The denial of jury trials and public trials raises troubling questions about the factual accuracy of delinquency adjudications.
At the same time, analysis of sentencing practices and condi523. See, e.g., PRESEDENT'S COIuISSION ON LAw ENFORCEMENr AND ADMNiSTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY 81 (1967) (ob-

serving that protection of the community is the guiding consideration for a
court dealing with threatening conduct); JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH

CRImEs, supra note 30, at 2 (proposing that adjudication and disposition of juvenile offenders should be recognized as expressing society's claim to self-protection rather than being solely rehabilitative).

524. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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tions of institutional confinement indicates that whatever the
rehabilitative justifications for these procedural deficiencies
may have been, such justifications are increasingly untenable
in a juvenile court that is explicitly punitive and offense-oriented rather than rehabilitative and offender-oriented. Although this Article has analyzed these procedural deficiencies
separately, their prejudicial consequences are cumulative-the
whole is far worse than the sum of its parts.
In promulgating its Rules of Procedure, the Minnesota
Supreme Court provided neither special procedural safeguards
to protect juveniles from the consequences of their own immaturity nor the full panoply of adult criminal procedural safeguards to protect them from punitive state intervention.
Instead, the court increased the likelihood that juveniles will
continue to "receive the worst of both worlds" by treating juvenile offenders just like adult criminal defendants when formal
equality redounds to their disadvantage and yet providing less
effective juvenile court procedures when those procedural deficiencies redound to the advantage of the state. At a number of
critical junctures, the court had the option of promulgating per
se rules and providing real substantive guidance but chose instead to encourage unstructured and discretionary decision
making. The most fundamental shortcoming of the court's entire endeavor was its subordination of the rule of law to the discretion of each juvenile court judge. 52 5
The court's policy choices also reflect a basic philosophical
ambivalence about the continued role of the juvenile court. As
juvenile courts become increasingly criminalized and converge
with their adult counterparts, there may be little reason to
maintain a separate juvenile criminal court whose sole distinguishing characteristic is its persisting procedural deficiencies. 526 This is a philosophical issue that cannot be answered
by reference to simplistic treatment versus punishment formulations, since there are no practical or operational differences
between the two-"sometimes punishment is treatment." 527
525. In this respect, the value and policy choices embodied in the Court's
Rules of Procedure are those of Packer's Crime Control Model rather than
those of the Due Process Model. See supra note 88.
526. For articles discussing whether there still is any reason for maintaining
a separate juvenile court system, see, e.g., Feld, supra note 35; McCarthy,
Should Juvenile Delinquency Be Abolished?, 23 CRIME & DELINQ. 196 (1977); Mc-

Carthy, supra note 87; Wizner & Keller, The PenalModel of Juvenile Justice: Is
Juvenile Court Delinquency Jurisdiction Obsolete?, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1120
(1977).
527. See supra note 433 and accompanying text.
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If the fundamentally criminal character of juvenile court
proceedings is conceded, perhaps the strongest argument that
can be advanced for its preservation is that the sentences a juvenile delinquent receives are typically shorter than those received by adult felony offenders for comparable crimes. It is
highly desirable that young offenders have an opportunity to
survive adolescence with their life chances intact, and this policy goal is threatened by the draconian sentences frequently inflicted on eighteen-year-old "adults." Several commentators
have urged that developmental differences render youths less
culpable or criminally responsible than their adult counterparts, and the common law mens rea infancy defense and "diminished responsibility" doctrines provide a conceptual
justification for a separate juvenile court. 528 Shorter sentences
for reduced culpability is a much more modest justification for
the juvenile court than those advanced by the Progressive child
savers and recognizes the punitive realities of juvenile court intervention. Recognizing that punitive reality, however, carries
with it a concomitant obligation to provide appropriate procedural safeguards, since "the condition of being a [child) does
5 29
not justify a kangaroo court."
If full procedural parity is afforded young offenders, then
the McKeiver Court's fear of sounding the death-knell of the juvenile court5 30 could well be realized. From both juveniles' and
society's point of view, however, abolishing the juvenile court's
jurisdiction over criminal and noncriminal misconduct may be
desirable. A therapeutic "alternative purpose" is an untenable
justification for this coercive institution. If shorter sentences
are the primary rationale for the current juvenile court, providing youths with fractional reductions of adult sentences could
just as easily meet that goal.5 31 Providing for the expunction of
528. See, e.g., Fox, Responsibility in the Juvenile Court, 11 WN. & MARY L.
REv. 659, 664-74 (1970); McCarthy, The Role of the Concept of Responsibility in
Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings,10 U. MicH.J.L REF. 181, 214-16 (1977); Walk-

over, supra note 416, at 533-47; Weissman, Toward an Integrated Theory of Delinquency Responsibility, 60 DEN. L.J. 485, 495-501 (1983). See generally F.
ZIMRING, CoNRoNrNG YoUTH CRnem 66-67 (1978) (immaturity is widely held to
limit responsibility for one's behavior).
529. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
530. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971).
531. For example, a 14-year-old might receive 33/50% of the adult penalty, a
16-year-old 66/75%, and an 18-year-old the full penalty, which presently is the
case. For youths below the age of 14, the common law mens rea infancy
defense probably would acquire new vitality. See supra note 528 and accompanying text. This proposal for fractional reductions can be made only against
the backdrop of realistic, humane, and determinate adult sentencing practices.
Adult presumptive sentences in Minnesota are specified in terms of months
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criminal records following the successful completion of a sentence could afford equivalent relief from an isolated youthful
folly.532 Revitalizing the common law infancy mens rea defense
could emphasize a youth's lack of criminal responsibility at
least as much as does the current juvenile court.5 3 3 Trying
young people in criminal courts with full procedural safeguards
does not necessarily require sentencing them to adult jails and
prisons. The existing training schools and institutions assure
the availability of age-segregated dispositional facilities, and insisting explicitly on humane conditions of confinement could
do at least as much to improve the lives of incarcerated youths
34
as has the "rehabilitative ideal."5
Although it is possible to provide alternative safeguards for
children, the case for abolishing the juvenile court rests on the
experience of two decades of procedural reform and "constitutional domestication." The juvenile court has demonstrated a
remarkable ability to deflect, co-opt, and absorb ameliorative
reform virtually without institutional change. Abolishing the
juvenile court would shift an enormous volume of cases into an
already overworked and inadequate adult criminal process.
Overloading the criminal justice system would force it to rationally allocate scarce social control resources. This should focus those scarce resources on the small proportion of serious
and chronic young offenders and decriminalize the "kid stuff"
that is the current grist of the juvenile court mill. This, in turn,
would provide a real moratorium for youthful deviance and allow most young people to survive adolescence with their life
chances intact.

rather than years, and "truth in sentencing" prevails. MINNESOTA SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, supra note 448, at IV (sentencing grid); see Knapp, supra note 512,
at 239, 243; Von Hirsch, supra note 512, at 188-89, 191-92. Not only are Minnesota
sentences realistic and determinable in advance, but Minnesota has one of the
lowest rates of incarceration of any state in the nation. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 1983, at 2 (1984).
532. See Feld, supra note 35, at 233-35.
533. See supra note 528 and accompanying text.
534. Cf. supra notes 456-72 and accompanying text (current inadequate conditions of juvenile confinement); see also B. FELD, supra note 457, at 197-205
(concluding that a primary goal of correctional programs must be the minimization of brutalization and victimization of inmates).

